



National
Foreign
Assessment
Center

Secret
NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-
ORCON

Read File
File 7013-3

استاد لاله چا سوسی

The Kurdish Problem
in Perspective

A Research Paper

کردستان (۲)

شماره (۳۲)

Secret

PA 79-10330D
August 1979

Copy 280

داسجوان مسلمان بیرو خط امام



**In the name of Allah
the most
Compassionate and Merciful**

IN THE NAME OF GOD ,
THE MERCIFUL AND THE
COPASSIONATE

TELEGRAM BONN 85481 WAS THE LAST COPY OF
ITS ORIGINAL TEXT AND, THUS, VERY DULL IN
COLOR, THEREFORE ITS PRINTING AND PHOTO-
GRAPHING IN BOOKS WAS NOT FAVORABLY PO-
SSIBLE. FOR THIS REASON, THE ABOVE-MENTI-
ONED DOCUMENT WERE RE-TYPED.

9 AUG

SECRET
TO: DIRECTOR
FROM: WNI
SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED] STAFFER RODMAN
STAFF POOL AND
NOW ARMED WITH
AND RE-ENTRY PERMIT WHICH WILL PERMIT HIM TO LEAVE
FOR MISSIONS ON BEHALF OF STATION. THE
MISSIONS ON BEHALF OF OTHER T/1 FAMILY MEMBERS
SHOULD ALSO BE
SOME OF HIS ANXIETIES OVER THEIR SITUATION
AND ALLOW HIM
STATE NOW ON OUR PLAN OF OPERATIONS.

2. [REDACTED] DISCUSSED THE AREAS OF COVER, DOCUMENTATION
AND TRAVEL IN THE T/1 ON 2 AUGUST. ALSO SURFACED WAS WHAT
T/1 MAY EXPECT AS COMPENSATION FOR HIS WORK ON OUR BEHALF

3. [REDACTED] AND T/1 IS IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THIS
APPROACH. THAT AN EXPLORATORY TRIP TO EUROPE OF TWO TO
THREE WEEKS IN THE SOON AS HE CAN BE DOCUMENTED. FOR THE
PURPOSE OF RECONNOITERING FORMER KURDISH ACQUAINTANCES AS HE CAN
LOCATE AND GET IN TOUCH WITH THEM. A LINE ON THE WHEREABOUTS OF OTHER
THE WOULD ALSO BE INTELLEIGENCE ON THE ACTIVITIES AND PLANS
THE VARIOUS STATIONS AS HE IS ABLE TO GATHER. T/1 SHOULD
BE PROVIDED WITH A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR CONTACT WITH THE LOCAL
STATIONS. T/1 WOULD BE MENTIONED IN TR/ST 24327 AND FR/ST
OTHER THAN THE LOCATED IN LONDON THE BROTHER OF KDP LEADER
24235. T/1 WOULD BE LOCATED IN LONDON THE BROTHER OF KDP LEADER
ISRAELI ARAB. NOW ATTEMPTING TO PIN DOWN, THROUGH HIS
DAUGHTER, THE LOCATION OF ALI QAZI. IF HE IS IN GERMANY, AS
IS BELIEVED, HE IS A KEY SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON OTHER KURIDS
PERSONALITIES. T/1'S OLD ADDRESS BOOKS AND FILES
REMAIN IN HIS APARTMENT AND SHE WOULD BE HARD PUT
TO LOCATE THEM. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT IF HIS DAUGHTER COULD BE
SUMMONED TO THE EMBASSY CONSULAR SECTION ON SOME PRETEXT,

AGE 2 MR/SAN IN
HE COULD PASS
OFFER TO HQS RI
LOCAL PHONE DIS
USED THIS AT
PROPE ON BEHA
DIRECTED TO ST
ESTABLISH

4. T/1 RE
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GOVERNMENT IN
ESTABLISH A DI
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ZARGAN AND G
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AT IF KURDIS
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(1) PA
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(2) KUR
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BE EXPERIENCE

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AL ZBAN HAS S
E. RE DO

SECRET

TO A STATION OFFICER FOR FORWARDING HERE.
ILITY. OTHERWISE, T/1 WILL HAVE TO USE
OR FREQUENT THE USUAL KURDISH HAUNTS.
SOME SUCCESS DURING HIS 1973 TRIP TO
S INTELIGENCE BUREAU. T/1 HAS BEEN
THE PHONE AND TRY IN ADVANCE OF TRAVEL
HIS TARGETS.

IS COVER STORY FOR TRAVEL TO EUROPE SHOU
KEELED OFF ACCORDING TO CIRCUMSTANCES.
OULD BE A STORY OF TRAVEL TO SEE HIS
TEE SECOND LAYER WOULD INVOLVE THE STORY
WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BAZARGAN
THEY HAVE ENLISTED HIM IN AN EFFORT TO
KURDISH LEADERS ABROAD. THE MISSION IS
CONDITIONS FOR PEACE WITH THE CENTRAL
DELICATE BECAUSE BAZARGAN IS READY FOR
ISSUE WITH KHOMEINI AND HARD LINERS FOR
STORY IS THAT AFTER GIVING SECOND, T/1
POSES SOME PRIVATE ENTERPRISE BETWEEN
PAGE FROM T/1'S ROLE AS EMISSARY, I.E.
ARS EXTRACT MATERIAL SUPPORT FROM
SUGGESTED TO GO ALTERNATE STORY THAT HE
OT SOME PROMISES OF HELP FROM PEOPLE ARO
PUT TOGETHER TO SUPPORT COMBACK. AT
DOES NOT THINK HIGHLY OF LATTEH VERSION

APPEARS UNLIKELY UNDER ANY CIR+

KURD CHIEFS CONSIDER THEMSELVES TO HAVE
T AND ARE UNLIKELY TO WANT TO REPEAT

OUT SNAH HAS MONEY AND CONCEIVABLY COUL
IT TO HARASS THOSE WHO KICKED HIM OUT
FORCE BUILDING IN IRAQ UNDER GENERAL
CURRENCY).
FOR TRAVEL TO EUROPE. T/1 BELIEVES BEST

PAGE 3. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 251 E S E C R E T
POSSIBLE (AND SUPPORTIVE OF HAZARGAN) (COVER STORY) IN
IRANIAN PASSPORT IN THE NAME. SINCE PEOPLE WILL CONTACT AND HE
IN TRUE NAME AND HE WANTS THEM TO KNOW HE IS THERE. THIS IS HIS
OPINION BEST APPROACH. NOT T/1 WAS EXPIRED REGULAR IRANIAN PASSPORT
IN TRUE NAME WHICH MIGHT ONLY NEED SOME UPDATING IF NEW TEMPLATE NOT
AVAILABLE. IT OCCURS TO CO THAT T/1 COULD EVEN TRAVEL ON HIS OWN
NAME U.S. RE-ENTRY PERMIT WHICH HAS APPEARANCE OF PASSPORT AND HAS
SPACE FOR VISA ENTRIES. IF T/1 DOES NOT NEED TO SHOW HIS PASSPORT
TO HIS CONTACTS, HE WOULD NOT NEED TO EXPLAIN WHY HE IS NOT ABLE TO
OBTAIN AN IRANIAN PASSPORT FROM THE CURRENT IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WHICH
HAS ALLEGEDLY ENTRUSTED HIM WITH HIS SENSITIVE COVER MISSION).

6. T/1 TOLD CO THAT HE WANTS AND EXPECTS NO SALARY OVER AND
ABOVE TRAVEL AND OPS EXPENSES. HE DOES WANT AT SOME FUTURE T/1
(AND THE SOONER THE BETTER) TO BE ABLE TO CONVERT RIAL FUNDS HELD
BY HIS FAMILY IN IRAN TO U.S. ACCOUNT IN DOLLARS. T/1 MENTIONED
HIS DESIRE TO TRANSFER ABOUT \$17,000 NOW, UP TO \$50,000
LATER. CO TOLD T/1 THAT WE ARE CURRENTLY CLUTTED WITH RIALS AND
HE WOULD KEEP WITH HIS SURVIVOR TRIP AND SHOW US SOME RESULTS BEFORE
MAKING THIS A FORMAL REQUEST. (HAD STAFFPOOL NOT WORDED SOME
FINANCIAL MERCHISES IN INSTANT T/1'S BEHALF, CO BELIEVES T/1 WOULD
HAVE BEEN EVEN MORE FORWARD IN HIS CONVERSION REQUEST. CO BELIEVES
THAT T/1'S PROPOSAL THAT HIS DAUGHTER BRING HIS PERSONAL PAPERS TO
THE TEHRAN CONSULATE MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN IN PART CALCULATED TO
ESTABLISH A RIAL/DOLLAR CONVERSION CHANNEL.)

7. REQUEST HQS COMMENT ON THE ABOVE. NEXT MEETING WITH T/1
WILL BE O/A 12 AUGUST.

8. FILE: 251-5 8995 RVW 04AUG99 DRV DRG.1 BY 030151.
ALL SECRET.

CO'S COMMENT: RELATED TO T/1 PER DIR 491412.
S E C R E T

#002

9 AUG 79

TELETYPE 090018Z AUG 79 STAFF
SITE DIRECTOR FOR 491418.
TO: PRIOR CITY FR/SAN FRANCISCO INFO TEHRAN.
INTEL AKAJA FORBES CUGORE SDTHROB EGSWIRL
REF: FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25113 (RELAYING TEHRAN)

1. CASE PROGRESSING NICELY AND BELIEVE WE ARE ON TRACK FOR
SDTHROB/ (T/1) EXPLORATORY TRIP TO EUROPE PER PARA 3 PROPOSAL.
2. A. CONCUR DESIRABILITY T/1 TRAVEL IN T/W. RE-EDUCATE
TION, DIRECTOR CAN PROVIDE IRANIAN EMBASSY WASHINGTON, D.C. RE-
VALIDATION CACHET DATED 25 MARCH 79 FOR T/1'S TOURIST PASSPORT.
REVALIDATION STAMP IS NORMALLY VALID FOR ONE YEAR. NOTE HOWEVER
THAT DURING MARCH 79 WASHINGTON EMBASSY WAS STILL USING IRANIAN
STAMP WHICH DOES NOT CONTAIN ISLAMIC OR REVOLUTIONARY REFERENCES
SUGGEST YOU MENTION THIS TO T/1 THOUGH WE DO NOT FORSEE ANY PRO-
BLEMS WITH USE OF THIS CACHET OUTSIDE IRAN THAT T/1 COULD NOT FINESSE
IF T/1 IS UNABLE TO USE OF THIS ENTRY REQUEST YOU POUCH HIM PASS-
PORT TO HQS REQUEST.
B. U.S. REENTRY PERMIT IS VALID FOR ONE YEAR AND DOES
LIMIT T/1'S ENTERING OR LEAVING U.S. HOWEVER, BELIEVE IT
OPERATIONALLY DESIRABLE FOR T/1 TO RELY ON IRANIAN PASSPORT TO
EUROPE/MIDDLE EAST TRAVEL IN ORDER TO LIVE HIS COVER TO THE FU-
PLS STRASS TO T/1 THAT U.S. REENTRY PERMIT IS TO BE TREATED AS
RESERVED TO BE USED ONLY FOR EMERGENCIES AND/OR REENTERING THE
C. PARA 3 RAISED ISSUE OF T/1'S ADDRESS BOOKS/FILES BE-
TO LOCATE HIS KURDISH CONTACTS. AGREE IT DESIRABLE TO OBTAIN
THOSE IN ORDER TO SAVE TIME AND ENSURE T/1'S CONTACT INFO/ITIN-
IS THOUGH. HOWEVER FEEL RISK OF T/1'S DAUGHTER ATTEMPTING
TEHRAN EMBASSY COMPOUND WITH DOCUMENTS OUTWEIGHS CONVENIENCE
FACTOR. SINCE EMBASSY CONTINUOUS TO BE GUARDED BY MUJAHIDIN GU-
FORCE. ANYONE ENTERING COMPOUND SUBJECT TO CLOSE SCRUTINY/RE-
SEARCH SUBJECT TO TEHRAN STATION CONCURRENCE. WE PROPOSE A
BETWEEN A MEMBER OF THE STATION AND T/1'S DAUGHTER AWAY FROM

PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 491419 S 2 C R E T U L D B E C O L L E C T E D A N D O U C H E
EMBASSY AT WHICH TIME MATERIALS COULD BE COLLECTED AND OUCHED
FOR PLANNING PURPOSES SUGGEST OF SK T/1 TO CONSIDER APPROPRIATE
VENUE FOR EXCHANGE AND HOW/WHEN EACH COULD CONTACT AUGUSTER WITH
INSTRUCTIONS.

4. PER PARA 4, CONCUR THAT AN AMERICAN COMEBACK COVER IS W
TO BE AVOIDED. OTHER "LAYERS" OF STORY ARE DEVISED BY T/ ARE
PRACTICABLE. DEFER TO BASE EXTENT TO WHICH T/1 SHOULD BE ASKED
EMBELLISH STORY/STORIES AND ASSESSMENT AS TO EXTENT HIS CAPTIVITY
FINESSE IF CORNERED. (WOULD IMAGINE AS OF WHO THAT HE CAN TA
CARE OF HIMSELF BUT REQUEST YOU EMPHASIZE T/1 NEED FOR IRON
PLAUSIBLE COVER STORY WHICH WILL BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT FOR
SUBSEQUENT TRIPS TO IRAQ, ETC.)

5. APPRECIATE BASE'S NON-COMMITTAL STAND ON RIA. EICHAN
REQUEST YOU MAINTAIN IT FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AND A LAST
T/1 HAS MADE A TRIP IN OUR BEHALF. T/1 (AND HIS FAMILY) HAVE
BENEFITED GREATLY AS REGARDS NATURALIZATION ISSUES AND THIS SHOULD
CARRY WEIGHT (FOR NOW AT LEAST) WITH T/1 VISA-S COMMISSION
WITH CURRENT RUMORS REGARDING POSSIBLE CURRENCY CHANGE AND POSS
DEMONSTRATION IN IRAN. BELIEVE IT URGENT TO WAIT FOR AT LEAST
A COUPLE OF MONTHS BEFORE CONSIDERING ANY COMMUNICATION EXCHANGE
ESPECIALLY OF THE SCALE T/1 IS SEEKING

6. PREVIOUS PLANNING IN THIS CASE IN LODES SCHEDULING T/
FOR SCSWIRL. PLS FACTOR THIS INTO PRESENT TIMETABLE AND ADVISE
DATE AND ALTERNATE T/1 AVAILABLE FOR TEST.

7. FOR TEHRAN: A. BYI SUTER B. (IT IS FR/SAN FRANC
ASSET WHO FORMER SQUADUS COLONEL AND CHIEF OF KURDISH
OPERATIONS SECTION. (IT WAS SDTHERMAN WHO ORDERED INTRODUCTION
SDTHERMAN TO BASE.) T/1 RESIDES IN CALIFORNIA HE HAS RECENTLY
ATTAINED FRA STATUS) AND IS NOW IN POSITION TO FULFILL HIS OFFER
OF FEB 79 TO TRAVEL ON REACTION'S BEHALF TO RECONTACT KURDISH
FRIENDS/AQUAINTANCES AND REPORT ON KURDISH ACTIVITIES
GENERAL. T/1 IS KURD HIMSELF AND HAS LONG STANDING CONTACTS
WITH BARZANI SONS. FR/SAN FRANCISCO HAS DETAINED T/1
EXTENSIVELY ON HIS KURDISH CONTACTS AND ALSO DISCUSSED HIS OFFER
TO RETURN TO IRAN TO SEEK KURDISH LEADERSHIP JOINTLY WITH PGOC. T/1
ATTEMPTED TO SOUND OUT THE RECEPTIVITY IN TEHRAN TO SUCH AN APPR

IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY CONCRETE OFFERS (PLUS INDICATIONS IT WOULD BE INADVISABLE FOR HIM TO RETURN TO IPAN) AN INDEPENDENT TRAVELLER PLAN WAS ADOPTED.

B. PLAN CENTERS ON T/1 TRAVELING IN EUROPE AND THE M
EAST, EXCLUDING IRAN, ON HIS EXPEDITION IN TOUR OF PASSPO
(RECENTLY UPDATED BY DUTCH) IN SEARCH OF T/1 OLD RUSSIAN NETWO
THIS PLANNING REACHED AN IMPASSE BECAUSE OF T/1'S INABILITY TO
TRAVEL UNTIL RECENT ADJUSTMENT OF HIS STATUS. T/1'S INABILITY TO
LEAVE/ENTER U.S. ON REENTRY PERMIT. WITH A T/1'S INABILITY TO
HE NOW ANXIOUS TO ACCELERATE EAST AND EXPEDITIONARY OVERCOM
TRIP AS SOON AS IS PRACTICABLE. T/1'S EXPLORATORY

<p>C. PER PARA 3 REF AND PARA 3 ABOVE HQS T/1'S MATERIALS COULD BEST BE OBTAINED FOURFIVE TO FR/SAN FRANCISCO. ASSUME STATION DAUGHTER ENTERING COMPOUND BYSSIVE. SUGGS BE FOR JIG/IAN PC CALL T/1'S DAUGHTER AND MEETING FOR EXCHANGE. FR/SAN FRANCISCO WILL CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS FOR STATION AND TO ATTE A CALL FROM AN AMERICAN FRIEND.</p>	<p>SOLICIT COMMENTS STATUS FOR ION/AN CONCUR RISE OF I ONE S LUTION MIG ANGE I NCHIONS ST T/1 TO PROVIDE HIS DAUGHTER TO E</p>
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D. WELCOME STATION COMMENTS/ADVICE ON THIS CASE #10
FEEL HAS CONSIDERABLE OPERATIONAL POTENTIAL GIVEN TAL. UNIQUE
ACCESS TO KURDISH LEADERSHIP.

SECRET 8. FILE: 201-328995. RW 08AUG99 DEC.1 A.L. SECRET

BT
#9993

11
17 AUG 79

SECRET 161930Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25174 (MADENSKY ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA FORRE SDTHROB SGSWIRL

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 476512
B. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25118
C. DIRECTOR 491418
D. TEHRAN 53880

1. SDTHROB/1 (T/1) ADVISED CO 15 AUG 79 THAT IN VISIT SAME DAY TO IRANIAN CONSULATE HERE, VICE CONGSSUL GRAFFARI TOLD NIME HE HAD RECEIVED AUTHORIZATION FROM TEHRAN TO ISSUE NEW, REGULAR IRANIAN PASSPORT TO T/1. PASSPORT WILL BE READY FOR PICKUP 21 AUGUST. GRAFFARI DID NOT ELABORATE ON APPROVAL MESSAGE FROM MFA AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS EVENT IN TERMS OF T/1 STATUS WITH PGOI NOT YET CLEAR. IN ANY CASE, THIS DEVELOPMENT OBVIATES NEED TO DOCTOR T/1'S OLD, EXPIRED PASSPORT FOR USE IN FOREIGN TRAVEL PER REFS.

2. MEANS OF GETTING T/1'S NOTES FROM DAUGHTER TO TEHRAN STATION OFFICER DISCUSSED WITH T/1. PROPOSE FOLLOWING, WHICH LETS STATION RETAIN CONTROL OF TIME AND PLACE OF MEETING: T/1 WILL CALL HIS DAUGHTER AND ENSURE THAT SHE HAS IDENTIFIED PAPERS OF INTEREST AND HAS THEM IN HAND. IN SECOND, SEPARATE CALL, T/1 WILL INSTRUCT HER TO LOOK FOR CALL FROM EMBASSY OFFICIAL RE A MEETING ON THE VISA PROBLEM. AT SAME TIME, T/1 WILL TELL HER TO TAKE TO THAT MEETING AND SURRENDER THE "PAPERS HE MENTIONED THE PREVIOUS CALL." (BELIEVE THAT IF SECOND CONVERSATION MONITORED, REFERENCE TO PAPERS WILL BE SUFFICIENTLY AMBIGUOUS AS TO BE REASONABLY CONSTRICTED BY EAVES-DROPPER TO REFER TO CONSULAR FORMS.) DAUGHTER (IDEN) SPEAKS AND UNDERSTANDS ENGLISH AT FAIR LEVEL, CERTAINLY ADEQUATE FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF ACCEPTING CALL FROM STATION OFFICER AND UNDERSTANDING MEETING ARRANGEMENTS. DAUGHTER'S HUSBAND MIGHT BE CURIOUS IF PRESENT WHEN STATION OFFICER'S CALL COMES IN. CALL BEST MADE DURING WORKING HOURS WHEN HE WOULD PRESUMABLY BE IN OFFICE. TO SAVE TIME THAT WOULD BE INVOLVED IN TWO-WAY POUCHING, PROPOSE WE SCRATCH NOTE OF INSTRUCTION FROM T/1 TO DAUGHTER; HE WILL MAKE HIS WISHES CLEAR IN

6

FIG SEPARATELY INSECTIONS. AIR ALREADY INSTRUCTED T/1 TO NO. FIRST
CALL. AIR T/1 AND AIR T/1 NO. 1. INSTRUCTING SECOND.

3. APP-ANS TO PAGE 0041 T/1 FIRST, EXPLODATORY TRIP TO EUROPE. CAN BE ANTICIPATED TO TAKE PLACE NO LATER THAN MID-SEPTEMBER (CONSISTING TIME ANTICIPATED TO BE OF THE ORDER OF 1-2 WEEKS), AND OTHER PREPARATION. T/1 HAS ALREADY AGREED TO SCSSWILL. PROPOSE THAT SAME SPECIAL OPERATOR WHO WILL CONDUCT INTERVIEW OF VPTCOON/1 (SEE T/5E (100)) IN CASE OF UNUSUALLY DELAYED RETURN IN SAN FRANCISCO INTERVIEW T/1 AT SAME TIME. IN ANY CASE, T/1 IS AVAILABLE AT ANY TIME AS OF NOW.

4. WITH NO OTHER INFORMATION IMPLICIT REF D THAT T/1'S PRINCIPAL ACCUSATION IS TO BARZANI FACTION. TO CONTRARY, ALTHOUGH T/1 HAS SEVERAL FRIENDS WITHIN THE BARZANI FACTION, HE FEELS THAT BARZANI IS PROBABLY RECIPROCATING. T/1 HAS UNSUCCESSFUL IN PERSUADING SDJANUS LEADERSHIP AND SEAH TO SUPPORT THE FACTION OF JALAL TALEBANI, VICE BARZANIS, AND THIS IS HIS PRINCIPAL REASON HE EVENTUALLY LEFT SDJANUS. T/1'S STRONGEST ATTACHMENT AND ACCESS IS WITH THE FACTION OF JALAL TALEBANI-IBRAHIM ARMED. LATTER HAS BEEN DETERMINED TO BE IN LONDON AND T/1 IS PRESENTLY TRYING TO OBTAIN HIS LONDON PHONE NUMBER (VIA HIS WIFE) THROUGH ARMED'S BROTHER-IN-LAW IN TEHRAN, ARMED KALGELI.

5. FOR DIRECTOR: T/1, AS COPY OF "VISAS 40- TELEGRAM SENT TO INS POS FROM SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE NOTIFYING THEM OF APPROVED IMMIGRATION PETITION BY I/1 SON (CITIZEN) ON BEHALF OF HIS MOTHER (T/1'S WIFE), WHICH WAS TO HAVE BEEN RELATED TO T/1RAN CONSULATS. TO DATE, I/1 WIFE HAS NOT BEEN SUMMONED BY CONSULATE IN T/1RAN. IF THERE ANY WAY FCS COULD ASCERTAIN WHETHER TELEGRAM ACTUALLY SENT TO T/1RAN VIA STATE, WOULD APPRECIATE CCMFIRMATION.

6. FILE: 201-0328995. RVW 16AUG99 DRV D9C.1 BY 033151.
ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T
BT
#3715

17 AUG 79 12 14Z

SECRET 181217Z AUG 79 STAFF

CITE PR/SAN FRANCISCO 25175 (MADENSKY ACTING)

TC: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN.

MINTEI AJAJA FORRES SDTEROB COSWIRL

REF: PR/SAN FRANCISCO 25174

1. IDENTITY IS: MRS. JALEH PORKAR AGHDAM
K. MOSSADEGH, K. MANAZ #11 APT 3, TEHRAN
TELE: 293367

2. FILE: 241-2329995. RVW 18AUG99 DRV D9C.1 BY 033151.

ALL SECRET.

SECRET

BT

#9712

T 310130Z AUG 79 STAFF

/SAN FRANCISCO 25280

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

INTEL RAJAJA FORRES SDTHROB

RTS: A. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25174
B. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25215
C. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25233
D. DIRECTOR 499099
E. TEHRAN 54086

1. ON 29 AUGUST SDTHROB/T (T/1) RECEIVED NEW REGULAR IRANIAN PASSPORT FROM HAND OF NEWLY-ARRIVED IRANIAN CONSUL GENERAL IN SAN FRANCISCO, FNU KHORRAM. THIS OBVIATES NEED FOR ANY MOLOCH DOCTORING OF OLD, EXPIRED PASSPORT BEING HANDCARRIED HQS.

2. IN LENGTHY, CORDIAL CONVERSATION WITH KHORRAM, WHO IS ABOUT 32 AND SAID HE WAS RECENTLY BROUGHT INTO FOREIGN MINISTRY BY LAZDI, T/1 GAVE KHORRAM HIS BACKGROUND. T/1 THEN OUTLINED HIS PREVIOUS, UNAVAILING EFFORTS TO ELICIT POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM RESPONSIBLE LEVEL OF REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT RE HIS DESIRE TO RETURN TO IRAN AND SERVE WITH SOVIET SUCCESSOR ORGANIZATION OR OTHERWISE AS KURDISTAN EXPERT. T/1 ALSO WHEED IN FOR INTEREST THAT HE HAD HAD FLEETING ACQUAINTANCE IN THE PAST (IN SECONDARY SCHOOL IN KERMANSHEH AND ON ENCOUNTER ABOUT TEN YEARS LATER) WITH DR. MUSTAFA CHAMRAN, PRESENT IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE HEAD. KHORRAM EVINCED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN ALL THIS AND SAID HE WOULD SEND A MESSAGE TO TEHRAN. (T/1 STILL BELIEVES THAT HE HAS A SLIM CHANCE OF GETTING REHIRED BY THE NEW REGIME AND WILL NOT GIVE UP IF ANY OPPORTUNITY PRESENTS ITSELF.)

3. T/1 HAS MADE SECOND CALL TO DAUGHTER IN TEHRAN WHEEDING TO LOOK FOR CALL ON VISA MATTER FROM EMBASSY OFFICER. IN MEAN TIME, HOWEVER, T/1 NOW PLANS TO SEND HIS SON HAMID TO IRAN WITHIN 6 SEPTEMBER FOR TWO-THREE WEEKS WITH HIS POWER OF ATTORNEY TO NEGOTIATE SALE OF T/1'S TEHRAN HOUSE. T/1 WANTS TO USE SON TO ENTER INTO CONSTRUCTION COMPANY PARTNERSHIP HERE WITH A U.S. BUSINESSMAN. (JUST NOW HE INTENDS TO GET PROCEEDS OUT OF

2/SAN FRANCISCO 23282 S E C R E T
PERSON WILL OF COURSE BE IN CONTACT WITH HIS SISTER, JALIL,
SHOULD BRIEF HER DIRECTLY ON THE MATTER OF PASSING T/1'S PAPERS TO
EMBASSY OFFICER WHO WILL CALL, AND T/1'S LETTER OF INSTRUCTION
ON ITS SLOW WAY TO TEHRAN STATION WOULD BE REDUNDANT. BASE
RECOMMENDS THAT LETTER (NOW ON WAY TO HQS) BE TOUCHED ONWARD TO
STATION ANYWAY IN CASE HAMID'S TRIP PLANS CHANGE. ONCE WE KNOW
HAMID HAS ARRIVED IN TEHRAN AND HAS TALKED TO SISTER, HOWEVER,
STATION COULD PLACE CALL TO HER WITHOUT AWAITING ARRIVAL OF POUCHED
LETTER. WILL ADVISE.

4. T/1 RAISED FINANCIAL PROBLEM NEAR END OF MEETING AND ASKED
CASE OFFICER IF ORGANIZATION COULD LEND HIM \$5,000 NOW WITH UNDER-
STANDING THAT HE WOULD REPAY AS SOON AS HOUSE SALE PROCEEDS ARE
REPATRIATED. (SEE ABOVE) T/1 SAID HIS PENSION MONEY (\$5,000) DID
NOT COME THROUGH IN AUGUST AND HE HAS TAKEN SAVINGS ACCOUNT DOWN TO
DANGEROUSLY LOW LEVEL. CASE OFFICER REPLIED BY SAYING THAT HE WOULD
MENTION THIS TEMPORARY NEED TO HQS AND SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE. IT
APPEARS TO GO IN RETROSPECT THAT T/1 WAS SIDESTEPPING ISSUE OF
ACCOMMODATION TRANSFER IN HIS REQUEST BUT ACTUALLY EXPECTED TO
EVENTUALLY REPAY "LOAN" IN RIALS. ALTHOUGH BASE SHARES HQS VIEW
THAT WE SHOULD NOT LET T/1 GET VERY FAR AHEAD OF US, HE APPEARS
TO HAVE GENUINE CURRENT FINANCIAL PINCH, HAS HIGH POTENTIAL, AND
BELIEVE THAT SOME RESPONSE CALLED FOR WHICH AT SAME TIME WOULD NOT
BE INSULTING. PROPOSE FOR CONSIDERATION A \$2,000 PAYMENT WHICH COULD
BE PRESENTED AS A RECRUITMENT BONUS FOLLOWING SUCCESSFUL GSWIRL
IF T/1 INSISTS ON ULTIMATE REPAYMENT. BASE CAN CARRY AS OPS LOAN
ON BOOKS. PLS ADVISE.

5. RE IMMIGRATION PETITION (VISAS FORTY) CABLE ON WIFE OF T/1
NO WAY CALER COULD HAVE BEEN SENT TO TEHRAN PRIOR TO 1 AUGUST.
CONCLUDE IT NEVER LEFT WASHINGTON AND INQUIRY SHOULD START WITH
INS. WASHINGTON.

6. FILED 261-4328996. RVW:1AUG68 DRY D-01 BY 037551.

SECRET
S E C R E T
BT
#7219

1 0 0 R E F 1 1 7 0 3 2 0 0 1 7 0 1 1 0 1

TE AIRPCTO 5007330.

0: PRIORITY FR/SAN FRANCISCO TO TEHRAN.

NINTEL AJANTA 40435 10TH OF 303-101

REF: FR/SAN FRANCISCO 23232

1. PER PARA 8 PFF, APPROVAL IS GIVEN FOR \$2,000 PAYMENT AT RECRUITMENT/SSG WITH BONUS. HOWEVER, AS ADDED CONDITION, HE WOULD EXPECT FUNDS TO BE PAID WHEN HE COMES UP WITH FAIRLY CONCRETE MINERATY/INTS FOR EXPLORATORY EUROPEAN TRIP. BELIEVE THIS SHOULD BE FEASIBLE NOW GIVEN POSITIVE PASSPORT DEVELOPMENTS AND T/1'S GENERAL KNOWLEDGE OF PRESENT LOCATION AND ACTIVITIES OF HIS PRINCIPAL KENNEDY CONTACTS. HE CONTINUED TO BE ANTI-FOE FOR T/1'S RECONTACTING HIS ACQUAINTANCES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND WOULD BE FOLD PROBLEMS IN HIS CASE HAVE REPEATEDLY DELAYED TRIP. APPROVAL OF ABOVE PAYMENT WILL AND TRULY OBLIGES T/1 TO FINALIZE TRAVEL PLANS AND PRODUCE FOR US.

2. PLEASED TO NOTE THAT T/1 HAS NOT COMPLETELY ABANDONED HIS EFFORTS TO SEEK FUNDIS SPECIALIST POSITION WITH REGIMIN IN IRAN AND AWAIT DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS REGARD. AS STATED IN PREVIOUS TRAFFIC/INTINFRANT COLLATOR PLAN HAS GOOD POTENTIAL BUT IS ESSENTIALLY SECOND CHOICE IN ABSENCE OF T/1'S SECURING GOVERNMENT JOB. PLS ENCOURAGE HIM TO CONTINUE THINKING ALONG THESE LINES. FACT PASSPORT WAS APPROVED AS QUICKLY AS IT WAS MIGHT INDICATE T/1 REMAINS IN GOOD STANDING WITH REGIME AND IT NOT UNREASONABLE TO SUPPOSE THIS CREATES POSSIBILITY HE COULD RETURN TO IRAN IN GOVERNMENT POSITION.)

3. SSGMIRL APPROVAL BEING PROCESSED. WILL ADVISE.

4. PER PARA 8 PFF, WE ARE CHECKING INTO THIS WITH ALLEN AFFAIRS OFFICE. WILL ADVISE.

5. TULEL 21-0-9995. RVW 215EP29 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET

\$ E
R E F
#9415

12 SEP 79 03.41Z

SECRET 112542Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE NR/SAN FRANCISCO 25329

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

MINUTEL AJAJA FORREE SUTHERON SCSWIRL

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 396755
B. DIRECTOR 396856 (NOT SENT TEHRAN)

1. SUTHERON/1 WAS SCSWIRLED 7 SEP WITH NO INDICATIONS HE EVER HONKED ASHBY, TUDOR PARTY, OR DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KURDISTAN MEMBER. TESTING ALSO SUPPORTED HIS DENIAL OF COOPERATING SECRETLY WITH LEADERS OF KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN IRAQ WITHOUT IRANIAN GOVT'S KNOWLEDGE, AS WELL AS THAT HE HAS NO WORKED FOR SAVAK SINCE RESIDING IN U.S., AND THAT HE HAS NO CONTACTS WITH KURDISH DEMOCRATIC REPS WHILE IN U.S.

2. TESTING LIKEWISE INDICATED THAT OUTSIDE OF HIS FAMILY AND SUTHERON/1. HE HAS NOT DISCUSSED HIS SECRET REACTION RELATIONSHIP FOLLOWING HIS PARTY'S RECOLLECTION THAT MR. KROHMAN HAD ASKED T/1 TO WRITE ABOUT HIS ACTIVITIES FOR THE SHAN SO THAT THESE STATEMENTS COULD BE FORWARDED TO TEHRAN. THERE WERE NO INDICATIONS THAT T/1 WAS NOT TRUTHFUL AND COMPLETE IN HIS REPORTING OF HIS 20 AUG MEETING WITH MR. KROHMAN. TESTING INDICATED THAT T/1 HAD NO INFO ABOUT SUTHERON/1'S CIRCUMSTANCES IN TEHRAN WHICH HE HAD NOT ALREADY TELL US ABOUT.

3. FINAL TESTING ON THE ISSUE OF CONSCIOUSLY OBTAINING INFO FROM POLICE/U.S. EFFORTS AGAINST HONKING AS REPORTED IN NEW ORANGE INDICATED REJECTION AND THAT T/1 WAS STILL WITHHOLDING INFORMATION. T/1 DID RECALL AS A RESULT OF SCSWIRL THAT AT THE TIME HE WAS ASKED RATHER THAN NATIONAL POLICE SHOULD BE WORKING WITH U.S. REPS - IN ADMITTING T/1 CLAIMED HE WAS ORDERED BY THE SHAN NO ASSET TO SHARE TO ASSASSINATE SEN. SAINTMAN. FORMER SAVAK CHIEF, AND THIS WAS PRIORITY OVER THE JOINT OF. WHEN TESTING INDICATED SUTHERON REJECTION, T/1 BROUGHT UP A PROTOCOL PROBLEM WITH U.S. REPS. THEY DID NOT ARRIVE ON TIME FOR A SECOND MEETING WITH T/1 ABOUT THE JOINT OF SO HE RAISED THEM BY NOT MEETING THEM.

FRANCIS 203293 E C M 1 1
201-002-000. REV 1151700 DIV DOC. 1 ALL BY

SECRET 12 SEP 79 STAFF
OITE FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25531 (SECTION 1 OF 2)
TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

UNWENTEL AJAJA FORRES SDTEROB SGSWIRL

REVS: A. DIRECTOR 598580
B. DIRECTOR 596755
C. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25329

1. SDTEROB/T (T/1) WAS AFFORDED SCWIRL EXAMINATION 6 SEPTEMBER WITH RESULTS DESCRIBED REF C. WHEREAS CI FACTOR DEQUATELY RESOLVED, T/1'S WITHHOLDING OF THE QUESTION ON HIS 1980 LIAISON OPERATION SUGGESTS AT LEAST THAT FUTURE RECOMMENDATIONS. BASE IN LATER PARAGRAPH HAS S

2. SCWIRL TEST SURFACED SOME NEW INFORMATION. ONE ITEM ADMISSION THAT UPON RETURN FROM HIS 1975 TRIP ABROAD TO KURDISH LEADERS AT THE SHAN'S REQUEST, T/1 WAS ARRESTED AT AIRPORT ON ORDERS OF THEN SAVAK CHIEF GENERAL NASSIRY. T/1 SAID FOR SOME 24 HOURS UNTIL THE SHAN ORDERED HIS RELEASE. HE BELIEVED THAT MEMBERS OF THE SHAN FAMILY WHOM HE HAD KNOWN IN EUROPE MUST HAVE BEEN SAVAK INFORMANTS AND THAT UNWARE OF T/1'S HIGHER ORDERS, HAD LEARNED OF T/1'S RELEASE. T/1 ADDED THAT DESPITE THE SHAN'S ORDER OF INVESTIGATION AGAINST T/1, HE HADEN PARTY MEMBERSHIP (WHICH T/1 PASSED), T/1 SAID THIS WAS OLD CANARD LAUNCHED BY MUHAMMAD MUSTAPHA PARZANI.

3. IF T/1'S LIAISON RELATIONSHIP WITH AMERICANS IN BAGHDAD, 1964-65, SAID REPORTED THIS HAD BEGUN WITH CONTACTS WITH U.S. ATTORNEY AND IN INFORMAL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION. SHAN SUBSEQUENTLY SANCTIONED THE RELATIONSHIP TO COOPERATE IN T/1 SAID SHAN HOPED THROUGH COOPERATION TO OBTAIN FROM U.S. SPECIALIZED WEAPONS AND SOPHISTICATED TURBINE ENGINES IN COOPERATION WITH IRAN.)

PAGE 2 FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25331 S E C R E T
LATER, SAID T/1, A NEW U.S. COLONEL ARRIVED IN BAGHDAD WITH
SPENDING DEPUTY (WHOM BASE ASSUMES WAS SMITHPORTER--T/1 CLAIMS
HAD FORGOTTEN ALL NAMES) LATTER OF WHOM T/1 CONCLUDED WAS FR
REACTION ALTHOUGH THIS WAS NEVER EXPLICIT. T/1'S RICHMONDS W
HIS DEPUTY WERE ALL DULY REPORTED TO TEHRAN AND HE DID NOT
CONSIDER THAT DEPUTY'S INTEREST IN HIM WAS OTHER THAN STRICTLY
PROFESSIONAL. PROMPTED BY SUBJECT OF PREVIOUS U.S. CONTACTS,
MENTIONED THAT SAVAK DEPARTMENT TWO, HIS DEPARTMENT IN PRE-PAGE
ON THIS, HAD HAD REACTION ADVISER WHOM HE DESCRIBED MERELY AS
T/1 CALL.

1. RE POLICE/REACTION 1969 INCIDENT, T/1 MENTIONED AFTER HE
WAS ONE THAT HE HAD CONSIDERED DEPUTY NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF
SAVAK'S ORDERS (THAT HE ENTERTAIN CONTACT WITH AMERICAN REFER-
TIVE ON SOVIET MATTER) HAD BEEN CONTRARY TO HIS UNDERSTANDING
OF INTELLIGENCE BUREAU AND GOT IN WAY OF OTHER PERSON
SAID ON HIM RE POLICE CHIEF MOBASSER AND SEAR (NOTABLY
WENT TO LAY TRAP FOR AND ASSASSINATE FORMER SAVAK CHIEF GENERAL
T/1). T/1 SAID HE HAD ARGUED WITH MOBASSER TO EITHER CUT IN
T/1 SAVAK'S BAKHTIAR PLAN (SAVAK HAD ITS OWN PLAN GOING IN
T/1). ONE THAT WAS APPARENTLY SUCCESSFUL IN THE END, OR
T/1 GOT SAVAK OFF HIS BACK. T/1 MAINTAINED WITH GO AND
T/1 THAT HE HAD FEEL ANTI-SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN TEHRAN WHEN THE
FUNCTION OF SAVAK'S DEPARTMENT EIGHT. T/1 CYNICALLY ACCUSED
T/1 OF PROMOTING THE ANTI-SOVIET LIAISON WITH REACTION IN ORDER
T/1 A TRIP TO THE U.S. (WHICH HE DID). T/1 NONETHELESS
T/1 HELD AN INITIAL EARLY-MORNING MEETING WITH REACTION REPS IN HIS
T/1 AND THAT A SECOND MEET WAS SUBSEQUENTLY SET UP. T/1 SAID
T/1 ARRIVED IN HIS OFFICE AT 0600 HOURS OF THE APPOINTED DAY,
T/1 REMINDING HIM HIS AIDE OF THE APPOINTMENT. AWAITED EXPECTED GUESTS
T/1 OF VISITORS. AT 0600 T/1 DELIBERATELY ABSENTED HIMSELF
T/1 THE OFFICE IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE HIS UNEASINESS WITH THE
T/1 WHICH HE TERMED "UNMILITARY". T/1 SAID HE NEVER HAD
T/1 DEALING WITH THE U.S. REPS. AND TURNED THE DOSSIER OVER
T/1, A MAJOR, ALLEGEDLY FEELING LATTER TO CARRY ON
T/1 SPOT ALL THE FACILITIES TO THEIR BUSINESS. T/1 MAINTAINED
T/1 COMPLETELY LOST TRACK OF THE ACTIVITY AND ITS PROGRESS.
T/1 T/1 CONTINUED PROBLEMS WITH THIS QUESTION ARE
T/1 ARISE FROM THE GOOD POSSIBILITY THAT HIS ALLEGED ORDER
T/1 ALL DOT FACILITIES WERE EITHER NONEXISTENT OR COUGHED

PAGE 3 FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25331 S E C R E T
IN LESS ENCOURAGING TERMS. THAT T/1 COULD LET PERSONAL LIQUOR
COVER UP HIS DUTY IS BELIEVABLE WHEN ONE CONSIDERS T/1'S FAIRLY
MYSTICAL SIDE. IN ANY CASE, T/1'S "EXPLANATION" DOES NOT
TO TEHRAN STATION'S 1969 DESCRIPTION OF AN ACTIVE COMPETITION
AT THAT TIME BETWEEN SAVAK AND THE POLICE IN SOVIET OPS. T/1
DOES NOT SOUND LIKE ONE OF THE COMPETITORS.

C. INTERVIEW ALSO BROUGHT ADMISSION THAT T/1, DURING WHOLE
PERIOD 1971-1976, WHEN HE WAS SUPPOSEDLY EMPLOYED BY OFFICE OF
POLITICAL ADVISER TO THE SHAH (GENERAL PAKRAVAN)--NOT REPT. BY
GENERAL FARDOUST'S SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE BUREAU AS PREVIOUSLY
REPORTED. ONLY MISSION HE PERFORMED WAS THE 1975 TRIP TO
EUROPE. T/1'S EMPLOYMENT WITH DR. VALLAN'S OFFICE OF HOLY CRIME
WHICH T/1 HAD PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED AS HIS COVER, SEEMS TO BE
REALLY SEE THIS MAIN OCCUPATION (AND WE GUESS A VERY LUCRATIVE
ONE). T/1 DESCRIBED TRIP HE HAD MADE TO SOUTH IRAN FOR VALAN TO
INVESTIGATE CORRUPTION AMONG OFFICIALS HANDLING SHRINE'S ENDO
T LANDS AND SERVICES WHEN CO SUGGESTED HE HAD REPORTED TO
HIS MAN.

S. SAGWILL HAS BROUGHT INTO BETTER FOCUS PICTURE OF A MAN WHO
EITHER CONSISTENTLY ADVANCED OWN INTERESTS AND WHO CERTAINLY
NOT ANY PREVIOUS TIME (AND HE HAD SEVERAL OPPORTUNITIES) TO
OF HIS WAY TO ADVANCE THOSE OF REVOLUTION. THAT HE SHOULD
WANT TO DO SO NOW HAS TO BE LOOKED AT FROM BOTH PAST AND PRESENT
PERSPECTIVE. IT IS NOW FAIRLY CLEAR THAT T/1 HOPES VIA REACTION
TO SORT SOME OF HIS RIVAL HOLDINGS IN IRAN AND THAT THIS MAY HAVE
BECOME A STRONG FACTOR IN HIS SEEKING AN OPERATIONAL ROLE WITH US.
HE WILL MAY HAVE A DEAL HERE, BUT IT IS OBVIOUS THAT CLOSE CONTROL
WILL BE NECESSARY. THE ITINERANT COLLECTOR PLAN, WHICH
COULD HAVE TO EXERCISE CONSIDERABLE INDEPENDENT INITIATIVE ON
TRIP TRAVELS OUT OF CONTACT WITH OURSELVES FOR LONG PERIODS.
T/1 PERHAPS A LONGER ROPE THAN DESIRABLE, WERE T/1 OCCUPYING
A SIGNIFICANT NICHES IN THE PGOI AND WILLING TO PASS DOCUMENTS FOR
OUR USE. HIS SITUATION WOULD BE BETTER SUITED TO THE TEMPERAMENT AND
ABILITIES OF THE MAN AND THE EXIGENCIES OF CONTROL AND SECURITY.

IN LAST INTERVIEW MEETING IN WHICH T/1 WAS TOLD THAT HE
HAD BEEN PASSED WITH FLYING COLORS, CO DISCUSSED THE

SECRET 122105Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE (R/SAN FRANCISCO 25331 (FINAL SECTION OF 2)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

UNINTEL AJAJA FORRES SDTHROB SCSWIRL

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 508588
B. DIRECTOR 508758
C. (R/SAN FRANCISCO 25329

EXPLORATORY TRIP AGAIN WITH T/1, WHO ADMITTED THAT UNLESS HE
CONTACTED KDF LEADER ABRAHIM AHMED IN ADVANCE AND SET UP A MEETING
WITH HIM IN ENGLAND, CHANCES OF HIS ACQUIRING SIGNIFICANT
INTELLIGENCE ON THIS FIRST SWING WERE IN DOUBT. T/1 WAS
PENDING REEVALUATION OF THE SCSWIRL RESULTS. HE SHOULD COME
IN EFFORTS ON GETTING AHMED'S LONDON PHONE NUMBER FROM
NATIVE IN TEHRAN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND PLACE THAT CALL. T/1 WAS
REF B, THAT CONVERSION OF HIS FUNDS WAS NOT PRESENTLY
WAS A LOAN BUT IF HE COULD SET UP A MEETING WITH AHMED
HE WOULD DEMONSTRATE THAT THIS TRIP WOULD BE WORTHWHILE. T/1
CONSIDER HELPING HIM TO THE EXTENT OF \$2,000. K(FIA) T/1
WAS TO MEET AHMED AND THE FOLLOWING MEETING. T/1 HAD ABANDONED THE IDEA
OF SELLING HIS SON, HAMID, TO TEHRAN TO SELL HIS HOUSE. T/1 SAID
HIS DAUGHTER COULD HANDLE THE TRANSACTION. CO VERIFIED THAT
HIS DAUGHTER, JAKIE, WOULD BE IN TEHRAN AT LEAST THROUGH
OCTOBER AND LOOKING FOR A CALL FROM AN NYELAZON OFFICIAL.

IT WAS ALSO DISCUSSED WITH T/1 THE ADVISABILITY OF HIS RESPONDING
TO GENERAL KHORRAM'S REQUEST FOR A WRITTEN REPORT ON T/1
BACKGROUND AND ACTIVITIES. TO BE SENT BACK TO TEHRAN IN SUPPORT OF
HIS REQUEST FOR A SUITABLE JOB IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT. T/1 HAS
ALREADY WRITTEN SUCH RESUMES FOR KHORRAM'S PREDECESSORS AND CO
OPINION IS THAT THE FACT SHOULD BY NOW HAVE SUFFICIENT BACKGROUND
MATTERS THAT SITTING HERE AND WRITING MORE RESUMES. T/1 IN BASE
VIEW, SHOULD SEE ABRAHIM AHMED IN LONDON SOONEST, NOT WAITING FOR
HIS PAPERS FROM TEHRAN, AND RETURN HERE TO REPORT. UNTIL T/1 HAS
SUCCESSFULLY PERFORMED AT LEAST THAT OPERATIONAL MISSION (AND
OTHER SCSWIRL WOULD NOT BE A BAD IDEA ON RETURN), HE WILL HAVE
A LINE OF HIGH IMPORTANCE CAPABILITIES WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY

AGE 2 FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25331 S E C R E T
IF CONTINUED EXPENDITURE OF TIME AND EFFORT HERE, IF
ABLE SET UP MEETING WITH ARMED WITHIN NEXT FEW WEEKS,
WROSE TO CUT BRIT AND REMAIN IN LOOSE CONTACT WITH
POSE OF MONITORING POSSIBLE RETURN TO IRAN. REQUEST
MENTS.

FILE: 201-8328995. RVW11SEP99 DRV DDC1 BY 25331

S E T

SECRET 121712Z 14 SEP 74

CITE DIRECTOR 217775.

TO: PRIORITY FR/SAN FRANCISCO INFO TEHRAN.

WMINTPL AJAJA FORRES SDTHRO3

REFSY A. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 26331
B. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25322

1. REGRET DELAY IN RESPONSE. HAS AN FULL AGENT
BASE'S LATEST ASSESSMENT OF SDTHRO3 (T/1) CIST IN THE
SSGWIWI RESULTS PER REF A. WHILE IT CLEAR THAT PREVIOUS
MISGIVINGS HAVE BEEN RESOLVED, CONCUR THOSE ELEMENTS OF
MAKE-UP WHICH ARE SELF-SERVING AND/OR LESS THAN TOTALLY
FORTHCOMING DICTATE DEVISING A MORE CLOSELY SUPERVISED AGENT
ROLE FOR T/1.

2. ACCORDINGLY CONCUR BASE PROPOSAL (PDR PARA 5 REF A)
T/1 BE REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH IBRAHIM AHMED AND
TRAVEL EXPEDITIOUSLY TO LONDON WITHOUT WAITING FOR ARRIVAL OF
PACKAGE FROM TEHRAN. WE COULD ADDRESS PROPOSAL FOR SECOND
SSGWIWI FOLLOWING DEBRIEFING T/1 ON THE TRIP.

3. IN VIEW OF OUR DECREASING (THOUGH NOT ABANDONED) INTEREST
IN T/1 PERFORMING LOOSE-DRASSED ITINERANT COLLECTOR MISSION,
POSSIBILITY HE MIGHT YET BE ABLE TO ACQUIRE TEHRAN JOE WITH
PGOI BECOMES ALL THE MORE ATTRACTIVE. BELIEVE T/1 SHOULD
COOPERATE WITH KHORRAM TO THE FULL IN PROVIDING ANY INFORMATION
ABOUT HIMSELF (WHICH WE HOPE WILL BE NON-INCRIMINATING) IN ORDER
TO SATISFY KHORRAM'S REQUESTS (WHICH WE REALIZE ARE BY NOW
BECOMING REDUNDANT). T/1 SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO CONTRAST IMPRESSION
KHORRAM THAT HE BORED AND LISTLESS IN HIS PRESENT SITUATION
EAGER TO RETURN TO IRAN IN AN OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE.

FILE: 201-322995. RVM 19 SEP 98 DRY DEC.1 ALL SECRET

E T

28 SEP

S H E R T 202356Z SEP 79 STAFF

DATE FROM SAN FRANCISCO 25424

TO: DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN.

WINTER AJAJA FORRES SUTHERO

REFS: A. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25331
B. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25329
C. DIRECTOR 515775

1. FOLLOWING IS INTERIM STATUS REPORT (9D) (E/1 T/1)
AS OF 2 SEPTEMBER T/1 WAS CONTINUING EFFORTS TO RE-ENTER LONDON
NUMBER OF LIBRARIAN. HE HAD REPEATEDLY NEEDED T/1'S BROTHER
LAW KRAAGH IN TEHRAN AND EACH TIME GOT REJECTED. KRAAGH WAS
CASPIAN. T/1 ALSO TRYING TO GET AHMED'S MOTHER AND KAHROM
FORMER SDJANUS OFFICER NOW LIVING IN LONDON. T/1 HAD BEEN
GO THRU KAHROM PASSED THROUGH SAN FRANCISCO RECENTLY. T/1
VISIT RELATIVE HERE, ABOL BOLUCHI, AND T/1 HAD BEEN
KAHROM TOLD T/1 THAT ANOTHER FORMER SDJANUS OFFICER, PNU AMMAN
ALSO LIVES IN LONDON (T/1 REMEMBERS AMMAN). T/1 FIGURED HE
UN SDJANUS KURDISH DEPARTMENT). T/1 FIGURED HE
THROUGH KAHROM AND LEARN AHMED'S PARTICULAR FROM AMMAN. (E/1
COMMENT: WE INTEND TO QUOTE T/1 IN DETAIL HERE. MID-LEVEL
UNRECORDED CONTACT HERE WITH KAHROM. REQ TR ON KAHROM

2. T/1 HAS ALSO REPORTED THAT HIS MOTHER, ESTER JALE
IS T/1 FIELD CALL FROM STATION RE HIS DOCUMENTS. T/1 OBTAINED
VISA AND WAS PLANNING TO LEAVE TEHRAN. T/1 OBTAINED
MOTHER (IF LATTER GOT IMMIGRANT VISA BY T/1). T/1 OBTAINED
(T/1 WIFE) HAS NOT HEARD FROM CONSUL IN TEHRAN. T/1 OBTAINED
OF T/1 WILL DEPART FOR U.S. ON 6 OCTOBER. T/1 WILL CONTINUE TO
THAT SITUATION, HOWEVER, AND IT JALEH DEES T/1 WILL WITHOUT
WILL HAVE T/1 PASS SAME INSTRUCTIONS AS T/1 BY T/1. T/1 OBTAINED
DAUGHTER JILA AND ADVISE STATION LATTER. T/1 WILL T/1. T/1 OBTAINED
AND ADDRESS.

3. T/1 IN PROCESS OF DRAFTING CV PROCA. T/1 OBTAINED

AGE 2 R/SAN FRANCISCO 25424 SECRET
HERE HAS BEEN NO OTHER OFFICIAL NEWS PRO

4- FILE: 201-9323995. RVW2 SLP

SECRET
SECRET

BT

1981

...MORNING OF
...FATHER'S DOCUMENTS.
...DAYS ON WHICH TO MEET, DAUGHTER
...THAT AFTERNOON. C/O MET DAUGHTER AND
...DIARIES/TELEPHONE BOOKS, AND FOLDER OF NOTES AND
...IS (WRITTEN IN COMBINATION PERSIAN, APABIC AND KURDISH,
...FATHER'S OWN "CODE"). ALL POUCHED HQS 16 OCT VIA
...NUMBER 7194. NOT YET RECEIVED IS REPORT, WRITTEN BY MEMBER
...AL TALEBANI'S FAMILY, ON CURRENT KURDISH SITUATION.

2. DAUGHTER THEN TRAPPED C/O IN LENGTHY DISCOURSE
...N-IRANIAN RELATIONS, INCLUDING ASSES
...AND COMPANY IN POWER
...Y. HUNTA

SECRET 261938Z OCT 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH
CITE WASHINGTON 5404 83

TO: FR/SAN FRANCISCO INFO THERAN.

FROM: CNE/IRAN INFO FR/SF

SUBJECT: WMINTEL AJAJA FORREF SDTHROB - STATUS SDTHROB

REFS: A. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25579
B. DIRECTOR 525742
C. DIRECTOR 515777
D. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25334
E. FR/SAN FRANCISCO 25117

1. WITH THE RECEIPT OF REF. WE HAVE REVIEWED IN DEPTH T
ALREADY LENGTHY SDTHROB/1 (C) (1) FILE AND, IN LIGHT OF OUR OTHER
EFFORTS AGAINST THE KURDISH TARGET WE ARE REASSESSING WHERE WE
ARE GOING WITH THIS CASE AND THE OPERATIONAL USEFULNESS WE CAN
EXPECT FROM IT. WHEN THE T/V CASE FIRST SURFACED IN FEBRUARY
1979, WE HAD LITTLE INFORMATION ON KURDISH ACTIVITIES AND FEWER
FORCES. T/V'S BACKGROUND, EXPERIENCE, AND CONTACTS WERE VIEWED
POTENTIALLY FILLING SEVERAL IMPORTANT GAPS IN BOTH OUR INTEL-
IGENCE COLLECTION AND OPERATIONS AND WE APPRECIATED THEN AND
CONTINUE TO APPRECIATE THE BASE'S RAPID AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSE
TO OUR REQUIREMENTS AND THE T/V CASE.

2. AS THE BASE IS AWARE, THE PACE OF THIS CASE HAS SINCE
SLOWED CONSIDERABLY, DUE TO THE INELUCTABLE NATURE OF THE IRANIAN
TARGET AND DURING THE INTERVENING TIME WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO
DEVELOP OTHER SOURCES ON KURDISH ACTIVITIES. THE REPORTING FROM
THESE PROVIDES A BEGINNING TO COVERAGE OF KURDISH EVENTS. WHILE
THESE COVERAGE OF THE TARGET IS NOT WHAT WE WOULD WISH IT TO BE,
OUR CONCERN WITH T/V'S POTENTIAL FOR KURDISH REPORTING IS THAT
HE IS NOT YET REALLY STARTED AND EVEN WHEN HE DOES, IT APPEARS
HE WILL BE COVERING MUCH OF THE SAME GROUND AS OTHER SOURCES
WE HAVE. WE HAVE REPORTERS. AS A CASE IN POINT, THE REF E NOTE
WAS ATTEMPTING TO GET IN TOUCH WITH IDEN A AND THAT HE
HAS ADDITIONAL BOOKS AND NOTES FROM THERAN TO BE ABLE TO

PAGE 2 WASHINGTON 082443Z OCT 77
REVA-LIBERATION COMBAT IS NOT US TO BELIEVE THAT T/1 IS NOT
AS WIRE INTO THE KURDISH MOVEMENT AS WE HAD HOPED. IDEN A I
CHOTIC/12, A KURD, WHO I WOULD FROM OTHER KURDS ARE HAVING
NO DIFFICULTY IN FINDING AND WHO HAS RESUMED HIS REPORTING RE-
LATIONSHIP WITH THE KURDISH MOVEMENT. WE ARE IN DIRECT CONTACT
WITH STJANUS/22 (IDEN). AND T/1 WISHES TO BE AS A SOURCE OF
INFORMATION ON THE KURDISH ROUTES OF HIS VARIOUS KURDISH CONTACTS.
STJANUS/22'S ACCESS TO THE KURDISH COMMUNITY IS MUCH MORE RECENT
THAN T/1'S AND WE BELIEVE THAT AT LEAST FROM THE STJANUS ANGLE,
HE WOULD BE A MORE PROACTIVE REPORTER. IN SHORT, AT THE PRESENT
TIME, WE THINK T/1 CAN BE MORE USEFULLY DIRECTED INTO OTHER
TARGETS AND WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD HAVE T/1 STAND DOWN ON HIS
EFFORTS TO WORK AGAINST THE KURDISH TARGET.

2. WE STILL WISH TO ENCOURAGE THE BASE TO DIRECT, IF POS-
SIBLE, T/1 INTO THESE OTHER IRANIAN TARGETS. WE ARE STILL VERY
MUCH INTERESTED IN THE POSSIBILITY OF T/1 REGAINING A POSITION
IN THE EGOL, PARTICULARLY IN THE NEW INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION AND,
AS REF C INDICATES, WE FIND THIS TO BE MUCH MORE ATTRACTIVE ALTERNA-
TIVE AND ONE WHICH WOULD GO A LONG WAY TOWARD SATISFYING AN IM-
PORTANT FI REPORTING REQUIREMENT. WE WELCOME BASE COMMENTS ON
HOW WE MAY BEST ACCOMPLISH THIS, RECOGNIZING THAT IN THE END,
T/1'S SUITABILITY FOR SUCH AN OPERATION MAY BE OPEN TO QUESTION.

4. FILE 201-325995. RVM 25 OCT 77. DRV DEC.1 ALL SECRET.

END
BT
39

00179 DR 5

C R E T 251858Z OCT 78 DEFERRED TEL EPO

WASHINGTON 540461.

FR/SAN FRANCISCO INFO TEHRAN.

ONE/IRAN INFO JR/C/58

WINTBL AJEJA FORREIS SDTHROE - STATUS SDTHROB/1 CA

WASHINGTON 540443.

IDEN A: ALI HOMAN QAZI.

IDEN B: JAMSHID AMANI.

FILE 250-328995. RYM 2501199 DR 7 DR 1

SECRET.

SECRET 170004Z APR 79 STAFF

17 APR 79 03 15Z

GITE DIRECTOR 420311.

TO: PRIORITY BONN INTO GERMANY, TEHRAN, VIENNA.

MMINTEL RYBAT AJAJA CATOMIC INTEL

REF: BONN 00190 (NOT SENT/NEEDED TEHRAN)

1. WOULD BE INTERESTED IN ALMOST ANY LIGHT CATOMIC/IS (A/19) (IDENTITY TEHRAN ONLY) COULD SHED ON THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KURDISTAN (DPK), BOTH WITHIN AND WITHOUT IRAN. PLEASE IDENTIFY SUB-SOURCING, SPECIFICALLY, ON IRAN:

A. WHO HEADS THE DPK IN IRAN AND ANY OTHER IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEADERSHIP?

B. WHAT IS THE PARTY STRUCTURE, BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE OF IRAN?

C. WHAT IS THE PARTY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS COUNTER-PARTS IN IRAQ, SYRIA, AND TURKEY?

D. WHAT IS ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE IRAQI COMMUNIST PARTY?

E. IS QASSEMLOU A MEMBER OF THE IRAQI COMMUNIST PARTY? IF SO, DOES HE REPRESENT THE IRAQI COMMUNIST PARTY WITHIN THE DPK?

F. IS THERE A MILITARY WING OF THE DPK WHO HEADS IT IF THERE IS?

G. WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DPK AND THE PLO?

H. WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE IRANIAN KURDS AND THE YODSE PARTY?

ON IRAQ:

A. WHAT IS THE STATUS OF CONTACTS BETWEEN IRAQI KURDS AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF IRAN? DO ANY OF THEM COORDINATING THEIR ACTIVITIES WITH KURDISH GROUPS IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES SUCH AS IRAN AND TURKEY?

B. WHAT ROLE, IF ANY, IS THE SOVIET UNION ASSUMING?

PAGE 2: DIRECTOR 427311 S E C R E T

ON THE KURDISH QUESTION:

C. WHAT KINDS AND HOW MUCH SUPPORT IS BEING PROVIDED BY
LIBYA TO THE KURDISH GROUPS?

ON TURKEY:

A. WHAT IS THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE TURKISH KURDS
IN GERMANY? ARE THEY ORGANIZED IN ANY WAY?

B. ARE THERE ANY KURDISH ACTIVIST/POLITICAL/
REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS IN GERMANY?

C. ARE THESE GROUPS INVOLVED WITH KURDISH MOVEMENTS/
ACTIVITIES IN OTHER COUNTRIES?

D. WITH WHOM IS A/19 IN CONTACT IN TURKEY?

E. ARE THESE TURKISH KURDS POLITICALLY ACTIVE?

F. WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE KURDS OF
IRAN, IRAQ, TURKEY AND SYRIA?

2. FOR VIENNA: ABOVE MAY BE DRAWN ON FOR USE WITH
DOABLE/1.

3. FILE: 281-6346414. RYM 16 APR 99 DRY DGC-1. ALL SECRET.

11 AUG 79

412

C R 7 T 110317Z AUG 79 STAF.
E DIRECTOR 433000.

TEHRAN INFO DCD/HEADQUARTERS, DCD/C/ICAGO, SINGAPORE.

INTEL AJAJA

1. AS RESULT OF MEETING BETWEEN HCS OFFICER AND DCD CON-
CT ROBERT MCY. BURNS, WE HAVE BEEN ABLE SURFACE INDIVIDUAL IN
TEHRAN WHO STATION MAY FIND USEFUL. WE REALIZE THAT THIS DE-
PARTURE FROM OUR NORMAL PRACTICE OF NOT BURDENING STATION WITH
S LEADS BUT WE BELIEVE YOU MAY AGREE THIS ONE HAS UNIQUE
POTENTIAL.

2. BURNS WAS FMC CORPORATION MANAGER IN TEHRAN FROM MID
1976 TO DECEMBER 1978. DURING COURSE OF HIS TOUR THERE, HE
DEVELOPED SEVERAL HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS IN AGRICULTURAL, MILITARY,
AND COMMERCIAL SECTORS OF IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. ON HIS DEPARTURE
FROM TEHRAN IN LATE 1978, HE LEFT CANADIAN NATIONAL HENRI
ST. MARTIN IN CHARGE OF FMC OPERATIONS IN IRAN, AND
ST. MARTIN HAS CONTINUED FMC OPERATIONS THERE AND MAINTAINED
SOME OF THOSE CONTACTS. MORE IMPORTANTLY, ST. MARTIN HAS
UNREPORTEDLY DEVELOPED, OVER PAST SEVERAL YEARS, EXTENSIVE CON-
TACTS IN KURDISH MOVEMENT. ST. MARTIN DEVELOPED THESE CONTACTS
THROUGH HIS IRANIAN AZARI WIFE WHO IN TURN HAS MANY KURDISH
RELATIVES. IT WAS APPEAL FROM THESE KURDISH CONTACTS THAT LED
ST. MARTIN, THROUGH BURNS, TO ATTEMPT TO CONTACT US.

3. ST. MARTIN, WHO IS 32 YEARS OLD, NATIVE OF QUEBEC AND
GRADUATE FROM UNIVERSITY OF MONTREAL, ARRIVED IN IRAN IN 1976
WITH HIS IRANIAN WIFE. HE WORKED AT VARIETY OF JOBS IN TEHRAN
UNTIL SUMMER 1978 WHEN HE WAS HIRED BY FMC. DURING HIS THREE
YEARS IN TEHRAN ST. MARTIN HAS DEVELOPED ACADEMIC INTEREST IN
KURDISH NATION AND HAS BUILT UP THROUGH HIS WIFE LIST OF EX-
TENSIVE CONTACTS. IN JUNE 1979 HE AND HIS WIFE TRAVELED FOR
SEVERAL WEEKS INTO KURDISTAN AND MET WITH SEVERAL PROMINENT
KURDISH LEADERS, INCLUDING REHIM SAIF G. H. A. Z. I., WHO, ALONG
WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF CHAZI CLAN, TOLD ST. MARTIN THAT HE
WOULD LIKE HIS ASSISTANCE IN CONVEYING MESSAGE TO WESTERN POWERS

WASHINGTON 233054 SECRET

THE KURDISH MOVEMENT IN NEED OF WESTERN ASSISTANCE AND THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO OPEN CHANNEL TO WESTERN COUNTRIES TO ATTEMPT SECURE THAT AS-
ACCORDING TO STE. MARTIN THIS GROUP, WHICH ALSO IN-
CLAIMED THE SUPPORT OF
STATED THAT THEY DID NOT
REASONABLE DEGREE OF AUTONOMY
WANT TO SOLICIT SOVIET SUP-
THEIR DISTRUST OF SOVIET
REPUBLIC OF MAHABAD IN 1947.
WITH BARZANI'S, WHO THEY
AS MUCH AS SOVIETS

NAME, NONE OF THIS NEW INASMUCH AS CATOMIC/19
SINCE APRIL 1979, BUT IT DOES
IN INTO KURDISH MOVEMENT
WHO MAY HAVE SOME FAIRLY
STE. MARTIN MAY BE ATTRACTIVE
ACCORDING TO BURNS, HE SPEAKS
ENGLISH, ALTHOUGH ENGLISH
WILL BE WILLING
AND INTENDS REMAIN IN
WILL GO THROUGH
NECESSARY PAPERWORK/APPROVALS.
WE WILL BEGIN PROCESSING NOW. WE
AT SOME POINT OUTSIDE
RECRUITMENT AND
CONTACT IN TEHRAN. WOULD

SECRET FOR THE SECRET. RVM 220039 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET

REF ID: A123127

DICTIONARY 1000000

BONN INTO GERMANY

SECRET

AD. ADJ. CATOM

BONN 94216

1. VERY MUCH APPREHENSIVE TOWARDS EFFORTS WHICH REPRESENT
PROGRESS AGAINST THE CASE DIFFICULT CASE. (C) TOMIC 10
(1) HAS RECENTLY OF THE OF AVIATION SUPPORT FOR HIGH NATIONALIST
THREAT DURING SEPTEMBER 7. NOTABLY, HAS BEEN "OFF CASE"

2. C/19 CASE AND MATERIAL ACCESS IS, HOWEVER, TELL OF
PRIOR INTERESTS AND WOULD HAVE ANOTHER SHOT AT HIM
SING WALTER J. KOVACH OF IRAN BACKGROUND AND
AS LANGUAGE, BE BE CONTINUE DIALOGUE. ACCORDINGLY, IN
PROPOSE FOR NOVEMBER, ARRIVING LATTER PART FIRST WEEK IN
SEPTEMBER, TO MEET WITH AND DETERMINE HIS WILLINGNESS CON-
TINUE RELATIONS WITH NATION WITHIN CONSTRAINTS CURRENT
NATION POLICIES. WILL HAVE FIRM ITINERARY 14 SEP 79. WOULD
APPRECIATE BONN GERMANY AVAILABILITY C/19 AND HIS WILLINGNESS
MEET AGAIN WITH IKO SK

3. FILE 100-250445 RYM 31AUG99 DRW DEC 1 ALL SECRET.

SECRET

#8777

SECRET--WULTEL--INFO--NO CONTRACT--ORCON

ANALYST

LIST OF KURDISH DELEGATION TO THE SOVIET UNION
OCT. EARLY SEPTEMBER 1979

MEMBER OF A PROMINENT KURDISH FAMILY WHO WAS
LAWYER AND THE LATE KURDISH LEADERS. HIS
CONTACTS WITH THESE KURDISH LEADERS,
HOWEVER, ARE LIMITED AND NO INFORMATION HAS
YET BEEN OBTAINED FROM ANY OTHER REPORTS.
SOURCE'S REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN
ESTABLISHED.

SOURCE HAS BELIEF THAT OF KURDISH REPRESENTING SO
DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND OTHER KURDISH FRACTIONS IN
WENT TO MOSCOW IN EARLY SEPTEMBER 1979 TO
OFFICIALS ABOUT KURDISH NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN IRAN. THE
KURDISH NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN IRAN, THE
ON THE DELEGATION IS UNKNOWN BUT IT DOES NOT
ON THE BASIS FIGURES IN THE FOLLOWING THE V
ANY OF THEM ARE NOW IN IRAN. THE
KURDISH POPULATION CENTERS IN IRAN. THE
HOWEVER, HAVE THE AUTHORITY OF THESE
EXPLORE THE POSSIBLE MEANS OF SOVIET
FINANCIAL AND ARMS SUPPLY FOR THEIR MOVEMENT
TO THE SOVIET UNION IS A REFLECTION OF
THE U.S. AND OTHER
KURDISH PEOPLE IN IRAN AND
DECIDED TO BACK THE KURDISH MOVEMENT TO OBTAIN THE
THEY WERE THEN TO OBTAIN THE
SUPPORT THEY WERE TO OBTAIN AUTONOMY WITHIN THE
STATE.

AGENCY: 15 SEPTEMBER

FIELD OFFICE: NEW YORK, BANGKOK, AND

IS NOTICE INTELLIGENCE SOURCE
IS INVOLVED WITH KURDISH NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN IRAN
TO CONTRACTORS OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY
AND EXERCISING OF

21 SEP 79 1342

201634Z SEP 79 STAFF

DIRECTOR 517454.

DATE BONN INFO GERMANY, STUTTGART, TEHRAN, ANKARA,

BONN.

BONN.

AYATA CATONIG

BONN 84660

DIRECTOR 515094

BONN 84421

WE THINK REF B SHOULD ANSWER REF C. IF YOU ARE NOT IN
REF B, IT AUTHORIZES REF C PROPOSAL WITH AN INITIAL
OF DM 7500 TO COVER CATONIG/19 EXPENSES FROM MAR 79
SEPTEMBER 79 AT DM1500/MONTH, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
A THREE MONTH TRAIL PERIOD FROM OCTOBER TO DECEMBER 79
ATE.

FILE: 201-0380414. 201 28 SEP 80 DOW DOW.1 121 SECRET

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SECRET 121122Z SEP 79 TART

BONN 44210

PROVORY DIRECTOR INFO GERMANY, ANIAR, ISTANBUL, TEHRAN,

ICART

NTL A AJA CATOMIC INTEL

1. BONN 84420 (EGH-7775)

REF REPORT OBTAINED IN COUR TWO MEETINGS
TH CATOMIC/19 (C/19) DURING WHICH BL TIME SPENT MAINTAIN
IN DETAILS OF HIS FUTURE COOPERATION WITH NOWKOWSKY. BASIC
MENT IS THAT C/19 WILL TEST PERIOD PROVIDING INFORMATION TO
FOR THREE MONTHS. HE NOW FULLY
IN EXTENT AND NATURE KURDISH MOVEMENT. HE NOW FULLY
FROM HIS CONTACTS BOTH IN AND OUT OF SUPPORT FOR HIS MOVE-
GO VIZING THAT THERE NO CHANCE OF U. IS DESIRE TO PRESEN
MEAN. C/19'S COOPERATION THIS BASED PERSONAL CHANNEL OPEN
HIS MOVEMENT'S SIDE OF STORY AND NE SUPPORT. C/O
TO WEST AND SOURCE OF PERSONAL FINANC MONTH FOR EXPENSES
INITIATIVELY AGREED PAY C/19 DM 1500. ONE BILL DATING
C/19 DOES NOT COVER HIS MONTHLY IN AT THREE MONTHS. AFTER
FROM MAY 1979) AND TO EXTEND THROUGH THIS OF RELATIONSHIP
WHICH TIME REVIEW OF PRODUCTION AND HIS UNDERSTANDS THAT
WILL RESULT IN POSSIBLE ADJUSTMENT FIRST MEETING WITH
HIS NOT FIRM COMMITMENT TO FIRM A MEMEN'S M. BASE PROPOS
NOWKOWSKY COLLEAGUE TO STOWLER CASE OFFICER FOR C/19
ST URGART C/19 HAVE NEXT MEETING FOR 20 SEPTEMBER. C/19
AND EXPECT C/19 KURDISH COMMUNITY IN B. CLOSING AREA NEGATIS
NATURE OF KURDISH COMMUNITY IN B. CLOSING AREA NEGATIS
INVOLVEMENT OF BONN BASE OFFICER

2. C/19 IS MOST EXPRESSIVE ELEMENTS IN KURDISTAN AND
MAY RESENTFUL IN CONTEXT OF HIS POSITION OF USE IN ACTION
OF IRANIAN PERSECUTION OF HE HAS ALREADY LIST
MORE FAMILY MEMBERS IN FIGHTING LOCAL ENEMY AND US
POTENTIALLY ABOUT IMMEDIATE FUTURE WHICH HE VIEWS CONT

2 SEP
1220047Z SEP 79 STAFF
VINE DIRECTOR 518777
FOR PRIORITY DOWN INFO TERRAN.
UNITEEL AJAJA CATOMIC
REF MONN 84321

1. AGREEMENT BETWEEN C/19 AND NOWIKOWSKI
RELAYED TO SEP 79, IS THAT WE WILL PAY HIM DM1500 PER MONTH
EXPENSES INCURRED IN CONTACTING PARADISE TARGETS OF INTEREST
EITHER BY TELEPHONE OR IN PERSON AND THAT, AS HE HAD BEEN DO
THIS FROM APRIL 1979 UNTIL WE RECONTACTED HIM IN AUGUST AND
SEPTEMBER 1979, WE WOULD SUPPORT THOSE EXPENSES AT THE RATE
DM1500 PER MONTH FROM MAY THROUGH SEPTEMBER. NOWIKOWSKI
WAS TO ALSO PAY HIM DM1500 IN APRIL 1979.
WE COULD ALSO PAY HIM DM1500 PER MONTH FROM OCTOBER THROUGH
DECEMBER AS PART OF A CONTINUING FIRST PERIOD TO DETERMINE
USEFULNESS OF HIS INFORMATION. IN RETURN FOR HIS MONEY, C
HAS AGREED TO MEET EVERY TWO WEEKS WITH AN ATTENTION OFFICER
RESPOND TO OUR REQUIREMENTS. AT THE END OF DECEMBER, MONN
AND C/19 AGREED THAT WE WOULD REVIEW THE QUALITY OF INFORMATION
PROVIDED AND ADJUST HIS EXPENSE ALLOWANCE ACCORDINGLY.
BILLS NEED BE PROVIDED TO SUPPORT HIS COLLECTION OF THIS
MONEY DOES HE HAVE TO ACCOUNT FOR EXPENDITURES.

2. HOPE THIS CLARIFIES MATTER. APPRECIATE BASE
ON THIS SUBJECT.

S. FILE 201- 08414. EMM 21SEP99 DRV D9C.1 ALL
S H C H N T
#4877

SECRET 251532Z SEP 79 STAFF
CITE SCOTTGART 17957 SECTION 1 OF

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, BONN INFO GERMANY, TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANBUL
WMINTEL REBAT AJAJA CATOMIC

REF: BONN 84660 (NOTAL)

1. KEITH L. TOHLERNY HAD INTRODUCTORY MEETING WITH CATOMIC/19
(T/19) 20 SEPTEMBER 1979 AT 1830 HOURS IN ROOM 1003 COLOGNE INTERCOM
MINUTAL, AS ARRANGED. MEETING LASTED FOR ALMOST FOUR HOURS.
AND T/19 WAS PAID IN 7500 FOR PERIOD MAY 1977 THROUGH SEPTEMBER
1979 AT RATE OF DM 1388 MONTHLY FOR EXPENSES FOR WHICH HE CASHED
HAND RECEIPT IN USUAL ALIAS. IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT MEETINGS WOULD
CONTINUE FOR THREE MONTHS TILL PERIOD 1-31 OCTOBER, THROUGH
DECEMBER, WITH DM 1500 MONTHLY AS EXPENSES. THE NEXT MEETING
WILL BE ON 27 SEPTEMBER. NO SECURITY PROBLEMS WERE APPARENT.

2. ATMOSPHERE: TOHLERNY BEGAN BY EMPHASIZING HIS AGE
(SLIGHTLY INCREASED) AND HIS LONG BACKGROUND IN AREA, POINTING
OUT THAT HE HAD VISITED KURDISTAN, HIS KNOWLEDGE OF KURDISH
HISTORY, ETC. HE THEN ADDED THAT HE WAS GOING TO TALK TO T/19
LIKE A FATHER WHEN NECESSARY AND THAT HE WOULD BE FOR T/19'S OWN
GOOD. HE THEN STARTED TO QUESTION T/19 ON HIS KNOWLEDGE ABOUT
KURDISH PROBLEMS, GENTLY POINTING OUT THAT T/19 HAD MADE LITTLE
DO WITH KURDISH NATIONALISM DURING HIS ADULT LIFE AND AS ONE CASE
TIME PRAISING T/19'S FATHER AND HIS CAREER. TOHLERNY CLOSED THE
INTRODUCTION BY NOTING HIS PERSONAL REGARD FOR THE KURDS AND
SYMPATHY FOR T/19'S DESIRE TO ANSWER THE PEOPLE. ALL THIS WAS WELL
RECEIVED BY T/19.

3. WORKS: TOHLERNY THEN RAISED QUESTION OF WHAT HE HADT BEEN
/19. DESPITE T/19'S RESPONSE, HE HAD NO INTENTION AT THIS POINT
SUSPECT KURDISH NATIONALISM WITH ARMED STRUGGLE AND T/19 WAS
AWARE OF THE REASONS FOR THIS. THAT BEING SAID, HE DID NOT WANT
TO RETURN BLIND TO KURDISTAN, BUT FOR VISIT AS ONE WHO
MIGHT CREATE SOME PROBLEMS FOR EVERYONE. HE COULD NOT HAVE
A COUNTRY BY SUPPLYING ACCURATE INFORMATION ON WHAT WAS

PAGE 2 STUTTGART 17987 S E C R T
HAPPENING THERE AND HOW EVENTS WERE CONTROLLED. THIS WAS FIRST
AND BASIC STEP. T/19 AGREED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD OUR POLICY.
EVEN THOUGH HE DIDN'T LIKE IT, AND HE AGREED THAT THREE-
MONTH TRIAL PERIOD SHOULD BE GOOD FIRST. HE THEN LAUNCHED INTO
LONG DISCOURSE ON FACT THAT HE WAS GRADUALLY BEING SEPARATED
FROM HIS SOURCES AND WOULD SOON HAVE NOTHING TO REPORT. HE THEN
STATED THAT HE IS ABLE TO ENTER KURDISTAN SUCCESSFULLY AND SET UP
NEW SOURCES AND ROUTES. HE ALSO RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER
WE COULD ASSIST HIM IN TWO MATTERS: (A) SUPPLYING HIM WITH SAFE
COMMUNICATION, I.E. POLICE FACILITIES, BETWEEN GERMANY AND IRAN
AND (B) WHETHER WE WOULD HELP HIM SEND EUROPEAN NEWSPAPER TO
TELL HIM INTO KURDISTAN "BLACK" IN ORDER TO PUBLICIZE TRUE STATE OF
AFFAIRS THERE. TOLENNY REPLIED THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER
BOTH QUESTIONS BEFORE RESPONDING BUT MADE NO COMMITMENTS. T/19 CON-
TINUED THAT HE HAD CORRESPONDED PRIMARILY THROUGH (A) COURIERS AND
THROUGH CONVERSATIONS WITH HIS SISTER IN TEHRAN, WHO IS MARRIED
GIVEN IN JAY ZIDEK AND SHE IN TURN HAD CONTACT WITH KURDISTAN BY
AND LETTER. NOW SISTER'S CONTACTS IN KURDISTAN HAD TEND TO KILLS
AND SISTER HAD MOVED TO BOMN. MOREOVER, PERIC COMING IN
KURDISTAN WAS INCREASINGLY CONTROLLED AS WAS THAT IN TEHRAN.
T/19 INSISTED THAT HE STILL HAD PLENTY OF ESSENTIAL SOURCES
IN KURDISTAN BUT HE HAD NO WAY TO REACH THEM FROM GERMANY AND
TO SEE IF NEW ROUTES AND COURIERS.

4. INTL: T/19 HAD NO INFO OTHER THAN GENERAL STATEMENT
THAT ON 12 SEPTEMBER THERE HAD BEEN FIGHTING IN MANY KURDISH
TOWNS, BUT HE HAD NO NAMES OF TOWNS. TOLENNY SYMPATHIZED
WITH T/19'S PROBLEM AND SUGGESTED THAT HE TRY TO EXTRACT MORE
INFORMATION FROM THOSE KURDS IN GERMANY WHO ALSO HAD THEIR
OWN SOURCES. HE AGREED TO DO THIS.

5. TARGETS: TOLENNY TOLD T/19 THAT FIRST THING WAS TO
COLLECT LIST OF NAMES, ADDRESSES AND BIO DATA ON KURDS IN
GERMANY THAT T/19 TRUSTED AND THOUGH CAPABLE OF OBTAINING
IMPORTANT INFORMATION FROM KURDISTAN. HE ALSO ASKED FOR SIMILAR
LISTS OF KURDS IN TEHRAN AND KURDS IN KURDISTAN. DEPENDING ON
THESE LISTS, WE COULD THEN TRY T/19 DETERMINING (A) WHO WAS
RELIABLE AND (B) IF IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR US TO ASSIST HIM
IN HIS ACTIVITIES. WE HAD TO KNOW FIRST WHOM HE MIGHT BE DEALING
WITH AND WHAT THEIR BACKGROUNDS WERE. T/19 AGREED READILY TO THE

NAME'S STATEMENT 17007 S E C R E T
AFTER THINKING IT OVER CAREFULLY AND AFTER BEING ASSURED HE
WOULD HANDLE INFORMATION IN SECURE MANNER. HE PROMISED TO
HAVE SOME INFORMATION AT NEXT MEETING.

8. SOVIET INFLUENCE: T/19 HAD NO HARD INFORMATION ON SOVIET
CONNECTIONS WITH NATIONALIST FORCES IN KURDISTAN, ESPECIALLY IN
RECENT YEARS. HE POINTED OUT THAT ALMOST ALL KURDISH LEADERS
HAVE HAD SOME CONTACT WITH SOVIETS, USUALLY FOR A PURPOSE.
QASHMID, VOX KHAMPEL, HE KNOWN AS COMMUNIST AND TUDER MEMBER,
BUT QASHMID THEM BROKE WITH SOVIETS AND PERHAPS NOW IS BACK WITH
THEM. IN ABSENCE OF HARD AND CURRENT INFORMATION, ALMOST ANY KURD
COULD BE REASONABLY EXPECTED TO HAVE SOME SOVIET CONNECTIONS.
QASHMID'S FATHER, A DEEPLY RELIGIOUS MAN AND STRONG KURDISH
NATIONALIST, HAD ACCEPTED SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO ACHIEVE HIS
PURPOSE. T/19 WAS INSTRUCTED TO BE ESPECIALLY ALERT FOR
INFORMATION CONCERNING SOVIET INFLUENCE.

9. T/19 SOVIET CONTACTS: AT THIS POINT, TOLERNY ASKED
T/19 ABOUT HIS SOVIET CONTACTS. HE HAD INVISED SOME MONTHS AND
SOVIET THIRD SECRETARY ALEXANDER S. KULIN TO HIS PARTY AND
WAS RETURNED SEVERAL WEEKS AGO UNEXPECTEDLY AND ASKED IF
THERE WERE ANYTHING HE COULD DO TO HELP T/19, REFERRING TO T/19
AS A DIPLOMATIC MENT. ACCORDING TO T/19, THEY TALKED AND
T/19 WAS ASKING HE WOULD BE BACK, BUT HAS NOT YET RETURNED.
T/19 DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS WAS EITHER FOR FUTURE PIERCE
NOT, BUT EXPECTS KULIN TO RETURN AND TALK ABOUT T/19 AND
OTHER MATTERS. T/19 PROMISED TO REPORT ANY CONTACT
WITH KULIN AND IN DETAIL. HE WAS ALSO WARNED OF POSSIBLE
DIRECT AND PERSONAL SURVEILLANCE. T/19 THEN ASKED IF
TOLERNY THOUGHT KULIN WAS CONNECTED WITH SUBJECT MENTIONED TO
BY HIS COUSIN, NAME SHIT S E A ZAI, PROPRIETOR KURDISH
STORE AND CLOTHES IN BAGU. T/19 HIS COUSIN FOR FIRST TIME IN YEARS
HE VISITED IN BAGU AND COUSIN MENTIONED THAT HE MIGHT
BE CONNECTED TO T/19, WHO DIDN'T KNOW ABOUT IT AT THEN. LATER
T/19 COUSIN WAS ASKED TO COME TO BAGU, AS HE
WAS BEEN PROMISED TO TRAVEL PREVIOUSLY OUTSIDE SOVIET UNION.
T/19 DID NOT KNOW HIS COUSIN MEANT BY SOMEONE, A KURD WHO
WAS VISITING HIM IN BAGU, OR IN SOVIET UNION OR SOVIET CONNECTIONS
THAT HE VISITED SOMEONE MEANT SOMEONE REPRESENTING SOVIET
INTEREST. TOLERNY SAID HE DIDN'T KNOW, AND T/19 ASKED IF HE

PAGE 1 STUTTGART 7937 S E C R I T
SHOULD ASK COUSIN TO SEND "SOMEONE".

TORRENT ADVISED WAITING.

8. T/19 REQUESTED: T/19 MADE SOME REQUESTS. (A) HE WANTED TO
KNOW IF BOMI COULD ASSIST SISTER NOW IN DOWN IN EDUCATION AND
SCHOOL IN TEHRAN. TORRENT SAID HE KNEW NOTHING ON DOWN SCHOOL
BUT WOULD ACQUAINT HIMSELF WITH SITUATION. (B) T/19 WOULD LIKE
COPY OF BOOK BY (FNU) FOGLETON ABOUT KURDS AND (C) COPY OF
ROOSEVELT ARTICLE IN MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL ABOUT KURDISH REPUBLIC
OF 1945-46. HE MADE NO MONEY REQUESTS, AND ALMOST FORGOT TO
COLLECT MONIES OWED HIM.

9. IN GENERAL MEETING WENT VERY WELL WITH GENUINE CORDIALITY
AND HUGS AT END OF MEETING AND A SHAKING HANDS TO GET ON
WITH BUSINESS. T/19 SUGGESTED MOVING NEXT MEETING UP TO GET ON
SCHEDULE 2 OCTOBER. JUST AS LEAVING, T/19 MENTIONED THAT ON
11 SEPTEMBER HE WAS GOING TO REGISTER IN BOMI A GROUP TO BE
CALLED "THE COUNCIL FOR KURDISH AUTONOMY". HE ALREADY HAD THE
PAPERS DRAWN UP AND IT WOULD BE A BEGINNING OF HIS ATTEMPT TO
GATHER TOGETHER AN ORGANIZATION HE COULD USE. TORRENT WILL
OBTAIN COPY OF PAPERS AND ADDITIONAL DETAILS OF MEETING.

10. COMMENTS: IN PRESENT SITUATION AND WITH PRESENT GUIDELINES
WE REALLY HAVE LITTLE TO OFFER T/19 AND HAS LITTLE TO OFFER
US. THEREFORE, WE SHOULD GET OUR SOON BEFORE WE GET BACK IN
MORE SHARP THAN WE WANT TO BE. THREE MONTHS TRIAL SHOULD BE MADE
ON THE OTHER HAND, TORRENT BELIEVES THAT IF WE ARE WILLING TO TAKE
A MORE ACTIVE ROLE, BASED ON REMAINING ONLY FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT,
T/19 MAY HAVE CONSIDERABLE POTENTIAL. THERE SEEM TO BE NO
OTHER KURDS WITH FAMILY BACKGROUND AND INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE
WHO CAN MAKE STRONG BID FOR KURDISH LEADERSHIP AND PERHAPS T/19
ALSO CANNOT. BUT NUMBER OF RECENT KURDS IN BOMI AREA AND
WHO SEEM HAVE HAD A GREAT EFFECT ON HIM. PERHAPS ENOUGH TO ALLOW
HIM TO PUT IT ALL TOGETHER FOR ONCE. TORRENT TOLD HIM ALMOSTLY THAT
AS KURDISH NATIONALIST WAS VERY TRUE, AND HIS TRACK
INTO SOMEONE STORIES WOULD GO TO BOTH KURDS AND
KURDISH UNLESS THERE FOR HIM. T/19 TOOK HIS VERY SERIOUSLY
AND FINALLY AGREED THAT HE HAD TO WORK AND WORK AND TO GET
WHAT HE WANTED. HE NOTED THAT KROMINI HAD DONE MUCH WITHOUT

PAGE 5 STUTTGART 17937 S E C R E T
HELP AND WHILE IN EXILE. TOBLERNY BELIEVES REACTION SHOULD
CONSIDER SERIOUSLY WHERE AND HOW IT ULTIMATELY WANTS TO GO WITH
T/19 BEFORE THE TRAIL PERIOD IS UP IN DECEMBER. TOBLERNY ALSO
BELIEVES THAT IF THE SOVIETS OFFERED T/19 GUNS, MONEY, ASSISTANCE
TOMORROW, HE WOULD HAVE DIFFICULT TIME REFUSING, BELIEVING
THAT HE COULD SOMEHOW USE THE SOVIETS FOR HIS OWN ENDS. T/19
SAYS HE BELIEVES IN AUTONOMY FOR KURDS, RATHER THAN INDEPENDENCE
AND SAYS HE WOULD BE WILLING TO DO ALMOST ANYTHING TO HELP
ACHIEVE IT FOR THE KURDS. HE IS BEGINNING TO THINK MORE OF
IMITATING HIS FATHER, NOW THAT IRAN IS A MESS. WHAT HE CAN DO,
HOW FAR HE CAN CHANGE HIS PLAYBOY PAST, WHAT INFLUENCE HE CAN BRING
AROUND HIS NAME, IS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE. THE POINT IS
THAT WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO DECIDE IF WE WANT HIM, WHAT WE WANT
HIM FOR, AND HOW BADLY WE WANT HIM. IF NOT, HE WILL EITHER LEAVE
PASSED THE POINT WHERE HE HAS THE DESIRE TO WORK FOR THE KURDS
OR SOMEONE ELSE MIGHT ALREADY OWN HIM.

11. FILE: 201-8386414. RTM 25SEPT69 DRW DGC.1
S E C R E T

BT
0037

SECRET 271228Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54321

TO: STUTTGART INFO DIRECTOR, BONN, GERMANY. ANKARA, ISTANBUL

WHILETEL RUSAT ALJAZA CATOMIC

REF: STUTTGART 17937

1. ACCORDING TO 12 SEPTEMBER ISSUE OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE WEEKLY CALLED "THE IRANIANS" RAMIN GHAZI RETURNED TO IRAQ IN APRIL 79. MAGAZINE SAYS HE WAS MEMBER OF KURDISH DELEGATION WHICH RECENTLY CAME TO TEHRAN TO TRY TO NEGOTIATE WITH GOVT ON KURDISH REBEL ION. THERE IS NO MENTION OF TRAVEL OUTSIDE IRAN SINCE GHAZI'S RETURN FROM USSR.

2. FILE: 201-306424. RVW 27 SEP 99 DRV DSC.1. ALL

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CONFIDENTIAL

TO: DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

FROM: AMEMBASSY, BAGHDAD

SUBJECT: IRAQI GOVERNMENT

ON 27 SEPTEMBER 1979, ATOM, A REPORTED FOLLOWING INFORMATION, IS A PAFAS, RIVAN, DUE TO FORM ACCIDENT BUT AGAIN, FROM SIDE FOR NEXT

THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE AFFAIRS IN I, LE, KNOWN FIGURE NAMED DR. MUHAMMAD, WHO LIVE, LI, AND ALWAYS NAMED DR. MUHAMMAD, WHO LIVE, MER, DES, FILLED, THE SECURITY GUARD, ESCORT OF, CONS, S, POSITION WITH IRAQI GOVERNMENT, IS NOT KNOWN, FROM, DE, RACI, IV, N, THE PRESIDENT, D, R, H, I, IN, 19, 46, R, SAIZ, WAS KNOWN IN WERBAIL, LAST IRANIAN ARMY, MU, A, Z, A, V, A, BRAND, Y, B, K, A, SHORT-LIVED, BAIL, A, P, U, B, L, I, C, A, F, T, E, R, C, O, L, L, A, P, S, E, O, F, E, R, T, A, I, N, C, H, E, F, L, I, E, D, T, O, AN, N, A, T, I, O, N, I, S, K, N, O, W, N, O, F, H, I, M, U, N, T, I, L, S, U, R, F, A, C, E, D, I, N, B, A, G, D, A, D, R, 712

SOME OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE IRAQI PART (K) AT PRESENT ARE AS FOLLOWS: A. D. AL-FATMAN, A. S. E. M. L. I. PRESIDENT, B. U. L. A. M. I. A. N. VICE PRESIDENT WHO WAS IN, LE, DASEMLU WAS ELECTED TO NEW, CIRCULATURE IN, AGAR, GOVERNMENT.

M. AMMAD, A. M. I. N. S. A. R. A. J. I. S. E. L. A. M. D. E. K. A. M. I. R. S. A. M. I. A. Y. K. E. A. S. E. L. A. M. M. L. A. H. P. A. S. A. M. I. B. A. A. I. H. A. R. A. S. N. A. R. M. A. M. A. D. I. B. A. A. I. H. A. R. A.

PAGE TWO FROM 1044 S E C
KURDISH ABOVE ME CLERS A T T I F W H E G E D O R I M

25 SEPTEMBER 1979 IRAN GOVERNMENT RADIO
TOWNSMAN ARTHUR SHAH WAS BLOWN UP BY IRISH P.M.E. THE
ATTACK WAS CARRIED OUT BY THE J. ANNUAL OF THE JAF TRIP
WHICH IS CLANS IN IRAN. ALTHOUGH MOST OF THE IS BASED
IN THE LEADER WAS THE NANNHVI DEPT. THE
GROUP WAS ORIGINALLY INTENDED TO ATTACK ANTI-ILSCOMPHANT
IN THE ARMY BUT AFTER THE DISCUSSION IT
WAS DECIDED THAT THE INSTALLATION WERE WELL PROTECTED TO
GAIN ASSURED SUCCESS.

K. S. U D. A R. Z. N I N O W I N A R E N S H A H R.
THE PRESENT LOCATION OF HIS BROTHER, THE S. U. N. N. THE
LATTER WAS IN THERAN REPORTEDLY TRYING TO REACH
AN AGREEMENT WITH ATATLAR K. P. O. M. E. I. O. N. H. E. FUTURE
STAFF OF THE KURDS. PARTICULARLY THOSE KURDS WHO FOLLOW THE
BAR. T. A. G. O. N. D. N. 20 SEPTEMBER 1979 AS ASSASSINATION.
ATTACK WAS MADE AGAINST KURDS. THE ESCAPED KURDS WERE
THEY ARE NOT KNOWN, BUT KURDISH CIRCLES IN THERAN
BELIEVE THE ATTEMPT WAS MADE IN AN ATTEMPT TO PREVENT
AN AGREEMENT WITH KROMETU. EITHER BY K. P. R. Z. A. KURDS
OR OTHER GROUPS IN THERAN WHO ARE CLOSE TO KROMETU
AND WOULD LIKE THE KURDS TO REBEL AGAINST THERAN.

BT 201-2025-114 200 3 SEP 79 DAV D-1
S E C

28 SEP 1979

SC 281653Z SZJZPB NTAT

01 BONN 34952

TO DIRECTOR, STUTTGART INFO GERMANY, TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANBUL

FM TEL AJAJA CATOMIC

REF: 1. STUTTGART 17957

2. BONN 34941

1. REF IS REPORTED INTL FROM 27 SEP MEETING WITH CATOMIC

2. SARDAR J A F, ONE OF LEADERS OF JAF TRIBE OF KURDS, TRIED TO T/19'S SISTER (HARA EIGHT REP A). AFTER FLEEING HE ULTIMATELY ARRIVED IN BAGDAD WHERE HE BECAME INVOLVED IN WORKING WITH IRAQI MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ASSISTING KURDS WHO WERE SAFE-HAVENED IN IRAQ. JAF TRIBE WAS DURING IRAQI-KURDISH FIGHTING IN 70'S AND SARDAR APPARENTLY AN IRAQI MILITARY GROUP AND TO MEET T/19 AND HIS SISTER. MINUTE TRIP WAS POSTPONED SO SARDAR COULD MAKE TRIP TO KURD STAN, AND HE IS NOW SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE BONN 5 OCT. ARRANGE FOR TOELERNY TO MEET SARDAR.

TOELERNY'S CHILDREN (3) HAVE BEEN ENTERED IN AMERICAN SCHOOL, BUT WITH COST RUNNING OVER \$5,000 (THIS FIGURE CHECKS) T/19 HAS REQUESTED OUR ASSISTANCE. CONSULTATION WITH BONN, TOELERNY PROPOSES USING SCHOOL PROGRAM WITH SARDAR SUGGESTING A PAY-AS-YOU-GO ARRANGEMENT IN RETURN FOR HIS CONTINUING COOPERATION. TARGETS BOTH KURDS AND IRAQI SERVICE. METHOD OF COMMO WOULD BE TIME ALLOWS TRAINING. OTHERWISE, WILL ARRANGE FOLLOW-UP WHICH WE COULD UNDERWRITE TO GERMANY TO SEE FAMILY. NOTE TRAINING AND SCSWILL.

3. REQUEST TRACES SARDAR. ALSO REQUEST HQS APPROVAL THIS PROPOSAL BY 5 OCT.

4. FILE: 281-2306414. RVN 28SEP90 DRD DEC 1

41-775 7 102

U S S R 1 101112 OCT 70 STAFF

CITE FROM 22042

MR. STURTON, STUTTGART INFO GERMANY, TEHRAN, ASIA

URGENT AREA CATIONIC

REF: DOWN 2452

1. FOLLOWING PIECES OF INFORMATION WERE PROVIDED BY
CATIONIC/16 (1/16) DURING LAST MEETING WITH TOLBERT AND ARE
FORWARDED FOR HIS INFORMATION AND POSSIBLE COMMENT:

2. RADIO T A S R T A S A I. 2ND VICE PRESIDENT
HASAN LERZAGUL, HAS BEEN RELATIVE OF KHOMEINI) NOW (TO
FOR SOMEONE FROM GERMANY. T/16 HAS TELEPHONE NUMBER AND
NAME. HAVE AN INTEREST?

3. T/16 HAS STORY OF SON OF TURKISH FORD, WHO
WAS T/16, WHEN T/16 EXTRACTED FROM SHAN'S PRISON AT SOME
TIME IN 1977. SON RECENTLY CAME TO T/16 WITH UNKNOWN FORD
WITH STRANGE STORY. SOCIALIST COUNTRY, IDENTIFY
WENT TO GIVE ARMS TO RUSS UNDER GUISE ARMS ARE BEING
FOR SUPPLIES IN RUSSIA. KUD ASKED T/16 IF HE
WAS FROM RUSSIA. T/16 SAYS HE IS FROM RUSSIA BY
STORY REQUESTS MUCH MORE DETAIL AND SUBSTANTIATION.
T/16 ASKED T/16 TO ENQUIRE IN NEXT MEETING WITH
T/16. KUD ASKED T/16 ABOUT THREE OTHERS. T/16 SUGGESTED
T/16 SPECIALIST, PRESIDENT NATIVE GERMAN, WHO COULD
BE THE OTHER GUISE OF CURRENT POSSIBILITY. TOLBERT
REQUESTED OF STORY AND WENT NO COMMITMENT.

4. ROBERT ALEXANDER T V L I N (PARA SEVEN REF A)
NO FURTHER CONTACT.

5. 247-220424. NEW 23 OCT 70 REF LOC.1.

6 OCT 79 07 07Z

SECRET 051436Z OCT 79 STAFF

THE BOMB 05112

PRIORITY DIRECTOR, STUTTGART INFO GERMANY TEHRAN, AKAR, STANBUL.

MENTEL AJAJA CATOMIC

NEW DIRECTOR 0506119

1. AS SPECULATED IN REF. SARDAR JAFI IS A BROTHER OF SALAR. CATOMIC/19 (1/19) INFORMED TOHLERND. 2. THAT SARDAR JAFI WILL BE DEPARTING BAGHDAD 3 OCT. ALTHOUGH LATTER DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER HE WILL BE COMING FIRST TO LONDON OR TO BONN. JAF WILL BE IN BONN ONLY FEW DAYS AND 7/19 WILL BROKEN MEETING BETWEEN JAF AND C/O AT THAT TIME. WILL USE THAT OPPORTUNITY TO EXTRACT WHAT INTELLIGENCE JAF MAY HAVE. WE MAY HAVE ACCESS TO INFORMATION CONCERNING IRAQI INVOLVEMENT WITH ANTI-KHOMEINI KUNDS, GUN-RUNNING TO KURDS AND MILITANT KURISH LEADERSHIP.

2. GIVEN RESERVATIONS EXPRESSED REF. WILL USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE FURTHER ASSESSMENT OF JAF. IF PROSPECTS LOOK GOOD, BASE PROPOSES TO UNDERWRITE JAF'S RETURN TO BONN ASAP FROM BAGHDAD. AT THAT TIME WE CAN BETTER ASSESS JAF'S ACCESS AND CAPABILITY AND WHERE WE WANT TO GO WITH HIM.

3. HQS STUTTGART AND BONN RECEIVE LITTLE KURDISH AFFIC KHAN MILDIST. IT WOULD AID CONSIDERABLY IN HANDLING KURDISH CASES IF WE COULD BE INFO ADVISED ON RELEVANT KURISH REPORTS, SO AS TO AVOID DUPLICATION OF REPORTING AND TO SETTING BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE UP TO SPEED.

4. SDTRIBE/ C/O WILL BE MEETING WITH ASSET IN APPROXIMATE THREE WEEKS. THERE GOOD CHANCE SDTRIBE WILL HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF SARDAR JAF AND BE ABLE TO PROVIDE ASSESSMENT DATA.

5. FILE: 201-386414. RVV- 3 OCT 89 DRD DSCN.
SECRET

10 OCT 1979 05:02

191750Z OCT 79

COMM 35281

AMMUNITION DIRECTOR TAVO GERMANY, TEHRAN, ANKARA, ESB
SAB

EL KAJA CATOMIC INTEL

BOY 05112

1. IN MEETING IN OCTOBER 1979 WITH GARONIZED
P...-TAV, SAKAR J A E, FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

2. JAF IS WORKING CLOSELY WITH IRAQI GOVERNMENT
TO KAF KURDS WHO HOLD AN AREA EAST AND WEST OF TE
IS JAF IS WORKING CLOSELY WITH IRAQI GOVERNMENT

THAN 1980 C... WAS WELL TO THE...
UNABLY THE C-S... MACHINE...
... DURING THE...
... GOVERNMENT...
... OCTOBER 1979...
... RELEASED BY THE...
... OCTOBER 1979...

3. JAF... BAHAD... OCTOBER...
... 12 OCTOBER...
... CHAIR AND...
... TO SEE...
... MEETING WITH PRESIDENT...
... VISIT TO...

55221 E H C A R T
LATTER WIFE IS TO SEE A DENTIST HE WILL RE
COLLECT HIS WIFE AND THREE CHILDREN AND TA
BACK TO BAGHDAD. HE REGRETS THIS BUT CANNOT
FINALLY TO GET THEM IN GERMANY. HE EXPECTS TO
GO AWAY IN ONE OR TWO MONTHS.

CLAIMS THAT NO ONE IS HELPING THE KURDS. E
IT HELPS THEM TREMENDOUSLY. KURDS APPARE
OBTAIN ASSISTANCE FROM IRAQ
SYRIA HAS BEEN HELPING THE
KURDS. THE KURANS UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF JAM
BUT THEIR AID HAS NOW DWANDED. IN
BAGHDAD TALAPANI WAS IN BAGHDAD. LOOKING

AT AN UNUSUAL STEP. CONSIDERING THE
HE IS ALSO GETTING
ARMY HAVE BEEN I
S. H. U. T

HAS VISITED BAGHDAD SEVERAL
THE SOVIET UNION IS DOING NOTHING
EVEN THOUGH THEY COULD DO IT VERY EASILY
AND THEY WOULD NOT OF COURSE. JAT
THE SOVIET UNION TO ASK FOR ASS
SO FAR AS
THEY HAVE SENT
THE SOVIET UNION, BUT
THEY HAVE REQUESTED HELP.

ASKED IF THE
IRAQI JAT
THE USSR.
SENKOV'S
IN EUROPE
OPENING AND
SUPPLYING
MONTYAN. THE
TO IRANIAN
LIKE A
CARRIED OUT
SEEN A
THE THE

THAT HE
HAD WITH
THAT HE

1 NOV 79 04 24Z

C R E T 210212Z NOV 79 INTEL

DIRECTOR 543733

TEHRAN INFO BORN, GERMANY, ANKARA, ISTANBUL, STUTTGART,
AVIV, MOSCOW.

INTEL AJAJA CATOMIC INTEL

BORN 55221 (NOT SENT TEL AVIV)

FOLLOWING IS TDFIRDB-315/19065-79 BASED ON REF FOR
DISSEM PER FIELD DISSEM LINE.

TDMIRDE-315/13065-73

DIST: 32 OCTOBER 1979

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
REPORT CLASS SECRET UNINT NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON

COUNTRY: IRAN/IRAQ/USSR

SUBJECT: 1. ARMS OBTAINED BY KURDISH FACTIONS;
2. COMMENTS OF KURDISH TRIBAL LEADER ON OTHER COUNTRY
SUPPORT TO THE KURDS (DOI: OCTOBER 1979)

SOURCE: A MEMBER OF A PROMINENT KURDISH FAMILY WHO HAS LONG STAYING TIES TO KURDISH LEADERS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED. SOME OF HIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN GENERALLY SUBSTANTIATED. HE INFORMANT HAD GOOD ACCESS.

1. ONE KURDISH TRIBE, THE JAYS, ARE CURRENTLY MINGLED IN AN AREA EAST AND WEST OF KERMANSHAH. IN THIS AREA, THE TRIBE HAS 1,500 MEN. A NUMBER DELIBERATELY KEPT THIS LOW IN ORDER TO GET QUALITY FIGHTERS. THEIR ORIGINAL SUPPLY OF ARMS WAS OBTAINED BY TAKING A MILITARY COMPOUND NEAR KERMANSHAH IN LATE APRIL 1979. THEY OBTAINED FROM THE FORTRESS MORE THAN 1,200 GERMAN G-3'S AS WELL AS 100 "LARGE" G-3'S, PRESUMABLY THE G-3 IN THE MACHINE GUN MODE; TWELVE G-2. NABE BR-114 MORTARS; TWO "SMALL" ARTILLERY PIECES; AND THREE TRUCK LOADS OF AMMUNITION. DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF OCTOBER, THE GROUP RECEIVED AN ADDITIONAL 400 KALASHNIKOV'S WHICH WERE PROVIDED BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT. THIS GROUP OPERATES IN THE KERMANSHAH-SANANDAJ AREA TO THE WEST OF THIS AREA TO THE IRAQI BORDER - THE NARDASET-BANER AREA. THE KURDISH ELEMENTS ARE UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP).

2. A LEADING MEMBER OF THE JAYS CLAIMS THAT NO ONE IS HELPING THE KURDS SECRETLY, AND THAT IRAQ IS PROVIDING CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT. (SOURCE COMMENT: KURDS APPARENTLY HAVE UNLIMITED AUTHORITY TO OBTAIN ASSISTANCE FROM IRAQ IF THEY HAVE GOOD CREDENTIALS.) SKRI HAS BEEN HELPING THE NORTHERN KURDS, THE SORRANI, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF JALAL TALA BANI. BUT THEIR AID HAS NOW DROPPED. TALABANI WAS RECENTLY IN BAGHDAD LOOKING FOR ASSISTANCE. (SOURCE COMMENT: THIS IS CONSIDERED AN UNUSUAL STEP AS TALABANI FOUGHT FOR IRANS IN 1974-1975.) THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP) IS ALSO RECEIVING SOME HELP FROM IRAQ, ALTHOUGH MOST OF THEIR AIMS HAVE

WAS LOOTED FROM THE IRANIAN AUTHORITIES. EVEN ABDOL RAHMAN
A S E M L U. THE PRESENT LEADER OF THE KDP WAS VISITED
MASHAD SEVERAL TIMES.

3. THE SOVIET UNION IS DOING NOTHING TO HELP THE KURDS,
EVEN THOUGH THEY COULD DO IT VERY EASILY ACROSS COMMON BORDERS.
AND EVEN THOUGH MOST OF THE KDP ARE BELIEVED BY THE KURDS TO
BE COMMUNISTS, OR AT LEAST LEFTISTS. THE GROUP THAT VISITED
THE SOVIET UNION TO ASK FOR ASSISTANCE HAD NOT RETURNED AS OF
15 OCTOBER. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: SEE TOPINDE-515/1627-79
DATED 17 SEPTEMBER 1979 FROM THE SAME SOURCE, WHICH REPORTED ON
THE VISIT.) (FIELD COMMENT: ACCORDING TO THE SOURCE, KURDS
FROM MANY TRIBES HAVE SENT REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE VIA RELATIVES
IN THE SOVIET UNION, BUT SOURCE SAID AS FAR AS HE KNEW, NONE
CLAIM TO HAVE RECEIVED AID AND HE WAS NOT AWARE OF ANYTHING
WHICH WOULD INDICATE SUCH AID HAD BEEN GIVEN.

4. IRAQ, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS COOPERATING IN EVERY WAY,
OPENING AND CLOSING THE BORDER FOR CLANDESTINE ACTIVITY, AS
WELL AS SUPPLYING MATERIAL AID. IN LATE AUGUST SADDAM HUSSEIN
VISITED SULAYMANIYAH, THE KURDISH CAPITAL IN IRAQ, AND THE
NAME OF HIS AID TO IRANIAN KURDS WAS SO WELL KNOWN AND BELIEVED
THAT HE WAS CREDITED AS IF HE WERE A HERO. (SOURCE COMMENT:
WELL, ADDING THE IRANIAN KURDS MAY HEAD AGAIN TO A REBELLION
IN IRAQ KURDISH ACTIVITY, THE IRAQIS APPARENTLY WANTED TO
USE THE KURDS AGAINST K H O M E I N I IN IRAN. IRAQ SEEMED
TO BE USING THIS PERIOD OF COMMON PURPOSE TO EXPLORE WHETHER
IT WOULD BE BETTER TO FAVOR THE KURDS RATHER THAN FIGHTING
THEM.

5. ACR.: (12 OCTOBER 1979)

6. FIELD DISSEM: SENT TO TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANBUL.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION
AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. RWW
590CT99 DRV DSC-1 BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS
CLASS CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

BT
#4863

RET 101705Z OCT 79 STAFF

FOR IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO GERMANY, ANKARA, ISTANBUL, TEHRAN

JOHN 06322

134
DATE 19 OCT 1979
TIME 0800
FROM
SUBJ
INFO
1. PURSUANT REF OPS INTER CABLE, KEITH L. TOLLEN MET
2. TOMIC/19 (1/19) AND SARDAR J A P 12 OCTOBER 1979 FOR
3. OPS, WHICH WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SORT OUT ALL OPS MATTER
4. A MAXIMUM TIME JAP AVAILABLE. NEXT MEETING SCHEDULED
5. 19 ON 24 OCTOBER.

TOULMENT ATTEMPTED TO ASSESS JAF WHILE EXTRA-
CROSSING PRIMARILY BY ASKING HARD QUESTIONS. JAF CAME ACROSS
KNEW WITH STRONG IDEAS ABOUT WHAT HE KNEW AND DIDN'T
DATES (WHICH IS FAIRLY COMMON), VERY CAREFUL WITH
THOUGH HE DROPPED A FEW. HE WAS NOT SELLING
STOCKY MAN WITH ALMOST A DISTINGUISHED APPEARANCE.
OWNED GRAY HAIR AND AN AIR OF QUIET AUTHORITY.
THAT HE HAD COME TO THE MEETING PRIMARILY
TO THIS WAS RECORDED HE HAD BRING
UNWILLING. HE WAS MUCH MORE
FOR ANY KIND OF ASSISTANCE, EVEN FOR HIS
WHICH HAD BEEN RAISED IN FACT BY 19
THE ISSUE OF CRYSTAL. THEIR RAISERS IT, AND
TOLD THAT JAF WAS GOING TO TAKE HIS FATHER
WITH HIM, THAT HE WOULD NOT AGREE TO LE
NORTHEN PORTLAND AND THAT IT WOULD BE
THAT THIS CHORD WAS DANGEROUS. JAF ASKED
AND THAT TOLMENT DIDN'T
YOU JUST THE SAME. HE MAY BE CLEVER
MIGHT WANT TO HEAR AND DIDN'T WANT TO
CAREST BY SAYING THAT IT THINGS DI
THE TRILL IN BANGOR. TO PASS THE WORD

PAGE 2 HONN 85222 S E C R E T
THROUGH 2/19 AND JAF HAS PLEASED

2. JAY WILL BE BACK IN BOMB. PERHAPS IN A WEEK
ET-PRMIER BAKETIYAR IN PARIS AND A DENTIST IN
AS INTEL FROM THE BAKETIYAR VISIT. THIS CAN PRO
AINED THRU 7/19. BUT IF JES WANTS TO RECONSIDER
L TO FUND SCHOOL COSTS IN BOMB (AND WE SURE
WE MAKE ONE LAST
HE RETURNS IN A WEEK.

2. JAP IS VERY SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT HIS TWO MISTERS
WHICH HE THOUGHT WOULD KILL HIM IN A MINUTE. JAP
WAS REQUESTED TO BE PROTECTED IN BEING KILLED. HE
WAS REQUESTED TO BE PROTECTED IN BEING KILLED. HE
WAS REQUESTED TO BE PROTECTED IN BEING KILLED. HE

[illegible]

TOULERY'S ASSUMPTION THAT KODISH LEADING WAS SO CLOSELY KEPT THAT HE IS GAINING INFLUENCE AMONG THE PAPERS, EXISTE TRAININGS, AND TO THE PLAGI READING BUT INDETERMINATE. S. MOORE CONTINUE TO SHARE MYTHS AND BELIEFS. S. MOORE HAS BEEN TO LONG BE MOORE'S FAVORITE. S. MOORE OF HIS KIND, HE WANTS TO HAVE A SUCCESSFUL S. MOORE ULTIMATELY COME THROUGH IN SOME WAY. S. MOORE

3. DOWNS 85222 S E C R E T
NOT RECORDED. IF HE COULD BE PERSUADED TO LEAVE HIS
HOME IN L.A., WITH OUR FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR HIS CHILD ONE
EDUCATION, HE MIGHT CHANGE HIS MIND. STRICHTY SPEAK
IT COULD NOT BE DONE ON A QUID PRO QUID BASIS IN RETURN FO-
WE WOULD NOT PLAY APPREHENSION ON HIS BASIS AS
IT COULD BE OFFENSIVE TO HIM, BUT HE WOULD BE HEAT-
ED DOWN AT HIS POINT. AND SUNDAY WOULD COME TO BE
E. PERHAPS WE CONSIDER PAYMENT OF TRAVEL FOR THREE
CHILDREN, TRAVELING APPROXIMATELY ONE \$1000 (1977-1978) WROD
IN ORDER TO KEEP
THEM "WELL OFF HERE" AND THEN THE COLLECTION WOULD BE IN
THEIR FISH AND FISHING WARE. WE WOULD THEN 2. WE WOULD
STRICHTY PROVE PROSECUTE. WE WOULD THEN 2. WE WOULD
IN ORDER TO APPROACH JAY AGAIN BEFORE HE LEAVES OR 2. WE WOULD

FILE: 281-306414. RVS IS OUR NO. 100 DOCK

190079 P 272

E T 182056Z OCT 79 STAFF

DIRECTOR 535045.

BONN, STUTTGART INFO GERMANY, TEHRAN, INFRA, ISRAEL, ID.

EL AJAJA SDFICKLE SDEAZE CATOMIC

BONN 85221

1. DURING CURRENT OR UPCOMING MEETINGS WITH CATOMIC/1-
9) AND SDFICKLE/1 (F/1) WOULD APPRECIATE ANY FURTHER INFOR-
MATION AVAILABLE SUPPORTING SDEAZE/1'S (P/1) REE REPORT ON GOVERN-
MENT OF IRAQ (GOI) SUPPORT TO KURDS FIGHTING IRANIAN FORCES.
HOWEVER, WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION ANY OF ABOVE
SOURCES CAN PROVIDE ON N A G R S H R A N D I FAMILY, REPORTEDLY
PROMINENT KURDISH FAMILY LEADERS OF WHICH HAVE FLED TO IRAQ.
FAMILY REPORTEDLY HAD LONG HISTORY OF ASSOCIATION WITH SPAN.

2. FILE 201-963160; 201-960951; 201-326414. PW 180079
ENV DGC.1 ALL SECRET.

SECRET

BT

7755

--SECRET--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

IRAN

FORMER IRANIAN PREMIER BAKHTIAR'S NASCENT EFFORTS
TO RETURN TO POWER (DOI: MID-OCTOBER 1978)

1. A MEMBER OF A PROMINENT KURDISH FAMILY WHO HAS LONG-
STANDING TIES TO KURDISH LEADERS. HE ATTENDED A
MEETING WITH BAKHTIAR. HIS REPORTING/RELIABILITY
HAS NOT BEEN FULLY ESTABLISHED.

1. FORMER IRANIAN PREMIER SHAHUR BAKHTIAR HAS
BEEN HOLDING DISCUSSIONS IN PARIS WITH INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS
OF VARIOUS KURDISH FACTIONS, AS WELL AS WITH EXILED IRANIAN
GROUPS IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE U.S. BAKHTIAR HAS STRESSED
TO THESE GROUPS THAT SHOULD HE RETURN TO POWER IN IRAN, HE
WOULD FAVOR KURDISH AUTONOMY BUT NOT SEPARATION FROM IRAN.
BAKHTIAR HAS ALSO INDICATED THAT HE HAS ENOUGH POLITICAL
SUPPORTERS AND WILL SOON HAVE ENOUGH FINANCIAL AID TO CARRY
OUT POLITICAL AND MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST THE KHOMEINI
REGIME. HE FURTHER IMPLIED THAT HE HAS BEEN IN INDIRECT
CONTACT WITH THE FORMER SHAH, BUT THAT HIS PAST LOYALTY
TO THE SHAH PLAY NO ROLE IN HIS PRESENT OR FUTURE PLANS
VIS-A-VIS RETURN TO POWER IN IRAN.

2. BAKHTIAR HAS GIVEN HIM MORAL SUPPORT TO THE KURDS.
AT KURDISH REQUEST, BAKHTIAR HAS ALSO AGREED TO ENLIST THE
AID OF FORMER SAVAK OR IRANIAN ARMY OFFICERS TO GO TO
KURDISTAN TO TRAIN KURDISH FIGHTING FORCES. BAKHTIAR HAS
BEEN IN CONTACT WITH KURDISH LEADERS IN BOTH THE KERMANSHAH AND
MAHABAD AREAS WHO WOULD LEAD THESE FORCES IN THEIR RESPECTIVE
AREAS. HE IS PLANNING TO DISPATCH IN MID OR LATE NOVEMBER
AN EMISSARY TO IRAN TO NEGOTIATE A POLITICAL AND MILITARY
LIAISON WITH THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP).

3. IN ADDITION TO COMING TO TERMS WITH THE KURDS,
BAKHTIAR REALIZES THAT HE MUST ESTABLISH A SUPPORT WITH THE
IRANIAN COMMUNISTS IF HE IS TO REGAIN AND RETAIN INFLUENCE
IN IRAN.

4. (SOURCE COMMENT: BAKHTIAR SPEAKS WITH CONFIDENCE
ABOUT HIS EVENTUAL RETURN TO POWER, AND GIVES EVIDENCE OF

ABLE TO ATTRACT A RAPIDLY INCREASING ENTOURAGE OF
STUDENT IRANIAN ELEMENTS TO HIM.)

5. ACQ: (26 OCTOBER 1979)

6. FIELD DISSEM: SENT TO TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANBUL.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T-WARNING NOTICE, INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR CONSULTANTS,
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY
ORIGINATOR. RVN 29OCT99 DRV D9C.1BY RECORDED REPORTING
OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF
OVERALL DOCUMENT.

29 OCT 19 17 12Z

291128Z OCT 79 INTEL

BT 775 ZNY KXXXX

CTOR INFO STUTIGART, GERMANY, BERLIN, TEHRAN,
ANKARA, ISTANBUL.

L A JAJA CATOMIC INTEL ZRWAHOO

DATA ZRWAHOO FOR THIRD COUNTRY CONTENT. SOURCE CATOMIC IS
MACAGONE OBTAINED. PLACE ACQUIRED OMITTED FOR SOURCE
PROTECTION. SEE BONN 82772 (NDIM) FOR DETAILS OF
ACQUISITION THAT DO NOT AFFECT DISSEM. OBDI 8-1.
NO LIAISON. NO INDEX. FILE: 281-8306/14. EG-7851
RVN 29OCT99 D9C.1 BY 055363.

FILED: 291126Z

3 Nov 79 07 11Z

S E C R E T 021349Z NOV 79 STAFF

CITE BONN 85912

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO STUTTGART, GERMANY. TEHRAN, PARIS, GENEVA.

MMINTEL AJAJA CATOMIC

REF: A. BONN 85797 3309324
B. DIRECTOR 543343

1. MEETING WITH CATOMIC/19 (T/19) HELD ON 31 OCTOBER; NEXT MEETING SCHEDULED FOR 8 NOVEMBER TO COINCIDE WITH T/19 RETURN FROM PARIS.

2. T/19 HAS TALKED BY TELEPHONE WITH BAKHTIAR AIDES IN PARIS. BAKHTIAR SLIPPED OUT OF PARIS DURING WEEK OF 29 OCTOBER AND TRAVELED TO IRAQ WHERE HE MET WITH HIGH-LEVEL IRAQI GOVERNMENT LEADERS. BAKHTIAR WAS EXPECTED BACK IN PARIS AT THE END OF THE WEEK, AND T/19 WAS INSTRUCTED TO COME TO PARIS FOR A 4 NOVEMBER MEETING WITH HIM.

3. T/19 ALSO MET IN BONN WITH GLOBAL AIRWAYS REPRESENTATIVE JAMES SALINAS DESCRIBED REFS A AND B. DISCUSSIONS FOCUSED ON GLOBAL GUN-RUNNING CAPABILITIES. SALINAS WAS VERY INTERESTED IN PROVIDING SUPPORT TO THE KURDS FOR SUCH ACTIVITIES. THIS IS IN LINE WITH T/19 UNDERSTANDING THAT AN EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRY, PROBABLY CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HAS AGREED TO SUPPLY WEAPONRY TO THE KURDS, BUT THAT THE KURDS MUST ENLIST THEIR OWN MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION FOR THE ARMS.

4. T/19 DISCUSSED RUMORS CONCERNING PRO-SHAH DEMONSTRATIONS TAKING PLACE IN IRAN BUT COULD NOT PROVIDE DETAIL OR RELIABLE SOURCING.

5. FILE: 281-386414. RVW 02 NOV 99 DRV D9C1.

GDS COMMENT: RELAYED TO INFO TEHRAN, PARIS, GENEVA PER DIR 545688
S E C R E T

BT
#0554

1

3 Nov 78 17 202

SECRET WINTL NOFORM CONTRACT ORCON 232256Z NOV 78 INTEL
TE DIRECTOR 545780

TEHRAN INFO PARIS, LONDON, GENEVA, BONN, STUTTGART, GERMANY.

INTEL AJAJA CATOMIC INTEL

BONN 85912 (BEING RELATED PARIS, GENEVA;
LACS SENT/NEED LONDON)

FOLLOWING IS TDFIRDA-315/19334-79 BASED ON REF FOR DISSEM
FIELD DISSEM LINE. FOR LONDON: OKAY FOR GRAPH SOURCED
UNTESTED SOURCE WITH GOOD ACCESS TO THE INFORMATION,

100-315/19334-72

DIS: 22 NOVEMBER 1979

THIS INFORMATION IS NOT FULLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
OF CLASS SECRET UNNT A NFORM CONTRACT ORCON

1. IRAN/IRAC
CT: CLAND STIN NIST TO IRAQ BY FORMER IRANIAN PRIN
NIN: IE SHARHUR BAKHTIAI DOI: 29 OCTOBER - EARLY
NOVEMBER 1979

2. A MEMBER OF A COMMITTEE SURVIVE FAMIL WHO HAS LOSE
STANDS FIVE TO SEVENTEEN YEARS. HIS RELIABILITY
HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED. SOME OF HIS INFORMATION HAS
BEEN SUBSTANTIATED. HE HAD GOOD ACCESS TO THE
INFORMATION CITED BELOW.

1. DURING THE WEEK OF 29 OCTOBER 1979, FORMER IRANIAN
MINISTER SHARHUR BAKHTIAI LEFT PARIS AND TRIP TO IRAQ. THERE
HE IS CURRENTLY READING AND TRAVELING TO IRAQ. THERE
HE HAD BEEN IN THE PAST GOVERNMENT LEADERS. BAKHTIAI WAS
CITED EACH IN PARTS OF THE PAST OF ALL CITY. FIELD COMMAND
SOURCE DID NOT KNOW THE PURPOSE OF BAKHTIAI'S TRIP TO IRAQ
WHAT HE DISCUSSED WITH THE IRAQI OFFICIALS.

2. ACC: (ON OCTOBER 1979)

3. FIELD DISSEMINATION TO TEHRAN, PARIS, LONDON

4. WARNING NOTICE- INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
METHODS INVOLVED- AT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS- NOT
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OF CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS- DISSEMINAT
EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. RFW
OVERS REV D.C. BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS
RE CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

3 Nov 79 07 23z

S E C R E T 030035Z NOV 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 545686.

TO: PRIORITY BONN, GENEVA INFO PARIS, STUTTGART, GERMANY, TEHRAN.

WMINTEL RYBAT AJAJA SDSTAY CATOMIC

REFS: A. BONN 85912 (BEING RELAYED GENEVA, PARIS,
TEHRAN)

B. DIRECTOR 536378 (NOT SENT/NEEDED BONN, STUTTGART, GERMANY,
TEHRAN)

1. WE ARE VERY INTERESTED IN ANY SUPPORTING DETAIL CATOMIC/19 (C/19) (IDEN FOR GENEVA, PARIS) CAN PROVIDE ON REF REPORT OF BAKHTIAR'S TRAVEL TO IRAQ. PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN WHO HE MET, SUBJECT THEIR DISCUSSIONS, NATURE/RESULTS ANY AGREEMENTS REACHED AND IN ACTIONS TAKEN RESULTING FROM SUCH MEETINGS. PLS PREPARE ANY SUCH INFORMATION IN INTEL FORMAT TO FACILITATE MORE RAPID DISSEMINATION.

2. FOR GENEVA: REF A MAKES REF B PROPOSED CONTACT WITH SDSTAY/1 (S/1) (IDEN FOR BONN, STUTTGART, GERMANY) OF MORE PRESSING IMPORTANCE AND WOULD APPRECIATE GUNION ATTEMPTING CONTACT S/1 AT HIS EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO ATTEMPT DETERMINE RESULTS BAKHTIAR'S IRAQI TRIP AND ANY OTHER INFORMATION ON CURRENT BAKHTIAR ACTIVITIES. PLEASE ADVISE.

3. FOR BONN: WE ALSO INTERESTED IN DETAILS C/19 CONTACT WITH GUN-SHIPPERS AND C/19'S ROLE IN ALL OF THIS. WHERE DOES C/19 GET UNDERSTANDING THAT EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRY HAS AGREED SUPPLY WEAPONS TO KURDS, WHO IS ARRANGING FOR SUCH SUPPLY, HOW WILL THEY BE SHIPPED PRIOR TO TURNOVER TO ANY CHARTER OUTFIT C/19 PROVIDES?

4. FILE: 201-0306414; 201-0212149. RVW 2NOV99 DRV D9C.1

ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T

BT
#6469

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1979-274-830

1

CATOMIC/19. Name unknown. Resides in Berlin. May be a teacher. Regards himself as a principal leader of the Kurdish community in Europe. Comes from prominent Kurdish family (family may have branches in both Iran and Iraq). Was in Europe well before the Revolution, and it is possible that his family had been in opposition to the Shah, and that he was in effect in exile.

Purpose of contact: To acquire information on the situation in Kurdistan. C/19 was to debrief or introduce to us people with firsthand knowledge of developments in Kurdistan. Believe it was he who introduced a Kurdish leader who was traveling in Europe in September or October. Name not recalled, but believe he is brother of Kurdish leader who was executed after the Revolution, probably in March. There were one or two meetings, during which he claimed to have Iraqi support for his Kurdish force near Kermanshah.

Jun 78 12 52

E C R E T 010127Z JUN 79 STAFF

ITE DIRECTOR 449183.

O: TEHRAN INFO FB/LOS ANGELES.

NINTEL AJAJA PORRES SD RA SIT

FM: DIRECTOR 449149

- 1. IDEN A IS HAJA OUN ROWSHA
IDEN B IS AJA ROWSHAI
IDEN C IS HAJA ROWSAHI

Handwritten: T. J. ...
Cry Ar. ...
Haj ...

- 2. FILE: 201-9-10 3. RVN 31 MAY 9 DRV 09C-1 ALL SECRET

E C R E T
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SECRET 012219Z JUN 78
CITE: FR/LOS ANGELES 20502
TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO PRI
FROM: ASAC
SUBJECT: ~~SECRET~~
FR/LOS ANGELES 20501
IDENTITY
TOMATOUN ROYANI MOGHADD
1. LANC P. ROYANI MOGHADD
2. MOGHADD
3. MOGHADD
4. MOGHADD
5. MOGHADD
THE SURVEY DEPART
FILE: 201-561045. 2111JUN80 DRY 90
SECRET
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10/18/2002 JUN 20 1967

20 JUN 1967 03 53Z

TEHRAN/LOS ANGELES 73553 (EGERUP LADINGS)

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN.

INTEL AJAJA HORRES SDTRANS T

TO: DIRECTOR 458103 ✓

1. IN CONTACT WITH SDTRANSIT/1 (T/1) 18 JUNE HE ADVISED HAS
BUYING GIFTS TO TAKE TO FAMILY IN TEHRAN AND IN PROCESS OF
LEAVING CAR. HE IS DELAYING HIS DEPARTURE ONLY BECAUSE HE
WAITING FOR AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE FROM WASHINGTON AS TO WHETHER
NOT HE WILL BECOME ASSOCIATED WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE. IF
ADVISED THAT THERE IS INTEREST, HE AVAILABLE FOR TRAINING AND/OR
ADVANCE AND DEBRIEFINGS FOR PERIOD REQUIRED.

2. AS REQUESTED BY BASE IN TELCON WITH T/1 ON 15 JUNE. HE
TELEPHONED HIS BROTHER IN ABADAN ON 17 JUNE. HE HAD ALSO TALKED
HIS FAMILY IN TEHRAN OVER WEEKEND. BROTHER SAID THAT T/1
PER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, COULD NOT ANTICIPATE BEING HIRED
OFFERED POSITION IN NIOC PRIOR TO ARRIVING IN COUNTRY AND
MENTIONED THIS OUT OF QUESTION FOR ANY EMPLOYMENT AT ANY LEVEL
THOSE PREVIOUSLY SENT BY NIOC FOR TRAINING ABROAD COULD
BE SURE THEY HAD JOBS ON RETURN. BROTHER EXPLAINED THAT HE
IN AUTHORITY WOULD TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY, BUT ADDED THAT
T/1'S CHANCES FOR EMPLOYMENT WERE VERY GOOD FOR FOLLOWING
REASONS: T/1 HAD PREVIOUSLY WORKED FOR ABADAN REFINERY AND IN
HE RETURNING TO REQUEST REEMPLOYMENT IN SAME OVERSEAS
ORGANIZATION. T/1 BROTHER HIMSELF HAD BEEN MEMBER AND
ORGANIZING THE PRO-REVOLUTIONARY, PRO-KHOMEINI COMMITTEE OF
ORIGINAL ELEVEN PERSONS AT THE ABADAN REFINERY WHEN DISSENT
STILL IN PARTS. T/1 BROTHER, AN OFFICIAL IN THE DEPARTMENT
PROCESSING, PLANNING AND ENGINEERING AT THE ABADAN REFINERY.
HE WOULD ASSIST T/1 IN GETTING NIOC EMPLOYMENT THROUGH HIS
TIES IN THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES. ALSO, AS AN OFFICIAL OF
T/1 BROTHER RECOMMENDED THAT T/1 APPROACH HASAN N A Z E M
NIOC AND SAID HE WOULD PREPARE A LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION IF
WERE NEEDED.

2. FR/LOS ANGELES 22553Z JUL 77. T/1, A FRIEND OF THE FAMILY, IS A RETIRED GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL OF THE MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION. HE IS ABLE TO GET THE TRAVEL PASSAGE OF HIS FAMILY TO IRAN. T/1, A FRIEND OF THE FAMILY, PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS GOVERNOR OF KORASAN, GOVERNOR OF THE MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION AND GOVERNOR OF TEHRAN. T/1, A FRIEND OF THE FAMILY, HAD RESIGNED AS GOVERNOR OF TEHRAN ABOUT A YEAR AGO. T/1 WAS APPROACHED BY T/1 TO REASSUME THIS POSITION. T/1'S SUGGESTION, YET WITH CRITICISM AMONGST CERTAIN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE MEMBERS, THE ASSIGNMENT WAS DROPPED; BUT T/1 REMAINS A FRIEND AND OCCASIONAL CONFIDANT OF THE FAMILY. THE FAMILY ALSO HAS A RELATIONSHIP WITH T/1 (POSSIBLY GARAND Z A CIA PLAN, THE CHIEF OF POLICE IN T/1, WHO IS ALSO A LONG-TIME CONFIDANT AND FRIEND OF KHOMEINI. T/1 AND HIS FAMILY TALKED OF ARRANGING A PERSONAL INTERVIEW WITH KHOMEINI T/1 ON HIS RETURN REGARDING HIS EFFORTS TO SEEK EMPLOYMENT. T/1 WAS ENCOURAGED TO BELIEVE THAT THIS INTERVIEW TO REVEAL HIS FAMILY CONNECTIONS. HIS EXPERIENCE IN ABADAN, AN OBVIOUS INTELLECT AND HIS EDUCATION IN PETROLEUM ENGINEERING. HIS PARENTS CLAIMED KHOMEINI AND HIS ASSOCIATES HAVE OFFERED THEM TO BE ACTIVELY SEEKING THE SUPPORT OF THE YOUNG, EDUCATED IRANIANS WHO COULD BE TRUSTED AND ARE ANXIOUS TO TURN TO WORK IN IRAN.

4. BASE CONSIDERS IT VERY MUCH ESSENTIAL THAT T/1 RECEIVE TRAINING PRIOR HIS RETURN TO IRAN. HE SHOULD NOT SIMPLY GIVEN SOME FORM OF COMMO WITH WHICH TO ADVISE REACTION WHEN HE HAS SECURED A JOB AS STATED RE. BASE ENCOURAGES HQS REVIEW THE ABOVE CIRCUMSTANCES ON A PRIORITY BASIS, FOR T/1 ST CERTAINLY CANNOT AND WILL NOT CONTINUE TO DELAY HIS DEPARTURE WITHOUT SOME SORT OF ENCOURAGEMENT THAT THERE IS FIRM INTEREST IN HIM. HE IS AVAILABLE TO START FOR TRAINING AS LONG REQUIRED, BUT CONTINUES ANXIOUS TO BE ON HIS WAY.

5. FILE: 201-0961045. RW 19 JUN 79 DRW DSC.1. ALL SECRET.

BT

415

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]
CITY: [REDACTED]
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI / SAC, NEW YORK
FROM: SAC, NEW YORK
SUBJECT: ELA AJAJA, JAMES S. SATANOFF, CLINTON
RE: NY 67-10000, CHASE

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3. REFUSE STANDING BY TO SEND TTY TRAINER ON CALL. WIDE PITCH WITH DATES TRAINING SCHEDULED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. (LITTLE LEAD TIME WOULD BE APPRECIATED TO FACILITATE ALL THE RESERVATIONS WHICH PRESENTLY COMPLICATED BY EC-1 SCHEDULING ORDER.) ADDITIONALLY REQUEST YOU PROVIDE DIRECT REQUESTS FOR 30-45.

4. REDUCE COVERT INSTRUCTION TRAINER NOT IMMEDIATELY
LABLE OUR TO INTRINSIC OVERLOADED WORK SCHEDULE AND REQUEST
DECREASEST DATE TRAINING COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED. STAG IN
IMPORTANT TO GET T/1 ON HIS WAY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. RECG-67
HANDLE BASIC TRADECRAFT AND REPORTS WRITING TRAINING FOR
(PLS NOTE THAT OUR PROBLEMS WITH SECURING SERVICES
AT TRAINER DO NOT IN ANY WAY DIMINISH OUR REGARD FOR T/1'S

521

2. DIRECTOR 481826 S E C R E T
AS AGENT. SHORTAGE OF INSTRUCTORS (THE PROBLEM WITH
TRAINING OF MANY NEWLY RECRUITED ASSETS.)

5. SUGGEST BASIS OF TRADECRAFT TRAINING SHOULD BE OPERATIONAL SECURITY IN MAKING PERSONAL MEETINGS, ESPECIALLY CAR MEETINGS SINCE THESE MOST COMMON FORM OF AGENT MEETING CONDUCTED IN TEHRAN GIVEN PRESENT CLIMATE. HE SHOULD BE MADE AWARE OF SIMILAR AND ALTERNATE COMMO PROCEDURES, BUT ALSO IN OPEN COMMO TELEPHONE MESSAGES TO TRIGGER UNSCHEDULED MEETINGS. IN VIEW OF UNKNOWN HIS BEING LOCATED IN ABADAN, THIS ASPECT MAY BE PARTICULARLY PERTINENT. ADDITIONALLY SUGGEST THAT THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL TRAINING IN SURVEILLANCE AND SURVEILLANCE DETECTION (VEHICLE AND FOOT) BE PROVIDED, AS WELL AS SIGNALS AND DROPS.

6. PROPOSE THAT A FIRST MEETING WITH TEHRAN STATION OFFICER BE SET UP SO T/1 CAN MAKE CONTACT AS SOON AFTER HE GETS ESTABLISHED IN NEW JOB AS POSSIBLE. SUGGEST T/1 TRIGGER THIS MEETING WITH APPROPRIATE OPEN CODE SIGNAL. SOLICIT ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS ON HOW TO BEST TAILOR A COMMO PLAN FOR T/1.

7. FOR TEHRAN: PLS PROVIDE FR/LOS ANGELES WITH TEHRAN OFFICE UP DATE BY IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE, AND ANY OTHER PERTINENT SUGGESTIONS.

8. FILE: 201-961045. RWV 20JUN69 DR 09C.1 ALL SECRET

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S E C R E T 201240Z JUN 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 05506 (BIELINSKI ACTING)

TO: IMMEDIATE FR/LOS ANGELES INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

WMINTEL AJAJA FORRES SDTRANSIT

REF: A. DIRECTOR 461326
B. FR/LOS ANGELES 205133

1. CAR PICK UP SITE FOR SDTRANSIT/11
2. GENERAL AREA WITHIN THE GENERALLY TRIANGULAR AREA
FORMED BY ABBASABAD STREET ON THE SOUTH, BOKHAREST STREET ON THE
WEST AND AN UNMARKED FOUR LANE DIVIDED ROADWAY THAT RUNS BETWEEN
ARGENTINE SQUARE AND SHAHANSHAH EXPRESSWAY. THIS PLACES ARGENTINE
SQUARE AT NORTH APEX OF TRIANGLE.

3. SPECIFIC AREA: PROCEEDING NORTH ON BOKHAREST STREET FROM
ABBASABAD STREET TOWARD ARGENTINE SQUARE AT THE FIRST TRAFFIC LIGHT
CONTROLLED INTERSECTION (AFTER PASSING THROUGH THE ABBASABAD/
BOKHAREST MAIN INTERSECTION) ON THE RIGHT IS EIGHTH STREET.
OPPOSITE SIDE OF INTERSECTION IS SEVENTH STREET. EIGHTH STREET
RUNS BETWEEN BOKHAREST AND THE UNNAMED STREET CITED IN PARA ONE,
BUT ALSO INTERSECTS CLOSE TO THE JOINING OF THE UNNAMED STREET
AND SHAHANSHAH FREEWAY. SDTRANSIT/11 SHOULD STAND NEAR THE EAST
END OF EIGHTH STREET ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE STREET. AS STREETS
IN PROCESS OF BEING RENAMED T/1 SHOULD FOCUS ON EIGHTH STREET
BEING THE FIRST TRAFFIC LIGHT CONTROLLED INTERSECTION NORTH OF THE
INTERSECTION OF BOKHAREST AND ABBASABAD.

4. BELIEVE T/1 SHOULD BE ISSUED STATION OPS PHONE NUMBER
(838-399 RPT 838-399) FOR OPEN CODE CALL-IN TO TRIGGER MEETINGS.
AS HIS VISITS TO TEHRAN LIKELY TO BE INTERMITTANT, SUGGEST THAT HE
OFFER CASE OFFICER MEANS TO RETURN CALL AND THROUGH OPEN CODE
ESTABLISH TIME/DATE FOR MEETING. POSSIBLE HE CAN BE REAR TELEPHONE
AT RELATIVE IN TEHRAN AT CERTAIN TIME FOR CASE OFFICER'S CALL.

5. FILE: 201-961845. R 7 21 JUN 79 DRV DSC:1. ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T

7 JUL 78 02 58Z

C R E T 062015Z JUL 78 STAFF
FM W/LOS ANGELES 2055L (HAGERUP ACTING)
PRIORITY TEHRAN, DIRECTOR I FO DIRTECH, ATTECH.
INTEL RYBAT AJAJA FORREX AQUATIC SDTRANSIT
PS: A. DIRTECH 53270
B. DIRECTOR 469800
C. FR/LOS ANGELES 20577
D. TEHRAN 83500

1. ON 6 JULY SDTRANSIT/1 (T/I) MET WITH HAGERUP FOR MEET
LAST TIME IN LOS ANGELES (FINAL MEETING 1500, 9 JULY). H
AS COMPLETED ALL ARRANGEMENTS TO DEPART, WITH EXCEPTION OF
PACKING SOME BOOKS WHICH HE LEAVING WITH FRIEND TO SEND TO H
ATER. HE HAS NOT YET SOLD CAR, BUT HE AND PURCHASER WERE C
ANE LATER IN AFTERNOON SAME DAY. HE WAS ADVISED OF REF E
ND DEMONSTRATED SURPRISE THAT ENTILAM NO LONGER IN DEPUTY
REVENUE POSITION. HE HAD OTHER ASSIST TO REPLACE ENTILAM VC
FAMILY FRIEND (HASSAN) E M E A C H I A N, ELDERLY SPOKE
THE PRINCE. HE BROTHER WHO MADE THE APPOINTMENTS. HE W
ETING ON BEHALF OF FAMILY AND NOT ON HIS OWN. T/I SAID HE
T HAVE SPECIAL ACCESS BUT TYPE OF BROTHER WHO WAS BORN I
NE AND ACTIVE IN TAKING CARE OF FAMILY REQUESTS. INTERE
T/I FAMILY MEMBERS, CONTACT, AND FRIENDS WAS PUT OUT MET
T/I ACTUALLY IN CONTACT WITH STATION.

2. RE HW: HAGERUP HAD RECEIVED FINAL TEST LETTER FROM
DIRTECH OFFICE HMOAR BY EXPRESS MAIL ON 4 JULY. T/I DREW
IN CAR WITH EXCELLENT RESULTS. HE MUCH ASSURED BASE WITH
MESSAGE CAME CLEAR. BASE APPRECIATES THIS ADDED ASSISTANCE
INDICATORS CITED PARA 2 WERE REVIEWED. A SINGLE
ADDITION WAS ADDED ONLY FOR USE IN OVERT TEST. THIS WOULD
BE IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT T/I WOULD BE FORCED UNDER DURESS
WRITE A/A ADDRESS. LETTER WOULD INCLUDE "DON'T SEND THING
AS I NO LONGER PLAN TO RETURN TO SCHOOL. IDME IS A/A AND
FOR USE BY T/I IN EVENT HE WRITES TO SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA.
3. ON TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION: TELEPHONE NUMBER CITED

PAGE 2 FR/LOS ANGELES 20581 S E C R E T
 REF D WAS GIVEN T/1 FOR ALTERNATE CONTACT WITH STATION.
 THIS POSSIBLE CONTACT SYSTEM IF T/1 CALLS HE WILL WILL SAY
 THIS IS MIKE. CAN I SPEAK TO CHARLES? WHEN CHARLES COM
 PHONE HE WILL EXCHANGE AMENITIES AND THEN MENTION THEY SHO
 GET TOGETHER FOR COFFEE OR TEA. THE PLACE OF CONTACT WILL
 CAR PICKUP SITE AS STIPULATED IN REF D. ANY OTHER PLACE M
 TIONED BY EITHER PARTY IS MEANINGLESS AND SHOULD BE DISREG
 FOR IF INCLUDED IT IS ONLY FOR CONVERSATION PURPOSES. THE
 DATE/TIME OF MEETING CAN BE SUGGESTED BY EITHER PARTY AND
 OUT ON PHONE. NO MATTER WHAT AGREED, THE DATE/TIME WILL BE
 DAYS AND 2 HOURS PRIOR TO TIME AGREED UPON; I.E. IF IT AG
 MONDAY NIGHT AT TEN P.M. (2200 HOURS). THE CAR PICKUP WOULD
 SATURDAY NIGHT AT EIGHT P.M. (2000 HOURS). T/1 HAS MEMORIZ
 THIS SIMPLE 2/2 SYSTEM. IN THE EVENT STATION WANTS TO TELL
 T/1, IT WILL HAVE TO BE ARRANGED PRIOR TO CALL. THE TIME O
 THE CALL WILL BE BASED IN SAME 2/2 SYSTEM. IF T/1 IS ADVIS
 THAT HE WILL BE CALLED, DATE AND TIME MUST BE GIVEN. HE WI
 ARRANGE TO BE AT HIS PARENTS HOME AT TIME CALL EXPECTED.
 NUMBER TO CALL IS IDEN 1 AND CALLEE SHOULD ASK FOR IDEN G.
 IT WOULD BE BEST IF CALL WAS MADE IN FLUENT PERSI.

4. RE CAR PICKUP: T/1 REQUESTED THAT FIRST DAY OF HIS
 PICKUP BE 20 JULY REPEAT 20 JULY AT 2100 HOURS WITH
 ALTERNATE OF 2200 HOURS. IF THIS CONTACT NOW MADE, HE WILL
 EVENT TO 1ST AND 15TH OF EACH SUBSEQUENT MONTH, USING WESTE
 ALMENDAR. MEETS WILL BE TO SAME CAR PICKUP SITE ALWAYS USING
 100 AND 2200 HOURS. HE WILL WAIT AT SITE FOR MAXIMUM OF TEN
 MINUTES. T/1 WILL ATTEMPT TO HAVE IN LEFT HAND SMALL SHOPPI
 AG. IN RIGHT HAND HE WILL HAVE NEWSPAPER. HE WILL BE DRESS
 IN BLACK TURTLE NECK SWEATER AND BLUE JEANS. (THERE WAS RE
 CENTLY DEATH IN FAMILY JUSTIFYING THIS DRESS.) HE WILL WEAR
 HEAVY HORN-RIMMED GLASSES WITH CLEAR GLASS. HE WILL APPROACH
 CAR PICKUP SITE FROM ABBASABAD/BOKEAREST MAIN INTERSECTION.
 KNEW OF LOCATION AND SAID HE WOULD DRIVE HIS BROTHER'S CAR
 NEIGHBORHOOD PRIOR TO MEETING TO MAKE SURE HE HAD LOCATION
 ALL IN MIND.

5. T/1 IS PRECISE AND INTELLIGENT; HE ASSUMES INSTRUCTION
 THOUT QUESTION AND REPORTS BACK WELL GUIDANCE PREVIOUSLY GI
 6. HE WANTS EARLY CONTACT SO AS TO BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIB

E 3 PR/LOS ANGELES 20551 S E C R E T
 DOES NOT QUESTION HIS OWN ABILITY OR OTHER ASPECTS OF OPER
 NS. BASE WILL HAVE FINAL MEETING AND ADVISE ADDRES IF EVER
 COMMEND FURTHER REPORTING BY BASE. HE HAS TICKETS FOR 1002
 RS, 10 JULY. GOOD LUCK.

S. FILE: 201-0961045 NW 06JUL99 DRV. DEC.1. ALL SECRET

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7 Jul 79 2 00Z

E C R E T 062100Z JUL 79 STAFF

TE FR/LOS ANGELES 20582 (BAGERUP ACTING)

PRIORITY TEFRAW, DIRECTOR INFO DIRTECH, ATRTECH.

INTEL RIZAT AJAJA FORRES AQUAT C SDTRANSIT

OPS: FR/LOS ANGELES 20581

1. IDEN A: PROFESSOR ROBERT M. CARTER, UNIVERSITY OF
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, TYLER BUILDING, 3601 FT
STREET, LOS ANGELES CALIFORNIA 90007.

IDEN B: 557-725 REPEAT 557-725.

IDEN C: BOMATOUN.

2. FILE: 201-89 104. RVW 06JUL99 DRV DDC.1. ALL SECR

E C R E T

BT
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Jul 78

SECRET 1448Z JUL 79
SITE POLICE ARRESTS 2252Z (C) AGING
IN: THORNTON KERRAN INFO DIRECT
WHEELER SAJA FORMER SUMMIT
A. PH/OS ANGELES 2252Z
B. PH/OS ANGELES 2252Z

THORNTON KERRAN MET WITH SAJASIN (T/I) ON 9 JULY
ADVISING THAT HE NOT DEPARTING LOS ANGELES
ALL MEETING ARRANGEMENTS REMAIN THE SAME.
KERRAN WAS CALL FROM T/I'S CLOSEST FRIENDS
KERRAN'S FATHER WAS JUST ARRIVED FROM TEHRAN. FATHER,
AT THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT HE BECAME 55. THIS
ONE OF THREE COUSINS AGING WITH SAME FAMILY NAME
KERRAN'S BROTHERS MINOR OF TRANSPORTATION AND OTHER POSITIONS
KERRAN IN PARA 3 REF B. T/I HE WAS MOST RECENTLY IN
KERRAN IN KERRAN PRISON. MORE IMPORTANTLY HE IS CLOSE FRIEND
KERRAN CHIEF OF POLICE PRISON ALSO DESCRIBED IN PARA 3
KERRAN OF T/I FAMILY T/I WAS INVITED FOR DINNER
KERRAN TO POSSESS DEPTURE UNTIL NEXT IN AIR
KERRAN HE WOULD HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO REQUEST LETTER OF INTRO-
KERRAN AND REGISTRATION FROM SAJASIN TO THE POLICE CHIEF

THORNTON KERRAN WILL BE AT SITE HIS FIRST CAR PICKUP

SECRET 1448Z JUL 79. PH/OS ANGELES 2252Z. ALL SECRET.

13 Jul 79 04 30Z

REF ID: A222427 JUL 79 STAFF
DIRECTOR 474988. SECTION 1 OF 2.
MM DIA; FR LOS ANGELES INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN.
ELERY 143434 MORRIS/LOTHANST.
FM/L 20588

Journal
file RQ

1. THERE IS HIGH DEGREE OF INTEREST IN WHATEVER INFORMATION SHAHRESTANI MAY HAVE ON THE IRANIAN SITUATION. IF AT ALL IN THE BRIEF REMAINING TIME T/1 WILL BE IN LOS ANGELES. WOULD LIKE HIM TO DEBRIEF SHAHRESTANI ALONG LINES OF INTERESTS WHICH PROVIDED BELOW. T/1 HIMSELF SHOULD KEEP INTERESTS IN MIND. PARTICULARLY THOSE CONCERNING COM SINCE HE IS IN A POSITION TO ANSWER THEM AFTER HIS PLANNED VISIT TO TEHRAN (MENTIONED IN REF).

2. FOR TEHRAN: IF FR LOS ANGELES UNABLE ACCOMMODATE T/1, REQUEST YOU DEBRIEF T/1 ON VERGE OF DEPARTURE FROM U.S., REQUEST YOU DEBRIEF T/1 ON HIS MEETING WITH GEN. SHAHRESTANI AFTER REESTABLISHING CONTACT IN TEHRAN.

3. REQUIREMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

MILITARY

A. ACCORDING TO RECENT PRESS REPORTS, THE PGC TRIED TO FIRE GENERAL AZIZOLLAH RAHIMI, THE OUTSPOKEN COMMANDER OF THE MILITARY POLICE, BUT WAS OVERRIDDEN BY AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, CAUSING CONSIDERABLE EMBARRASSMENT TO THE GOVERNMENT. BOTH DEFENSE MINISTER RIABI AND ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF FARROD HAYI SAID THAT THEY WILL OBEY KHOMEINI'S ORDER. WOULD APPRECIATE SOURCE'S COMMENTS ON RAHIMI AFFAIR. IS RAHIMI TRYING TO PUT HIMSELF INTO POSITION TO TAKE RIABI'S OR FARROD'S PLACE? HOW MUCH SUPPORT DOES RAHIMI HAVE WITHIN THE MILITARY?

B. WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE HOMOFAR GROUPS? ARE THEY ALLIED WITH THE MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ? ARE THEY MOVING AWAY FROM SUPPORT OF KHOMEINI?

1

RAH

DIRECTOR 474988 S E C R E T
C. COMMITTEES WITHIN THE MILITARY: IS THERE A COMMAND
STRUCTURE OR HIERARCHY? DO THEY COMMUNICATE WITH EACH OTHER?
ARE THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEES? ARE THEY NOMINATED OR
ELECTED BY SOMEONE OR SOME GROUP? ANY SIGNIFICANT LEADERS
EMERGING? COMMENTS ON MAGANI RELATIVE TO THE COMMITTEES?
RELATIONS BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN COMMITTEES?
D. WHO CONTROLS ACCESS TO ARMS? ARE MILITARY UNITS IN
THE AREA ARMED? PLANS TO REBUILD THE MILITARY? STATUS OF U.S.-
MAINTAINED EQUIPMENT?
E. ARE MILITARY PERSONNEL TRAINING REVOLUTIONARY G?
DSE?

IRANIAN

F. COMMENTS ON THE PRESENT PIPELINE EXPLOSION: DO ANY
SOURCE KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT LABOR TROUBLE IN THE OIL FIELDS?
ANYTHING ABOUT THE ARAB PROTESTS IN KHUZESTAN?
G. ARE THE IRAQIS ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THE TROUBLES
IN KHUZESTAN?
H. DOES HE HAVE ANY INFORMATION ON THE ACTIVITIES OF
THE CASEGATI?

COMMITTEES

I. DO COMMITTEE LEADERS HAVE DIRECT ACCESS TO KHOMEINI
OR DO THEY HAVE TO GO THROUGH THE TEHRAN CENTRAL COMMITTEE?
OR THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL?
J. IS THERE A GATHERING MOMENTUM AWAY FROM THE
COMMITTEES TOWARD POLICE AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS? CAN SOURCE
DESCRIBE THE NATURE OF SOME OF THE CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE COMMITTEES
AND OTHERS? RECENT NEWS SEEM TO BE FREQUENTLY REPORTED FROM
PROVINCIAL CITIES?

QOM

K. DESCRIBE THE ORGANIZATION OF KHOMEINI'S HEADQUARTERS.
IS HIS HEADQUARTERS ACTUALLY LOCATED AT THE FAJRIER SCHOOL? OR
DOES HE USE OTHER BUILDINGS? HOW ARE THE GUARDS ORGANIZED? ARE
THEY TRAINED? BY WHOM? WHO ARE THEY? IS THERE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF SOME KIND? WHO RUNS IT?

DIRECTOR 474000S S E C R E T
 1. GIVE ALL OFFICIALS POSSIBLE ABOUT THE PEOPLE IMMEDIATELY
 KHOMEINI. WHO IS WITH HIM MOST OFTEN? ARE ANY OF THE
 INS RESEMBLING HIM? AND IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE ANY
 S ABOUT THEM AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH KHOMEINI. HIS SON
 HIS BROTHER-IN-LAW ESHRAFI, BEREZETI, BANISADE, KHALKHALI,
 KHALKHALI, MOKHBERI. WHAT IS KHOMEINI'S RELATIONSHIP
 THE REZAIEN-E ISLAM? IS KHALKHALI ITS LEADER? WHAT ARE
 GOALS OF THE REZAIEN-E ISLAM? HOW MANY MEMBERS DOES IT HAVE?
 4. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KHOMEINI,
 AT-MAJDEH, GOLPAHGANI, AND MARASHI-NAJAFI. DO EACH OF THESE
 IS THERE HOSTILITY BETWEEN THE VARIOUS GROUPS OF GUARDS?
 5. WHAT ARE THE VARIOUS GROUPS OF GUARDS?
 6. IS THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL LOCATED IN
 QOM? WHO IS ON IT? HOW OFTEN DOES IT MEET? DOES
 IT MEET REGULARLY WITH KHOMEINI?
 7. WHO DOES KHOMEINI AGREE TO SEE IN SMALL MEETINGS?
 DO PEOPLE ARRANGE TO GET ACCESS TO KHOMEINI? WHAT SORT OF
 SITUATION DOES ONE HAVE TO BE IN TO SEE HIM?
 8. WHAT IS THE CURRENT STATE OF KHOMEINI'S HEALTH?
 9. WHO WOULD BE A LIKELY SUCCESSOR TO KHOMEINI IF HE
 DIED? ANY SPECULATION ON WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN IN QOM? WHO THE
 PRINCIPAL ACTORS WOULD BE?
 10. IS THERE A REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS POST IN QOM? HOW
 MANY OF THEM ARE THERE? ARE THEY TRAINED? BY WHOM?
 11. THE UNIFORMED GUARDS WITH RAHIMI ARE SUPPOSED
 TO HAVE SOME KIND OF SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP TO KHOMEINI. WHO ARE
 THEY? WHO TRAINED THEM? HOW MANY ARE THERE? WHO ARE THEY
 LOYAL TO?
 12. WHAT IS THE SECURITY SITUATION IN QOM? HOW
 ACCESSIBLE IS IT TO FOREIGNERS? ARE THE POLICE RESPONSIBLE FOR
 SECURITY IN QOM? THE MUJAHEDIN OR THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS?
 13. WHAT IS THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO EACH OTHER?
 14. WHAT SORT OF INCIDENTS INVOLVE TERRORISTS? WHO ARE
 THEY? WHAT SORT OF SENTENCES DO THEY RECEIVE WHEN THEY ARE
 CONDEMNED? IS THERE FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT WITH OR SUPPORT TO THE
 TERRORISTS?
 15. NOT ALONE KNOWS HELPFUL. REALIZE SOURCE WILL NOT BE
 ABLE SERVICE ALL ANSWER HOWEVER. HE SHOULD KEEP THEM IN MIND FOR
 IN
 474000S

474500 3 17

RAN.

231-3881/45.

P 1 12 JUL 95 08:00:01. ALL SECRET

S. R. C. N. E. T 251655Z JUL 79 STAFF

28 JUL 79

CITE DIRECTOR 482370.

1. IMMEDIATE TEHRAN INFO FR/LOS ANGELES.

PRINTED PAGE FOREIGN SPY/INTELL

REFS: A. TEHRAN 20703
B. FR/LOS ANGELES 28521
C. TEHRAN 20703

1. SUBJECT REF A WHO CALLED IS SPY/INTELL. FOREIGN WAS CONTACT BLANK

A. TELEPHONE COMM. W/L WILL CALL CHARION OPER. 20703
20703 INT 20703 AND WHILE SAY HE. THIS IS FIRST CAR. CHARION
CHARLIE. WHEN CHARLIE COMES ON PHONE HE WILL REVERSE CHARLIE
AND THEN WHEN HEY SHOULD GET FOOTSTEPS FOR LEFT ON CHARLIE
PLACE OF CONTACT WILL BE CAR RIGHT SIDE LATER REMOV. CHARLIE
PLACE MENTIONED BY OTHER PARTY IN CHARLIE'S AND SHOWED CHARLIE
RECORDED BECAUSE IF INCLUDED IS ONLY FOR CONVERSATION
THE DATE/TIME CAN BE DETERMINED BY EITHER PARTY AND CHARLIE
THE PHONE. NO MATTER WHAT NUMBER THE DATE TIME WILL BE
AND TWO MORE FROM TO TIME AGAIN UNDER 1.2. IF IT
MONDAY NIGHT AT 2200. THE CAR PHONE SHOULD BE CHARLIE
2200 HOURS. IN EVERY CHARLIE SHOULD WANT TO CALL 1.2.
HAVE TO BE PRE-ARRANGED BY ME OR BY PERSONAL CHARLIE
OF CALL WILL BE BASED ON SAME TWO TWO SYSTEM. IF 1.2
THAT HE WILL BE CALLED. DATE AND TIME MUST BE FIRST
ARRANGE TO BE AT HIS HOME AT TIME CALL. CHARLIE
NUMBER TO CALL IN 1.2. AND CALLER SHOULD ASK THE
BEST IF CALL WHEN IN 1.2.


2. CAR PHONE. 1.2. AND RIGHTED CHARLIE FIRST
CAR PHONE BE 20 JUL 79 AT 2200 HOURS. IF CHARLIE
2200 HOURS. IN EVERY CHARLIE SHOULD WANT TO CALL 1.2.
AND DATE OF BASE SHOULD BE 20 JUL 79. CHARLIE
WILL BE BASED ON SAME TWO TWO SYSTEM. IF 1.2
THAT HE WILL BE CALLED. DATE AND TIME MUST BE FIRST
ARRANGE TO BE AT HIS HOME AT TIME CALL. CHARLIE
NUMBER TO CALL IN 1.2. AND CALLER SHOULD ASK THE
BEST IF CALL WHEN IN 1.2.

PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 482379 S E C R E T
 ATTEMPT TO HAVE IN LEFT HAND SMALL SHOPPING BAG AND IN RIGHT HAND
 A NEWSPAPER. HE WILL BE DRESSED IN BLACK TURTLE NECK SWEATER
 AND BLUE JEANS. HE WILL WEAR HEAVY BORN RIMMED GLASSES WITH
 CLEAR GLASS. HE WILL APPROACH CAR PICKUP SITE FROM ABBASABA/
 BOKHARIST MAIN INTERSECTION. HE HAD SAID HE KNEW OF LOCATION
 AND SAID HE WOULD DRIVE BROTHER'S CAR IN NEIGHBORHOOD PROXIMO
 MEETING TO MAKE SURE HE HAD LOCATION WELL IN MIND. THE GENERAL
 AREA OF THE SITE IS WITHIN THE TRIANGULAR AREA FORMED BY ABBASABA/
 ABBAS STREET ON THE SOUTH, BOKHARIST STREET ON THE WEST, AND N
 UNMARKED FOUR LANE DIVIDED ROADWAY THAT RUNS BETWEEN ARGENTIER
 SQUARE AND THE ISHAFANSHAHI EXPRESSWAY. THIS PLACE AREA IS IN
 SQUARE AT THE NORTH APPEX OF TRIANGLE. SPECIFIC AREA: PROCEEDING
 NORTH ON BOKHARIST STREET FROM ABBASABA STREET TOWARD A GENUINE
 SQUARE AT THE FIRST TRAFFIC LIGHT CONTROLLED INTERSECTION (AFTER
 CROSSING THROUGH ABBASABA/BOKHARIST MAIN INTERSECTION) THE
 LIGHT IS EIGHTH STREET. OPPOSITE SIDE OF INTERSECTION IS FIFTH
 STREET. EIGHTH STREET RUNS BETWEEN BOKHARIST STREET AND UNMARKED
 STREET ABOVE. BUT ALSO INTERSECTS CLOSE TO THE JOINING OF UNMARKED
 STREET AND ISHAFANSHAHI EXPRESSWAY. 1/1 SHOULD STAND NEAR THE
 EAST END OF EIGHTH STREET ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE STREET. AS
 STREETS ARE BEING RENAMED SHOULD FOCUS ON EIGHTH STREET BEING
 FIRST TRAFFIC LIGHT CONTROLLED INTERSECTION NORTH OF INTERSECTION
 OF BOKHARIST AND ABBASABA.

2. IF KEYS AND OTHER MATERIAL RELATING TO TRANSIT/ HAVE
 BEEN DESTROYED, ADVISE AND WE WILL FORWARD.

3. FILE: 201-201945. RYM 25JUL69 DRW HSC.1 ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T
 BT
 #0716



26 JUL 79 13 35Z

S E C R E T 252205Z JUL 79 INTEL

CITE DIRECTOR 482711.

TO: TEHRAN INFO NEW DELHI, ISLAMABAD, KARACHI, KABUL, TEL AVIV,
AMMAN, CAIRO, BEIRUT, JIDDA, KUWAIT, FR/LOS ANGELES, RIYADH.

WMINTEL INTEL

FOLLOWING IS TDFIRDB-315/13141-79 FOR DISSEM PER PARA FOUR.

TD FIRD-315/13141-79
DIST: 25 JULY 1979

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
REPORT CLASS SECRET UNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: STATUS OF IRANIAN POLICE FORCES AS OF LATE
SPRING 1979 (DOI: MAY-JULY 1979)

SOURCE: A WELL-EDUCATED IRANIAN SOURCE WITH AN INTEREST IN
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. HIS RELIABILITY HAS NOT
BEEN DETERMINED. HE OBTAINED THE INFORMATION FROM A SOURCE
WITH GOOD ACCESS.

1. THE IRANIAN NATIONAL POLICE FORCE (INP) CONTINUES TO BE
UNABLE TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL DISCIPLINE AND TO FUNCTION AS AN EFFECTIVE
POLICE FORCE. LARGELY SUPPLANTED BY THE PASDARANS (REVOLUTIONARY
GUARDS), THE MORALE OF THE POLICE FORCES HAS SUNK TO THE LOWEST POS-
SIBLE EBB: THEY ARE UNARMED; MOST OF THE LOWER RANKS PAY NO ATTENTION
TO THEIR OFFICERS; THEY DO NOT WEAR THEIR UNIFORMS; AND THEIR APPEAR-
ANCE IS GENERALLY SLOVENLY. PUBLIC ORDER IN THE COUNTRY CONTINUES TO
BE MAINTAINED BY THE PASDARANS, WHO COULD FORM A NATIONAL POLICE FORCE
THE MINUTE AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH K H O M E I N I GAVE THE WORD. EVEN IF
THE INP WERE AGAIN GIVEN THE RESPONSIBILITY TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC ORDER,
IN THEIR PRESENT CONDITION THEY WOULD BE UNABLE TO DO SO.

2. THE CURRENT COMMANDER OF THE INP IS A LIEUTENANT COLONEL
WASER M O J A L A L I, WHO IS FORMALLY RESPONSIBLE TO THE
INTERIOR MINISTER. HE RECEIVES AT LEAST SOME GUIDANCE FROM QOM ON
ACTIVITIES OF THE INP. THE COURT SYSTEM STILL DOES NOT FUNCTION
PROPERLY AND IF THE POLICE DO BECOME INVOLVED IN APPREHENDING A SERI-
OUS CRIMINAL, THE CRIMINAL IS STILL TURNED OVER TO THE REVOLUTIONARY
COURTS, RATHER THAN THE GOVERNMENT COURT SYSTEM.

3. ACQ: (20 JULY 1979)

4. FIELD DISSEM: SENT TO TEHRAN, NEW DELHI, ISLAMABAD, KARACHI,
KABUL, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, CAIRO, BEIRUT, JIDDA, KUWAIT.
REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE-INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE
TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION
OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. RWV 25JUL99 DRV D9C.1 BY
RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CON-
TROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

BT
#1326

P E T 021702Z AUG 70

TEHRAN 5300

INTECTOR INFO RE LOU IN LES

NY SDTRANSIT

1. STATION OFFICER AT FIRST MEETING
WAS TO DISCUSS HIS ACTIVITIES AND HIS
WAS A JOB OF INTEREST IN NIOC.

2. T/1 HAS VISITED THE OFFICE OF AYAT
T ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING A GOOD POSITIO
TMENT WITH AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI IN CONDO
PURPOSE. AT THESE MEETINGS, HIS PITCH IS
AN ENGINEER AND A LOYAL IRANIAN MOSLEM
NATIVITY. HE DOES NOT EXPECT ANY DIRECT HE
LIES BUT THEY HELP SPUR UP HIS PRESENT
NOTED HIM TO PAY ATTENTION TO ALL THE AD
INVOLVED IN HIS INTERVIEW WITH KHOMEINI
T POSSIBLE REPORT AFTERWARDS.

3. T/1 HAS ALSO PREPARED A RESUME AND
T OF SPEECH HE GAVE IN ISLAM AND S
TIALS TO SECRETARIAT OF HASSAN NAZIF.
DAY, HE HAS MET WITH KHACHATURIAN,
RY, TO APPLY FOR JOB THERE. T/1 THINKS
T A JOB IN ARACAN, BUT IS NOT SO CERTAI
LD HIM THAT WE ARE VERY INTERESTED IN T
TAN AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE HIM THERE. I
FER IN POLICY SECTION OF NIOC, WORKING
IN TEHRAN, WE WOULD ALSO BE INTERESTED
AT WE HAVE LITTLE INTEREST IN PRODUCTIO
TICS AND EVEN LESS INTEREST IN SEARCH OF PROD
TOOK A JOB OF THIS KIND IN TEHRAN, WE W
IED IN MAINTAINING THIS CONTACT. T/1 U
ERATIONS.

4. T/1'S YOUNGEST BROTHER, MARSOUD,

IRANIAN
E HAS AN
GUST FOR
HE IS A
IS TO HELP
ON THESE
C/1
RATING FOR
ER TO PREP
ER A COMPA
TED HERE
OF NIOC
OF ARACAN
KEY WHAT
I TEHRAN
NATION IN
GOT A GOOD
CHANGES OF
CAUTIONED
EXPORT
PROCESSES
NOT FOR BL
CON WERE

01 JULY. T/1'S FAMILY HAD KNOWN FOR 2-
DAY WAS A MEMBER OF THE FEDAYAN (CHAPKINS).
KING SPECIFIC ABOUT HIS ACTIVITIES. THEY D-
HE DIED, ALTHOUGH THEY DO NOT BELIEVE A VER-
HAS BEEN DECLARED BY THE PASDARIAN (REVOLU-
HIMSELF IS A SUPPORTER OF THE MUJAHEDIN, BUT
FEDAYAN WHO WERE HIS BROTHER'S CONTACTS, H-
FROM THESE FRIENDS TO ACCOMPANY THEM TO K-
NOW THE FEDAYAN ARE SUPPORTING THE KURDISH
C/O TOLD T/1 THAT HE ARE RELUCTANT TO L-
LAST HIM FROM GOAL OF OBTAINING JOB IN NIC-
STAN. HOWEVER, COOPERATION BETWEEN THE KUR-
BE AN IMPORTANT REPORT, IF HE COULD ARRAN-
IT WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH HIS EMPLOYMENT
BELIEVES THAT HE CAN DO SO AND WILL REPORT
FEDAYAN INVOLVED AND THEIR PLANS AT THE NE-
WOULD LAST ABOUT ONE WEEK AND COULD NOT I-
1 AUGUST. IN DISCUSSING THE TRIP, C/O LE-
THIM HIMSELF.

5. FROM HIS BROTHER AT THE KOMITEH IN ABOUT LABOR PROBLEMS AT NIOC. THE WORKER CONCERNED ABOUT RATION PRIVILEGES FOR FOOD WHICH YEARS, WHICH HAVE BEEN CANCELLED. COOPER GUARD FORCE AND THE PASDARAN GUARDS WILL BE RETURNING TO ABADAN ON 3 AUGUST TO (IDENTITY) BEFORE RETURNING TO TEHRAN VICE THAT WE ARE VERY INTERESTED IN ALL BROTHER IN ABADAN AND THAT I SHOULD RE- BROTHER'S REMARKS ON LABOR PROBLEMS IN ABADAN. ALSO KNOWS AN ARAB SHEIKH, WHO WAS IN AFGHANISTAN IN THE SHAH'S ERA. C/O TOLD IN LEARNING ABOUT ARAB ATTITUDES AND CONCENTRATIONS ON ARAB-FARSI POLITICAL

FOR NEXT MEETING, SCHEDULED FOR 15
IN REPORT ON HIS SPACE JOB PROSPECTS
BROTHER AT THE ABADAN KOMITEH, AND O

APPS THAT NOT KNOW
DIT KNOW EXACT
OF SWITCIDE
ARMY GUARDS
NOWS SOME CF
AS A TENTATIV
STAN TO
OCRATIC PARTY
OTHER ISSUES
REFER ABLY IN
AND THE FEDA
THIS PRELIM SO
PROCESSING
DETAILS ON
MEETING THE
PLACE OF EUROPE
THAN H

AND T/1 HAS
RE VERY
HEY HAD LEAD
ATION BETWEEN
BIG PROBLEM.
IT FAMILY AND
OM. C/O
PROBLEMS FACE
ENTION TO
REPORT THEM.
INOR POLITICAL
THAT E ARE
LITICAL
RENCES IN THE

ST. T/1 IS
100 ON INFOR
INTERVIEW

GE 3 TEHRAN 5827 S E C R E T

TH KHOMEINI IN COM. HE WILL ALSO PROBABLY HAVE SOME INFORMATION ON FEDAYAI KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY COMMISSION.

7. FR LOS ANGELES: SDTRANSIT/APP. AFTER THIS FIRST MEETING, TO BE A WELL-MOTIVATED AGENT WHO HAS ACCEPTED HIS ILLEGITIMATE ROLE FULLY. HIS FUTURE VALUE WILL DEPEND ON LANDING JOB WITH THE RIGHT ACCESS, BUT HE IS THE KIND OF AGENT MATERIAL WE NEED.

8. FILE : 201-961045. PVM 2 AUG 89. V DSC-1. ALL SECRET

BT
#827

SECRET 141325Z AUG 79 REFERRED TELPOUCH

CITE TEHRAN 53916

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: C/NE/IRAN

SUBJECT: WMINTEL/INTEL - SOURCES

1. PLEASE ADVISE SOURCES OF FOLLOWING DISSEMS:

TDFIRDB-315/13092-79 @DIRECTOR 482081)

TDFIRDB-315/13141-79 @DIRECTOR 482711)

TDFIRDB-315/12061-79 @DIRECTOR 470697)

TDFIRDB-315/13216-79 @DIRECTOR 484304).

2. NO FILE. RVN 13 AUG 79 DRV DEC.1. ALL SECRET.

SECRET

18 AUG .

SECRET 171404Z AUG 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITY WASHINGTON 466859.

TO: TEHRAN.

FROM: NE/IRAN/R

SUBJECT: WMINTEL/INTEL - SOURCES

REF: TEHRAN 53916

1. SOURCES OF REF DISSEMS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- A. TDFIRDB-315/13092-79 SDVALID/1;
- B. TDFIRDB-315/13141-79 SDTRANSIT/1;
- C. TDFIRDB-315/12061-79 SDACE/1;
- D. TDFIRDB-315/13216-79 SDVALID/1.

2. NO FILE. RVW 16AUG99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

SECRET

BT

#9925.

782 -

S E C R E T 210820Z AUG 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE TEHRAN 53983

TO: WASHINGTON.

FOR: C/NE/IRAN

SUBJECT: WNINTEL INTEL PROPOSED SOURCE DESCRIPTIONS

1. IN ANTICIPATION OF INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION FROM SDTRANSIT/1 AND SDPROBE/1, FOLLOWING ARE PROPOSED SOURCE DESCRIPTIONS:

A. SDPROBE/1.

(1) FOR REPORTING IN WHICH SDPROBE/1'S NAME APPEARS AS THE ULTIMATE SOURCE, E.G., "VIEWS OF (SDPROBE/1) ON . . .": "A MEMBER OF THE MUSLIM PEOPLE'S REPUBLICAN PARTY WHO IS A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF (SDPROBE/1). HE IS BELIEVED TO REPORT ACCURATELY WHAT HE IS TOLD."

(2) FOR ALL OTHER REPORTING: "A LIBERAL POLITICIAN WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL CIRCLES. HIS REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED."

B. SDTRANSIT/1.

(1) FOR REPORTING ON PETROLEUM AT KHUZESTAN: "AN IRANIAN ACADEMIC WITH GOOD CONNECTIONS IN THE IRANIAN PETROLEUM INDUSTRY. HIS RELIABILITY IS UNDETERMINED."

(2) FOR REPORTING ON KURDISTAN AND TEHRAN POLITICS: "AN IRANIAN INTELLECTUAL OF KURDISH DESCENT WITH PERSONAL CONNECTIONS TO THE FEDAYAN AND MUJAHEDIN ORGANIZATIONS HIS RELIABILITY IS UNDETERMINED."

2. WELCOME HQS INPUT. PLS ADVISE APPROVED BYLINES.

3. NO FILE.- RVW 21 AUG 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T 181536Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE TEHRAN 54525.

TO: DIRECTOR INFO FR/LOS ANGELES.

WNINTEL SDTRANSIT


1. CASE OFFICER MET SDTRANSIT/I (T/I) ON 15 AND 17 OCTOBER FOR DEBRIEFINGS ON HIS ACTIVITIES FOR PAST TWO MONTHS. T/I SPENT MOST OF AUGUST IN KURDESTAN, ACCOMPANYING FEDAYAN FIGHTERS WHO WERE ASSISTING THE KURDS. HE BROUGHT SEVERAL HUNDRED PHOTOS TO 15 OCTOBER MEETING, SOME OF WHICH DOCUMENT FEDAYAN PARTICIPATION IN KURDISH DEMONSTRATIONS. C/O SELECTED SOME FOR COPYING AND FORWARDING TO HQS.


2. ON 9 SEPTEMBER, NEAR PAVEN, T/I WAS WOUNDED BY A GUARDSMAN (PASDAR). BULLET HIT T/I IN SIDE, GLANCING OFF RIB. A KURDISH DOCTOR TREATED HIM AND HE RETURNED TO TEHRAN TO RECUPERATE. DURING SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, HE CONTINUED EFFORTS TO SECURE GOOD POSITION AT NIOC, EITHER IN TEHRAN OR ABADAN. HE HAS BEEN OFFERED POSITIONS TEACHING AT UNIVERSITY OF SHIRAZ AND AT ABADAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (AIT), NEITHER OF WHICH IS OPERATIONALLY INTERESTING. T/I DOESN'T WANT TO TAKE THESE POSITIONS BECAUSE HE FEELS HIS CREDENTIALS ENTITLE HIM TO SOMETHING BETTER.


3. T/I MISSED MEETING DATES EITHER BECAUSE HE WAS IN KURDESTAN OR WAS CONVALESCING. HE SAID THAT AT LAST MEETING DATE ON 1 OCTOBER, A GUARDSMAN APPEARED AND ASKED HIM WHAT HE WAS DOING AT MEETING SITE. T/I SAID WAITING FOR A FRIEND. C/O AND T/I CHANGED MEETING POINT TO NAHID STREET OFF MOSSADEGH AND MADE MEETING TIME 1900 HOURS, WITH ALTERNATE AT 2000 HOURS.

4. C/O AND T/I MEETING AGAIN ON 19 OCTOBER. PROCESSING INFORMATION ON FEDAYAN COOPERATION WITH KURDS FOR DISSEMINATION.

5. FILE: 281-961845. DRVW 18 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T

















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تک پرا
عواغل استعمار

REPORT CLASS--SECRET--WNINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--ORCON

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: KDP AND FEDAYAN-E-KHALQ ACTIVITIES IN KURDESTAN
(DOI: AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 1979)

SOURCE: AN IRANIAN OF KURDISH DESCENT WITH PERSONAL
CONNECTIONS TO THE FEDAYAN AND MUJAHIDIN ORGANI-
ZATIONS. HIS RELIABILITY IS UNDETERMINED.

1. DURING AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 1979, THE KURDISH AREAS OF WESTERN IRAN AROUND KHANEH AND MAHABAD WERE UNDER CONTROL OF THE LOCAL POPULATION, WHICH IS OVERWHELMINGLY SYMPATHETIC TO THE LEADER OF THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP); AYATOLLAH EZZEDIN HOSSEINI HAS THE HIGHEST PRESTIGE OF ALL THE KDP LEADERS, WHILE ABDUL RAHMAN QASSEMLOU ENJOYS SOMEWHAT LESSER RESPECT. THE BARZANI BROTHERS, IDRIS AND MASSOUD, THE SONS OF MULLA MUSTAFS BARZANI, ARE CONSIDERED 'MERCENARIES' (JOSH) WHO HAD BEEN PAID BY THE SHAH AND BY FOREIGNERS, AND WHO NOW HAVE NO STANDING AMONG THE KDP SUPPORTERS.

2. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ACTIVE WORKERS WITHIN THE KDP IS CALLED THE KOMITEH ZAHMAT KESHAN KURDESTAN AND INCLUDES ALL KURDS WHO TAKEN ACTIVE PART IN SUPPORTING THE FIGHTING GUERRILLAS, THE PESHMERGA. THE ORGANIZATION IS INFORMAL AND IS PREPARED TO ASSIST ANY KURDS WHO WISH TO FIGHT WITHOUT INQUIRING INTO CREDENTIALS OTHER THAN KURDISH PARENT AGE. (SOURCE COMMENT: DURING SEPTEMBER 1979, THE MEMBERS OF THIS ORGANIZATION IN THE BORDER TOWN OF KHANEH PASSED OUT WEAPONS FREELY TO ANY ONE WHO VOLUNTEERED TO FIGHT THE GOVERNMENT FORCES.)

3. ABOUT 95 PERCENT OF THE ARMED KURDS BELONG TO THE KDP'S PESHMERGA, WHILE THE FEDAYAN-E-KHALQ GUERRILLAS WERE NOT MORE THAN FIVE PERCENT OF ALL FIGHTERS. DURING AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 1979, ABOUT 25 KNOWN FEDAYAN WERE IN MAHABAD-KHANEH AREA. (SOURCE COMMENT: THERE WERE PROBABLY NO MORE THAN 200 FEDAYAN FIGHTING IN ALL OF KURDESTAN DURING THIS PERIOD.)

4. GUERRILLAS AND SYMPATHIZERS OF THE FEDAYAN-E-KHALQ HAVE FOUGHT AND DEMONSTRATED TOGETHER WITH THE MEMBERS OF THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY SINCE FEBRUARY 1979, BUT THERE IS NO ORGANIZATION COORDINATING THE

ACTIVITIES EXPLICITLY SPONSORED BY THE FEDAYAN ARE WELCOMED IN THE LARGER CITIES SUCH AS MAHABAD AND SANANDAJ, WHERE FEDAYAN AND PESHMERGA GUERRILLAS OF THE KDP HAVE FOUGHT SIDE BY SIDE, WHILE MARXIST FEDAYAN CONCEAL THEIR AFFILIATION IN SMALLER VILLAGES AND THE COUNTRY SIDE, WHOSE PEOPLE ARE DEVOT MOSLEMS AND DEEPLY-ANTI-COMMUNIST.

5. ALTHOUGH THE FEDAYAN ARE ORGANIZED INTO GROUPS CLASSIFIED AS "SYMPATHIZERS" AND "FIGHTERS" BOTH TYPES OF MEMBERS TRAVELED TO KURDESTAN TO TAKE PART IN THE FIGHTING IN AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE FEDAYAN NORMALLY TRAVEL IN SMALL GROUPS, USING ORDINARY MEANS OF TRANSPORT, AND PICK UP WEAPONS AFTER THEY ARRIVE IN KURDESTAN.)

6. ACQ: IRAN, TEHRAN (19 OCTOBER 1979) FIELD REPORT NO. NIT- 10,787.

7. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AND DEFENSE ATTACHE AT TEHRAN SENT TO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, JIDDA, KARACHI, KOWAIT, MANAMA, NEW DEHLI, TELAVIV.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCE AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. RVW 25OCT99 DRV D9C.1 CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

This text is rewritten from typewriter tapes left in CIA station on 4th November 1979.

S E C R E T

OCT 79 INTEL

CITE TEHRAN

ZNY XXXXX

TO: DIRECTOR INFO AMMAN, BEIRUT, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD
JIDDA, KARACHI, KUWAIT, MANAMA, NEW DEHLI, TELAVIV.

WINTEL SDTRANSIT INTEL

SUPDATA: SDTRANSIT/1. NOLIAISON. NO FILE. NO INDEX. OBTAINED
BY JAMOTTE. FIELD REPORT NO. NIT-10,787. CLBY 015356.

FILED: PAQUIN

This text is rewritten from typewriter tapes left in CIA station
in 4th November 1979.



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SDTRANSIT/1. Name unknown. Marital status: Believed to be single. Age: Probably mid-twenties. Educated in the U.S. (school unknown). Academic specialty: Petroleum engineering, or possibly a related field. Returned from the U.S. in July or August. No regular employment since his return.

Contacts: Met approximately once a week, when in Tehran (see below). Picked up by car. Meetings either pre-arranged or scheduled by means of phone call from the Source.

Purpose of contacts: 1) Information on organization and activities of the Fedayan; 2) Information on the petroleum industry (production, physical security, labor situation, etc.); 3) Arab politics and organization in Khuzestan, to include Iraqi involvement, if any. Re 1): Source had personal friends in the Fedayan, and although not himself a member, was able to spend approximately two weeks with them in Kurdistan, where he received a bullet wound. (He reported a maximum of about 50 Fedayan fighting with the Kurdish dissidents.) Re 2): Source was offered at least one job with NIOC in Tehran, but it was judged that this would not provide the desired access to the situation in the oil fields themselves, and as of 4 November he was exploring job prospects in Abadan. Re 3): Access to the Arab situation would have been contingent on his finding a job in Khuzestan.

Payment: Source received regular compensation, exact terms not known.

SECRET 211825Z JUN 79 STAFF
CITE BONN 42216 SECTION 1 OF 2

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO GERMANY, TEHRAN, AMMAN, ISTANBUL
WNIATTEL AJAJA WEYWAY CILTO SDFICYLE

REAS: A. DIRECTOR 44543 (444543)
B. BONN 91345
C. WASHINGTON 459272, 19 JUNE 79

1. PER INSTRUCTIONS OF THE CHIEF OF BASE, WALBO R. FELTHOUSE CONTACTED SDFICYLE/1 (S/1) AND ARRANGED A MEETING WITH HIM FOR THE EVENING OF 18 JUNE. THE MEETING, WHICH LASTED MORE THAN TWO AND A HALF HOURS, TOOK PLACE IN THE HOTEL IN COLOGNE. IT WENT SMOOTHLY AND WITHOUT INCIDENTS. SDFICYLE/1 SAID THE MIAS JAR AND WENT FRIENDLY.

2. IN ONE FIRST MEETING WITH HIM, S/1 DID NOT SHOW PICTURES OF LONIA SOVIETS TO S/1. VALENTIN SUGGESTED THAT S/1 MEET HIM AT 1200 HOURS ON 30 JUNE. VALENTIN WOULD MEET S/1 ON THE STREET OPPOSITE THE SMALL CHURCH AT REHNHOFSTRASSE IN COLOGNE. S/1 SAID THAT EXCEPT FOR THE 26 MAY MEETING HE HAD REPORTED ALL OF HIS MEETINGS WITH THE SOVIETS IN DETAIL TO HIS FORMER SOVIET CASE OFFICER.

3. ACCORDING TO S/1, HIS SOVIET CASE OFFICER HAD INSTRUCTED HIM ON THE KINDS OF SUBJECT TO DISCUSS WITH HIS SOVIET CONTACTS AND THE KINDS OF INFORMATION TO PASS TO THEM. S/1 IS CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THAT THE INFORMATION WHICH HE PASSED TO THEM WAS GENUINE, AND THAT THEY TRUST HIM.

PAGE 3 BONN 82218 S E C R E T
 THIS IS WHY S/1 THINKS THE SOVIETS INVITED HIM TO EAST BERLIN.
 ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS SDJANUS C/O, S/1 ACCEPTED THE
 INVITATION. HE WENT TO WEST BERLIN
 LAST WEEK OF JULY 72 AND WAS MET BY NOVIKOV AT
 A PRE-ARRANGED SITE IN THE S-PÄHN CHARLOTTENBURG STATION.
 THEY IMMEDIATELY PROCEEDED TO EAST BERLIN BY S-Bahn, AND
 CROSSED THE BORDER CHECKPOINT ON FRIEDRICHSTRASSE, WHERE 140
 OTHER SOVIETS WERE WAITING FOR THEM. THEY TOOK S/1 BY CAR TO
 AN APARTMENT ON KOPERNIKSTRASSE 2A, WHICH IS LOCATED NOT FAR
 FROM THE IRANIAN EMBASSY. S/1 SPENT 3 DAYS IN EAST BERLIN.
 THE SOVIETS TOOK HIM SIGHTSEEING, BUT THEY ALSO CONDUCTED
 DISCUSSIONS WITH S/1 ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF A.S.A. THE DEMOCRATIC
 PARTY OF KURDISTAN (DPK), AND THE UNION OF REVOLUTIONARY
 FORCES OF TURKEY (HEVRA). S/1 SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN
 NEGATIVE TOWARDS THE DPK, BUT THEY PROBABLY STATED THAT
 THEY SUPPORTED HEVRA. THE SOVIETS PROPOSED THAT S/1 RESIGN
 FROM THE DPK AND DEVOTE HIMSELF ENTIRELY TO THE ACTIVITIES
 OF HEVRA. S/1 ALSO SUGGESTED THAT S/1 JOIN

PAGE 4 BONN 82218 S E C R E T
 FOR A.S.A. CONSEQUENTLY, AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH HIS SDJANUS
 CASE OFFICER, S/1 ACCEPTED IN ONE INSTANCE DM 1,000. ON EACH
 OF TWO OCCASIONS DM 2,000 AND ONCE DM 500. S/1 SAID THAT HE
 HAD REPORTED ALL THIS AND HAD TURNED OVER THE MONEY TO SDJANUS.

E. CONCERNING COMMUNICATIONS, S/1 SAID THAT ALL OF
 HIS MEETINGS WITH THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN PREARRANGED EXCEPT
 FOR THE FIRST MEETING WITH VLADIMIR. NO MEETING WAS EVER
 MISSED. ONLY ON ONE OCCASION DID NOVIKOV GIVE S/1 AN
 OPERATIONAL TELEPHONE NUMBER. THIS WAS JUST BEFORE BREZHNEV'S
 LAST VISIT TO THE FRG. NOVIKOV INSTRUCTED S/1 THAT SHOULD HE
 HEAR THAT SOME VIOLENT ACTION WAS PLANNED AGAINST BREZHNEV,
 THAT SOME ANTI-BREZHNEV DEMONSTRATION WAS ABOUT TO TAKE
 PLACE, HE MUST IMMEDIATELY CALL THAT NUMBER AND PASS THE
 INFORMATION. THE TELEPHONE NUMBER GIVEN BY NOVIKOV WAS
 0279-149530. (C/O COMMENT: NOVIKOV'S NAME WAS
 0279-149530. NOVIKOV'S NAME WAS 0279-149530.)

... WAS BORN IN 1924 AND IS THE ELDEST OF FOUR CHILDREN. HE WAS BORN IN THE CITY OF ...
... WAS BORN IN 1924 AND IS THE ELDEST OF FOUR CHILDREN. HE WAS BORN IN THE CITY OF ...
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... WAS BORN IN 1924 AND IS THE ELDEST OF FOUR CHILDREN. HE WAS BORN IN THE CITY OF ...

... S/1 CONTACTED SDJANUS ABOUT 3 YEARS AGO AND BECAME
HIS COLLABORATOR. HE DID SO TO HELP HIS FATHER WHO WAS IN

PAGE 6 BORN 22219 S E C R E T
JAIL UNDER THE SEAR REGIME. AT THE BEGINNING S/1 DID NOT
ACCEPT MONEY, BUT LATER ON HE RECEIVED A MONTHLY SALARY OF
DM 800, PLUS OPERATIONAL EXPENSES. HE ALSO RECEIVED BONUSES
FROM SDJANUS FROM TIME TO TIME. FELTHEUSE PROPOSED TO PAY
S/1 A MONTHLY SALARY OF DM 800 BEGINNING 1 JUNE 1979, FOR
A TRIAL PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS. SUBJECT ACCEPTED. IT WAS
ALSO AGREED TO MEET AGAIN ON 7 JULY IN DUESSELDORF.

7. C/O COMMENT: S/1 MADE A GOOD IMPRESSION, AND WE
BELIEVE THAT HE SPOKE THE TRUTH ABOUT HIS RELATIONS WITH THE
SOVIETS. IN ORDER TO BE SURE WE WOULD LIKE TO ARRANGE AN
INTERVIEW FOR S/1. WE DO NOT WISH TO RUSH THIS PROCEDURE,
SINCE S/1 IS FINANCIALLY INDEPENDENT AND A PROUD
PERSON WHO DOES NOT WANT TO HURT HIS FEELINGS.

18A6.

2 AUG 79 STAFF

ECTOR, GERMANY, ISTANB'L, TEHRAN.

OFF SDJANUS SKDICKLE INTEL

183673

LANGTON 496090

SITUATION IN EAST IS CERTAINLY NOT CALM, WE FEEL
THROUGH HIS FAMILY CONNECTIONS, MIGHT BE ABLE TO
FREELY THAN OTHER FOREIGNERS. HE COULD GET INTO
HERE TO ASK QUESTIONS INDISCRIMINATELY OF EVERYBODY,
EXPECT HIM TO DO SO.

IS WHETHER SDFICKLE WOULD BE ABLE TO PROVIDE
INFORMATION TO JUSTIFY COST OF TRIP WHICH, WE ASSUME,
FUND. WOULD APPRECIATE HEAVING MORE DETAILS
LY WHOM SDFICKLE WOULD SEE AND WHAT SPECIFIC
FORMATION HE WOULD BE ABLE TO COLLECT. WILL HE BE ABLE
SIFIC DETAILS ON SOVIET SUPPORT, ON SUPPORT POSSIBLY
COUNTRIES, AND ON WEAPONS SMUGGLING. WILL HE BE
E DETAILED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION ON THE
KURDS, THEIR FUTURE INTENTIONS, AND THE INTERPLAY
BES. WOULD BOT BE INTERESTED IN PROPAGANDE-TYPE

201-963951, 201-306414. RWV 17 AUG 99 DRV D9C.1

↓
SDFICKLE

2

21 AUG 1972

SECRET 211637Z AUG 72 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 496994.

TO: PRIORITY BOMB, ANKARA INFO GERMANY, ISTANBUL, TEHRAN

UNCL AJAJA SDJNUS CKLG SOFICKL

REF: A. ANKARA 4435D
B. WASHINGTON 496298
C. BOMB 53873

1. WE ARE, IN FACT, INTERESTED IN SOFICKL'S (F/I) TRAVEL TURKEY AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, IF HE WILLING, HIS TRAVEL IN IRANIAN KURDISTAN. AS ADDRESSEES AWARE, EVENTS KURDISTAN ARE MOVING FAIRLY RAPIDLY AND BOTH AREAS OF PRIORITY INTEREST. REF B INDICATES, WE DO HAVE SOME RESERVATIONS CONCERNING F/I IN TURKEY DUE TO POTENTIAL AND DANGER, AND WE SIMILARLY CONCERNED OVER F/I TRAVEL IN IRAN. AT SAME TIME, WE BELIEVE NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED IF F/I PROPERLY BRIEFED ON REQUIREMENTS MENTIONED CONCERNING HIS ACTIVITIES. ACCORDINGLY, WE DETERMINE TO RECONTACTING F/I AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY FOR PURPOSE WE COULD ADDRESS TRAVEL THROUGH TURKEY TO IRAN FOR PURPOSES HE WOULD LIKE, IF POSSIBLE, FOR F/I BEGIN TRAVEL THIS WEEK OR VERY NEXT AND ANTICIPATE TRIP LASTING ONE TO TWO WEEKS. IF ALL INEVITABLE TRAVEL BOTH IRAN AND TURKEY, DO NOT BELIEVE F/I SHOULD SPEND MORE THAN TWO-THREE DAYS IN EASTERN TURKEY AND KURDISTAN REQUIREMENT IS IN IRAN.

2. ARE PREPARED FUND COST OF F/I'S TRAVEL AND, IF WE PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT REPORTING IN RESPONSE TO REQUIREMENTS, WE WOULD PROVIDE HIM WITH BONUS DEPENDING ON QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF INFORMATION AND ITS FULFILLMENT OUR REQUIREMENTS.

3. WE VERY EMPHASIZE NEED FOR THOROUGH BRIEFING F/I REALITIES OF SITUATION IN EASTERN TURKEY AND KURDISTAN WHICH, BEING KURDISH, WE SURE HE AMPLY AWARE. HE SHOULD CAUTIONED DANGER HE MAY ATTRACT ATTENTION TO HIMSELF BY HIS TRAVEL IN TURKEY AND HE SHOULD BE DISCREET TO WHO HE COMES AND HOW HE ACQUIRES INFORMATION, AS TURKISH SECURITY, AM

PAGE 2 DIRECTION 498994 S E C R E T

OUT FOR JUST HIS SORT OF ACTIVITIES. IN IRAN, AS F/1 EVER MORE COGNIZANT, IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAS BEGUN CRACKDOWN ON KURDISH MOVEMENT AND HIS ABILITY TRAVEL OR CONTACT MEMBERS HIS FAMILY, CONTACT MAY BE RESTRICTED. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES, OF COURSE, SHOULD HE EVER ADMIT REACTION CONTACT AND WE NOT IN POSITION TO OFFER HIM ASSISTANCE SHOULD HE RUN INTO DIFFICULTIES EITHER COUNTRY. FEATHOUSE SHOULD INSURE F/1 UNDERSTANDS ALL OF ABOVE AND HE ACCEPTS OUR INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING HIS TRAVEL.

4. WHILE WE ANTICIPATE NO CONTACT F/1 IN TURKEY, AS HE SHOULD BE DEBRIEFED BY HIS C/O IN BONN ON HIS RETURN FROM THIS TRAVEL, WE WOULD APPRECIATE EMERGENCY CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS IN CASE HE HAS HIGHLY PERISHABLE INFORMATION WHICH COULD NOT WAIT FOR HIS RETURN TO GERMANY. F/1 SPEAKS NO ENGLISH, SOME TURKISH, EXCELLENT GERMAN, EXCELLENT FARSI, AND HIS NATIVE KURDISH. BEST ISTANBUL, BEST CHOICE FOR CONTACT SINCE COB IS FLUENT IN ARABIAN LANGUAGE. FLS ADVISE.

5. IN RESPONSE REF QUESTIONS CONCERNING ACCESS F/1, WE BELIEVE HE WOULD BE ABLE SERVICE THOSE REQUIREMENTS IN SUFFICIENT MANNER. JUSTIFY EXPENDITURES INVOLVED. REFER BONN AS TO EXACTLY HOW HE WOULD BE ABLE SEE IN TURKEY AS F/1 HAS BEEN PRIMARILY TARGETED AGAINST IRANIAN KURDISH PROBLEM. IN ADDITION REQUIREMENTS POSED REF A. FOLLOWING QUESTIONS, ISSUES OF HIGH INTEREST CONCERNING IRANIAN KURDS:

A. IDENTIFICATION OF VARIOUS FACTIONS AND LEADERS OF KURDISH MOVEMENT OF CONTINUING INTEREST.

B. IDENTIFICATION OF FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR KURDISH MOVEMENT, IF ANY. WHAT TYPE OF SUPPORT? ARMS? MONEY? CAN U.S., CLEAN, SOVIET INVOLVEMENT BE IDENTIFIED?

C. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF TUCEN OR CHARINKHA-YE FED KHALAQ SUPPORT FOR KURDS?

D. KURDISH STRATEGIES CONCERNING RESOLUTION OF MINORITIES ISSUE IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE?

E. WITH GROWING EVIDENCE THAT RIVAL KURDISH FACTIONS ESTABLISHING ENCLAVES IN KURDISTAN, I.E., F/1'S KDP RELAT

11 SEP 78 15Z

OR ET 110659Z SEP 78 TO STAFF

E. BOMB 84383

PARIS INFO DIRECTOR, GERMANY, TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANBUL.
NT L AMAJA SOFICKLE

PARIS 1836

DURING A SEPTEMBER MEETING SOFICKLE SAID THAT MRS. ALI-RAHMAN BASIRLU APPEARS TO BE 44-46 YEARS OLD, MEDIUM BUILD, LIGHT BROWN HAIR, SOMETIMES DYES HER HAIR. SHE DRESSES SIMPLY AND CONSERVATIVELY. THE OLDER DAUGHTER IS ABOUT 20-21 YEARS OLD, THE YOUNGER ONE IS ABOUT 17-18 YEARS OLD. BOTH GIRLS ARE OF MEDIUM BUILD. SOFICKLE IS NOT SURE BUT THINKS THAT THE OLDER ONE IS GOING TO COLLEGE, WHILE THE YOUNGEST IS ATTENDING FRENCH SECONDARY SCHOOL.

ACCORDING TO FAMILY, BASIRLU HAS POLITICAL EXILE PERMITS FOR RESIDING AND WORKING IN PARIS. SUCH PERMITS ARE OBTAINED WITHIN TURKISH CIRCLES IN PARIS.

FILE: ERI-892284, ERI-892285, RWV 10 SEP 78 DRV D9C.1

COR E T 110927Z SEP 79 STAFF

17 SEP 79 245Z

BONN 84384

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO GERMANY, ANKARA, ISTANBUL, TEHRAN.

TEL AJAJA SPICKLE

A DIRECTOR 508752

BONN 84385

SPICKLE/FI (F/I) MET EVENING 8 SEPT 79 BY FELTHOUSE
NO INOWSKY. WAS GIVEN REF A AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS FOR
TRIP TO KURDISTAN. DURING MEETING F/I WAS REPEATEDLY
ON ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENTS OF SECURITY AND FACT WE NOT
OFFER HIM ANY HELP IF HE ENCOUNTERS ANY DIFFICULTIES
IRAN. F/I ACCEPTED AND RECEIVED FOR DM 2500
EXPENSES; DM 800 AUG SALARY AND DM 200 OPS EXPENSES.

2. F/I'S SCHEDULE HAD HIM TRAVELING PARS 9 SEPT 79 TO
LENA GASEMLU AND GET LETTER FOR DELIVERY TO HER HUSBAND.
RETURN BONN AND DEPART BONN 12 SEPT 79 VIA TURKISH
FOR ISTANBUL AND VAN. HE WILL THEN TRAVEL INTO BOTH
AND IRANIAN KURDISTAN, EXPECTING RETURN EUROPE AT END
OCTOBER. WILL MEET AND DEPART AT THAT TIME.

3. FILE: 201-0960951. RW 10 SEPT 90 DM DSC.1.

R E T

10 FRA

90CT95 12 58Z

C R I 001206Z OCT 79 STAFF

00NN 83 44

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANBUL, C
NTEL ANKARA SDFICME

00NN 84 54

1. SDFICME HAS RETURNED FROM HIS TRIP TO TURKI
ANIAN KURDISTAN. FELTHOUSE CONTACTED HIM ON THE EVE
NIGHT AND SET UP A DEBRIEFING SESSION FOR 9 OCT IN DUE

2. ONE OF THE REASONS SDFICME'S RETURN WAS DEL
AYED HAD BEEN ARRESTED BY IRANIAN (MILITARY)
AUTHORITIES IN SAHAZ.

3. SDFICME WAS DETAINED FOR FOUR DAYS. HE WAS ACCUSED
OF ILLEGALLY CROSSING THE TURKISH-IRANIAN BORDER AND FAIL
ING TO HAVE LEGAL DOCUMENTS. SDFICME SAID THAT HE HAD LEFT
TURKEY ON PURPOSE IN TURKEY. FORTUNATELY
THE LOCAL JUDGE AND THE AUTHORITIES

4. HIS IRANIAN WIFE AND FRIENDS OF SDFICME'S FAMILY
WROTE HIM A LETTER. A NEWS ITEM ENTITLED "SON OF SHAH
ARRESTED" APPEARED IN THE TEHRAN DAILY "KEYHAN," NO.
DATE IN NEXT. WE ARE FORWARDING THE NEWSPAPER CLIP
SDFICME'S ARREST TO HQS VIA TM NUMBER 44

5. RESULTS OF THE DEBRIEFING SESSION WILL BE
FORWARDED TO HQS.

6. 00NN 84 54 00NN 84 54 00NN 84 54 00NN 84 54

SECRET 171517Z OCT 79 INTEL
CITE BONN 85481 SECTION 1 OF 2 ZNY XXXXX

TO: DIRECTOR INFO GERMANY, ANKARA, ISTANBUL, TEHRAN .

WNINTEL AJAJA SDFICKLE INTEL ZRWAHOO

SUBJECT: ZRWAHOO FOR THIRD COUNTRY CONTENT. SOURCE SDFICKLE/1.
SUB-SOURCES SDFICKLE'S FATHER AND OTHERS DESCRIBED
IN BONN 85330. FELTHOUSE OBTAINED. PLACE ACQUIRED
OMITTED FOR SOURCE PROTECTION. OBJ: S-1. NO LIAISON
NO INDEX. FILE: 201-0960951. EGN-7833. RVW
17 OCT 99 DRV D9C . 1 BY 055303.

FILED: 171517Z

REPORT CLASS- SECRET-WNINTEL-NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON

COUNTRY: IRAN

SUBJECT: STATUS OF THE KURDISH MOVEMENT IN IRAN (DOI:
LATE SEPTEMBER 1979)

SOURCE: A KURD, NOW RESIDING ABROAD, WHO IS BELIEVED TO
HAVE GOOD ACCESS TO THE KURDISH COMMUNITY IN IRAN
AND WHO RECENTLY VISITED IRANIAN KURDISTAN. HIS
REPORTING RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

SUMMARY: THE MORALE OF PARTISAN FIGHTERS IN IRANIAN
KURDISTAN IS HIGH , AND THE KURDS CONTINUE IN THERE
DETERMINATION TO GAIN AUTONOMY. THE PRINCIPAL PARTISAN GROUPS
CURRENTLY OPERATING IN IRANIAN KURDISTAN ARE THE RESISTANCE
GROUP OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KURDISTAN, THE SAZEMAN-E,
ZAHMAT-E FASHAN-E KURDISTAN, THE KURDISTAN SECTION OF THE
PEOPLE'S FEDAYEEN AND THE FOLLOWERS OF HOSSEINI. THE KURDS
ARE ARMED WITH WEAPONS STOLEN FROM RAIDS ON IRANIAN GARRISONS
AND WITH ARMS SUPPLIED BY IRAQ. KURDISH FORCES HAVE SOME
CONTACT WITH THE TUDEH PARTY, BUT ACTUALLY COLLABORATE
ONLY WITH THE PEOPLE'S FEDAYEEN AND CHRIKH-HAYI-~~IRAKI~~ IRAN.
A NEW ORGANIZATION HAS BEEN FORMED TO LIQUIDATE KURDS WORKING
WITH THE KHOMEINI REGIME. END SUMMARY.

1. DESPITE THE RETREAT OF KURDISH RESISTANCE FIGHTERS
AND THE EXTENSIVE MATERIAL AND HUMAN LOSSES SUFFERED IN
AUGUST 1979, THE SPIRIT AND MORALE OF THE GENERAL KURDISH
POPULATION AND THE PARTISAN FIGHTERS IN IRAN IS HIGH. THE
KURDS ARE HOPEFUL ABOUT THE FUTURE AND ARE DETERMINED TO
WIN THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTONOMY. THE PEOPLE DO NOT BLAME
ABD-AL-RAHMAN Q A S E M L U , SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE
DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KURDISTAN (BPK), OR KURDISH RELIGIOUS
LEADER, EZ-ED-DIN H O S S E I N I , FOR THE LOSSES AND RETREAT.
KURDS RESPECT AND ADMIRE THESE TWO LEADERS.

2. THE MAJORITY OF KURDISH RESISTANCE UNITS ARE
LOCATED NEAR THE IRAQI AND TURKISH BORDER, AND IN THE MOUNTAINS
AND FOREST REGIONS OF KURDISTAN. THERE ARE FOUR MAIN ARMED
KURDISH PARTISAN GROUPS. THEY ARE:

A. THE ARMED RESISTANCE GROUP OF THE DPK-THIS GROUP'S LEADER IS A FORMER MAJOR IN THE IRANIAN ARMY AND MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE DPK, ABDUL RAHIM A B B A S S I. THE GROUP'S HEADQUARTERS IS IN THE FOREST OF X SARDASHT. THESE FORCES ARE CURRENTLY CONDUCTING INTENSIVE TRAINING FOR SUDDEN ATTACKS AND QUICK RETREATS. MILITARY UNITS OF THE DPK ARE OPERATING FROM WESTERN AZERBAIJAN DOWN TO THE SOUTH OF THE KURDISH MOUNTAIN TRAILS TO IRAQ.

B. MILITARY UNITS OF SAZEMAN-E ZAHMET-E KASHAN-E KURDISTAN-THIS IS A MARXIST-LENINIST, LEFTIST MILITARY UNIT LED BY FORMER LAW STUDENT SALAH M U H T A D I. THE SAZEMAN -E ZAHMET-E KASHAN-E KURDISTAN IS RUMORED TO BE OPERATING EITHER IN THE SOUTH NEAR THE IRAQI BORDER OR IN THE OUTSKIRTS OF SANANDASH.

THE KURDISTAN SECTION(SHAHA-YE KURDISTAN) OF THE PEOPLE'S FEDAYEEN-THIS KURDISH GROUP ALSO HAS MARXIST-LENINIST CONVICTIONS AND IS PART OF THE PEOPLE'S FEDAYEEN. IT STRONGLY ~~OPPOSES~~ THE PRESENT KHOMEINI REGIME. THE SO-CALLED RADICAL KURDISH COMMUNIST GROUPS, THE KURDISTAN SECTION OF THE PEOPLE'S FEDAYEEN AND THE SAZEMAN-E KASHAN-E KURDISTAN DIFFER IN THAT THE FIRST IS PART OF AN IRANIAN ORGANIZATION; THE SECOND IS A PURELY KURDISH ENTITY. BOTH ARE ANTI-SOVIET. AT THE PRESENT TIME THERE IS NO ENMITY BETWEEN THEM. THE KURDISTAN SECTION OF THE PEOPLE'S FEDAYEEN OPERATES IN THE MARIVAN AREA.

D. ARMED FOLLOWERS OF RELIGIOUS AND NATIONAL LEADER HOSSEINI-THEY CONSIST OF VARIOUS SMALL GROUPS WHO ARE HIDING AMONG THE GENERAL POPULATION IN TOWNS AND LARGER VILLAGES.

E. BESIDES THE ABOVE-MENTIONED FOUR GROUPS, THERE ARE VARIOUS SMALL KURDISH ARMED RESISTANCE GROUPS, AMONG THEM TWO SIGNIFICANT ONES--THE GROUP UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF ROSSOUL M O L M A N FROM THE PEOPLE'S SOCIALIST MOVEMENT OF KURDS IN IRAQ, AND THE GROUP OF DR. MAHMOUD O S M A N ALSO FROM IRAQ.

3. THE ESTIMATED NUMBER OF KURDISH RESISTANCE FIGHTERS IN IRAN STANDS AT MORE THAN 20,000 . THE MAJORITY OF THESE

2. FIGHTERS BELONG TO THE ARMED GROUP OF THE DPK. THEY ARE ARMED WITH WEAPONS CAPTURED FROM THE IRANIAN GARRISONS IN MAHABAD, SANANDAJ AND NUSUT IN FEBRUARY 1979. THE KURDS HAVE SUFFICIENT ARMS AND AMMUNITION TO LAST THROUGH THE WINTER ACTIONS.

4. MORE ARMS ARE COMING TO THE IRANIAN KURDS FROM IRAQ. THE MAIN SUPPLIER OF THOSE ARMS IS THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE CELAL T A L A B A N I ORGANIZATION. THE IRANIAN KURDS ALSO RECEIVE AID FROM EAST GERMANY, ROMANIA AND CUBA. THIS AID, HOWEVER, IS ~~CONCENTRATED~~ OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES, FOOD AND CLOTHING, AND USUALLY REACHES THE KURDS VIA IRAQ. IN AUGUST 1979, THE DPK SENT A SPECIAL DELEGATION TO CUBA. AS OF LATE SEPTEMBER, THE DELEGATION HAD NOT YET RETURNED TO IRAN.

5. Q A S E M L U SPENDS MOST OF HIS TIME IN IRAQ AND VERY SELDOM COMES TO IRAN. HOSSEINI IS ALSO HIDING IN IRAQ, BUT FREQUENTLY VISITS IRANIAN KURDISTAN. THE MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE DPK CENTRAL COMMITTEE SUCH AS MEHMET EMIN S I R A C I, AMIR K H A Z I AND HANI B U L U R I Y A N ARE REMAINING IN IRANIAN KURDISTAN WITH THE ARMED GROUPS.

6. THE DPK AND OTHER KURDISH ARMED GROUPS HAVE SOME CONTACT WITH THE TUDEH PARTY, BUT THEY ARE NOT COLLABORATING WITH IT. THE DPK AND OTHER KURDISH FACTIONS ARE, HOWEVER, CLOSELY COLLABORATING WITH THE PEOPLE'S FEDAYEEN. CHERIK-HAYI-KHLKI IRAN, AND OTHER IRANIAN DISSIDENT GROUPS WHO ARE OPPOSING THE KHOMEINI REGIME. NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDERWAY TO ADOPT A JOINT ACTION PLAN WITHIN THE COMING SIX MONTHS AGAINST THE KHOMEINI REGIME.

7. IRANIAN ARMY UNITS PRESENTLY STATIONED IN KURDISTAN ARE TRYING TO ESTABLISH A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LOCAL POPULATION. THEY OFTEN PROTECT THE LOCALS FROM KHOMEINI'S MILITIA FORCES. THE DPK AND OTHER KURDISH FACTIONS VALUE THIS EFFORT AND SEE IT AS A GOOD SIGN FOR THE FUTURE. THE DPK IS WORKING TO WIN THE SYMPATHY OF ALL TO ESTABLISH A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH IRANIAN ARMY UNITS.

8. A NEW KURDISH ORGANIZATION IS BEING CREATED IN

BT

5481

109

(IRANIAN KURDISTAN. IT IS CALLED SHAHIT (WITNESS). THE GOAL OF THIS ORGANIZATION IS TO LIQUIDATE THE KURDS WHO ARE COLLABORATING WITH THE KHOMEINI REGIME. NOT LONG AGO SHAHIT KILLED A KURDISH LANDLORD, T E L I B E K (LNU), WHO HAD COLLABORATED WITH KHOMEINI'S REPRESENTATIVES. NOW THE ORGANISATION IS PLANNING TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST OTHER KURDS WHO ARE SUSPECTED OF WORKING FOR KHOMEINI'S REGIME.

9. NEITHER THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION(PLO) NOR ANY OTHER PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATION HAS AN OFFICE OR REPRESENTATIVES IN IRANIAN KURDISTAN. KERIM H I S S A M I. A MEMBER OF THE DPK'S POLITBURO, IS IN CONTACT WITH A PLO REPRESENTATIVE IN BAGHDAD. HISSAMI ALSO HEADED A DPK DELEGATION WHICH VISITED PLO HEADQUARTERS IN LEBANON. SINCE THAT TIME HE HAS HAD CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE PLO. HISSAMI IS ABOUT 54 YEARS OLD AND RESIDED IN PRAGUE FOR MANY YEARS. HIS FAMILY IS STILL LIVING IN PRAGUE BUT HISSAMI HIMSELF IS IN IRANIAN KURDISTAN.

10. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY IS IN SESSION IN TEHRAN. THE KURDS ARE NOT PAYING ATTENTION TO IT AND FEEL IT IS WORTHLESS. ONLY ONE KURD FROM SANANDAJ IS A MEMBER OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY, AND HE HAS NO INFLUENCE IN IT.

11. ACQ: (9 OCTOBER 1979)

12. FIELD DISSEM: SENT TO ANKARA, ISTANBUL, TEHRAN. REPORT CLASS S E C R E T-WARNING NOTICE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS-NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR CONSULTANTS. DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. RVW 17OCT99 DRV D9C. 1 BY RECORDING REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

BT

#5481

S E C R E T 242201Z OCT 79 STAFF

250ct79 04 17z

CITE DIRECTOR 538929.

TO: BONN INFO TEHRAN.


WNINTEL AJAJA ZRWAROO

REF: BONN 95541 EGN-7939

1. DO NOT PLAN TO DISSEM REF AS REPORT AS WRITTEN DOES NOT APPEAR TO ADD SUFFICIENT NEW INFO TO WHAT ALREADY KNOWN TO WARRANT DISSEM.

2. IT PREVIOUSLY KNOWN THAT PAST EFFORTS BY BARZANI AND TALA-P BANI TO COORDINATE ACTIVITIES HAD FAILED. THIS SUPPORTED ALSO BY TDFIRDE-315/13524-79 FROM GNGRAPH (FROM AN ESTABLISHED SOURCE DRAWING ON A NUMBER OF SUBSOURCES WHOSE RELIABILITY AND ACCESS CANNOT BE ASSESSED) WHICH REPORTED THAT MASUD BARZANI HAD CROSSED FROM IRAN INTO NORTHERN IRAQ TAKING WITH HIM SIZEABLE GROUP OF PESH MERGA. JALAL TALABANI, DISSIDENT KURDISH LEADER UNTIL RECENTLY SUPPORTED BY SYRIA, ATTEMPTED RECONCILIATION WITH MASUD WHO REJECTED HIS ADVANCES. REPORT ALSO SAID MASUD BARZANI HAD ESTABLISHED A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH IRANIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS YAZDI AND THE KDP HAD GAINED SUPPORT OF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WHICH HAD GIVEN IT WEAPONS AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT. CATOMIC/19 IN TDFIRDE-315/15112-79 (BONN 84015) REPORTED ALSO THAT BARZANI BROTHERS HAD NOT ATTEMPTED TO COORDINATE THEIR ACTIVITIES WITH THE IRAQI KURDISH LEADER TALABANI. AGAINST THIS ARE TWO REPORTS OUT OF BAGDAD IN AUGUST 1979 WHICH INDICATE THAT IN EARLY SEPTEMBER 1979 THERE WAS TO BE FRESH EFFORTS BETWEEN TWO FACTIONS TO REACH SOME KIND OF ACCOMMODATION.

3. IN VIEW OF ABOVE INFO BELIEVE REF REPORT WOULD BE MORE USEFUL IF SDYICKEL/1 COULD BE MORE SPECIFIC AS TO DATE OF HIS INFO. DID HE PICK UP IN ANY SPECIFIC INFO OF PROPOSED MEETINGS IN EITHER SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER; IF SO, WERE THESE EFFORTS ALSO REJECTED ETC. IT WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL IF SDYICKEL/1 COULD PROVIDE MORE SPECIFIC INFO THAN BONN 85336 ON WHO SUBSOURCES WERE WHO CAN DEFINITELY SAY THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO RECENT COORDINATION EFFORT



PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 538929 S E C R E T
BETWEEN THE TWO FACTIONS. ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON PAST COORDINATION
BETWEEN KURDISH FACTIONS AND COMMUNISTS PLUS AMPLIFICATION ON EXACT
MEANING OF STATEMENT "SUCH A RELATIONSHIP IS IMPOSSIBLE BECUASE THE
BAGHDAD REGIME CONSIDERS THE IRAQI COMMUNISTS TRAITORS AND IS ACTIVE-
LY PERSECUTING THEM" WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL.

4. PLS ADVISE. NO FILE. RVW 23 OCT 99 DRV D9C.1.ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T
BT
#5514

1 NOV 79 04 17z

S E C R E T 311839Z OCT 79 STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 543375.

TO: ,BONN INFO GERMANY, TEHRAN.

WNINTEL AJAJA SDFICKLE

REF: BONN 95706

1. CONCUR PARA TWO REF.
2. WILL PROVIDE MORE DETAILED COMMENTS RESULTS SDFICKLE/1'S TRIP IN NEAR FUTURE. WE VERY PLEASED.
3. FILE: 281-8969951. RVW 38OCT99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T
BT
#4196

SECRET 140023Z STAFF

CITE DIRECTOR 419577

TO: TEHRAN INFO PARIS

WNINTEL AJAJA UNCAMEL FUSIL

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 408750 (NOT SENT)
B. PARIS 96132 (BEING RELAYED)
C. PARIS 95702
D. PARIS 96010 (FEB 1979)

1. REF A REQUESTED PARIS ST
RECRUITED STATION ASSETS UNCAMEL/1
TO REPORT ON KURDISH AUTONOMY MOVEMENT
ACTIVITIES IN IRAN, AND TO SPOT LEAD
ASSETS WITH ACCESS TO TRIBAL AFFAIRS

2. FURTHER TO REF B RESP
FRENCH CITIZEN, IS FREE-LANCE JO
OF FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY (PCF)
PARIS STATION SINCE 1972 AS RE
ON PCF AFFAIRS AND ON COMMUNIS
HAS TRAVELLED EXTENSIVELY IN
CONTACTS IN VARIOUS AFRICAN A
CIRCLES, INCLUDING KHOMEINI
FRANCE. UNCAMEL/1 HELD INTER
AND LATER SUCCEEDED IN HAVIN
ALSO, RE REF C AND SUBSEQUEN
FULLY TO ACCOMPANY KHOMEINI

3. I WOULD APPRECIATE
RESPONSE TO REF B, AS
VENTURE

2 DIRECTOR [REDACTED] E T
FACTS.

4. PARITY [REDACTED] TO ABOVE, DOES UNFUSIL/1 HAVE ANY
POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE FACTS WITHIN IRANIAN COMMUNIST
ELEMENTS?

5. PARIS [REDACTED] THAT UNFUSIL/1 PREPARED TO
MAKE TRIP, BEGINNING [REDACTED] 20 APRIL. (DO NOT SEE OVERLAP
IN AGENTS' ACTIVITIES. THEY WILL BE DIRECTED SEPARATELY
AGAINST RESPECTIVE [REDACTED] C TARGETS.) UNFUSIL/1 IS U.S.
CITIZEN RESIDING IN PARIS. HE IS SELF-EMPLOYED AS PHOTO-
GRAPHER AND FILM PRODUCER. HE WAS BRIEFLY EMPLOYED BY IRANIAN
GOVERNMENT IN 1977 TO PRODUCE SERIES OF FILMS FOR TELEVISION
AND PRESUMABLY SPENT SOME TIME IN IRAN DURING THAT PERIOD.
A WITTING, PAID AGENT. HE WAS RECRUITED IN 1978 AS ACCESS
AGENT TO LEFTIST AND SOUTHEAST ASIAN TALENTS IN FRANCE AND ELSE-
WHERE. UNFUSIL/1 WAS ACCOMPANYING PHOTOGRAPHER AT SERIES OF
INTERVIEWS WITH KHOMEINI HELD NOVEMBER 1979. HE MANAGED TO
INGRATiate HIMSELF WITH MEMBERS OF KHOMEINI IMMEDIATE ENTOURAGE
AND HAS SINCE ESTABLISHED GOOD PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH
PRINCIPAL ADVISER YAZDI, WHO, PER REQUEST, ISSUED STANDING INVITA-
TION FOR UNFUSIL/1 TO VISIT HIM IN IRAN. UNFUSIL/1 ALSO
RECEIVED PERSONAL INVITATION TO ACCOMPANY KHOMEINI GROUP FROM
FRANCE TO IRAN, BUT WAS UNABLE TO DO SO BECAUSE OF CONFLICTING
PROFESSIONAL COMMITMENTS.

6. ANTICIPATE UNFUSIL/1 WILL BE UNABLE TO EXTEND NO MORE
THAN COUPLE OF WEEKS, AND THEREFORE NO NEED AT THIS TIME
FOR DIRECT STATION CONTACT. HOWEVER, EVENT EITHER ASSET
SHOULD COME ACROSS PERISHABLE INFORMATION, REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS FOR
EMERGENCY CONTACT WITH TEHRAN STATION. ALSO WELCOME TEHRAN
COMMENTS/SUGGESTIONS ON ABOVE INFORMATION AS WELL AS ON BEST
TARGETING OF EACH.

7. FILE: 29-6-248/3 [REDACTED] 28 APR 1979 SECRET RVW 13
APR 1999 DRV D9C.1.
S E C R E T

E C R E T 151221Z APR 79 STAFF
ITE TEHRAN 52705 (GLEGOROFF ACTING)

: PARIS INFO DIRECTOR.

WMINTEL AJAJA UNCAMEL E USIL

REFS: A. PARIS 98132
B. DIRECTOR 419577

1. BELIEVE THAT IF WHEN UNCAMEL/I
HE STRESSES FACT HE IS EXPERIENCED FRE
FINANCIAL MEANS AND IN GENERAL AVOIDS
AFFILIATION, HE SHOULD ENCOUNTER NO B
OR INTO KURDISH AREAS. ONCE IN IRAN,
CREDENTIALS TO GAIN MORE FRIENDLY RE
NALISTS, EVEN AMERICANS, HAVE RECENT
AND AS FAR AS WE KNOW DID NOT RUN I
ATTACHE CONFIRMS THIS.) PGOI PERM
WE BELIEVE THAT C/I CHANCES OF SUC
HAS LOCAL ASSISTANCE IN TEHRAN.
FRIENDS FOR DRIVER/GUIDE WHO UNDF
HAVE A LEG-UP ON THE PROBLEM. I
PARIS WHO REPRESENTS FRENCH PREF
ONLY, TEHRAN ASSET SDTRAMP/I (T
UNTIL ITS RECENT CLOSURE AND IS
LIKELY PROVIDE C/I WITH ADVICE
CONTACT T/I AT HIS OWN INITIA
THAT WE SHOULD OURSELVES PLAC

PLIES FOR VISA
JOURNALIST OF SOME
NG HIS POLITICAL
HIS TRAVEL TO TEHRAN
LD PLAY ON HIS CP
KDP. WESTERN JOUR-
ELLED INTO HINTERLANDS
BLE. (EMBASSY PRESS
S NOT REQUIRED, BUT
LD BE ENHANCED IF HE
AN ARANGE THROUGH
KURDISH DIALECT HE WOULD
JGGET HE INQUIRE IN
RAN. FOR STATION INFO
LD JOURNAL DE TEHRAN
APP RISE. T/I WOULD
STAND. C/I MANAGES TO
DO NOT REPEAT NO1 SUGGEST
T/I IN CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER.

2. SUGGEST THAT C/I INIT
VIEWING KURDESTAN DEMOCRATII
WHO HAS OPENED PARTY OFFICE
ACTING AS UNIFYING FORCE A
VIOUSLY GHASMLOU WILL PRO
THAT C/I WILL PUBLISH SYM
QUARTERS REQUIREMENTS AP
C/I SHOULD MANAGE TO
HOPE

INVESTIGATION BY INTER-
ZADER ABDOL RAHMAN GHASMLOU
HAD AND WHO IS PRESENTI
JUS KURDISH ACTIONS. ON
WITH CURRENTLY IN LINE IN HOPE
TREATMENT. DETAINED HEAD-
LE AND GIVEN TIME AND LUCK
IC QUESTIONS OF HIGH INTE
ACE "LINE". AT CONCL

PAGE 02 TEHRAN 28705 Z E C H E Y
 VISIT, IF C/I HAS DEVELOPS LOCAL LEFTIST CC
 PRECIPITATE RUN-DOWN ON WHO THEY ARE. IF C/I
 WITH LOCAL FEDAYEEN (CHARAKS) OR MARXIST-C
 THIS WOULD REPRESENT A VALUABLE OPERATION
 VISIT TEHRAN UNIVERSITY A CENTER FOR LEFT
 TO MOVE AGAINST THIS TA SET.

, WE WOULD AP-
 TURE INTO TALKS
 O MUJAHIDIN,
 HE SHOULD
 CTIVITY, IN ORDER

3. WHILE UNFUSIL/I (F/I), PER PARA
 LENT ENTREE TO KHOMEINI GROUP, THESE CF
 HIS DISADVANTAGE IN TRYING TO TALK TO
 BEEN REPORTED THAT AYA/TOLLAH SAQDARI,
 SHIITES WHO WAS CLOSE TO KHOMEINI, NA
 ALAMEN MOFTI-ZADEH WHO WAS KHOMEINI?
 HIS POPULARITY AND IS ISOLATED. THE
 A LOSS AS TO HOW BEST F/I MIGHT APP
 HIMSELF AT DISPOSAL OF KHOMEINI GRO
 GET CANNED EXPLANATION OF HOW PG01
 DEMANDS FOR AUTONOMY. ON OTHER HA
 STRAIN, AS SUGGESTED FOR C/I, HE P
 CHANCE OF SUCCESS IF F/I VISITS
 VISIT KHOMEINI CROWD (INCLUDING
 WOULD PROVIDE APPROPRIATE REQUIR
 FROM PARIS.

F B, HAS EXCEL-
 LS MAY WORK TO
 LEADERS. IT HAS
 R OF THE KURDISH
 KURDISTAN AND THAT
 O THE KDP HAS LOST
 JE ARE SOMEWHAT AT
 OBLEM. IF HE PLACES
) EXPECT THAT HE WILL
 O HANDLE MINORITY
 /I TRAVELS ON OWN
 WOULD HAVE REASONABLE
 WE WOULD WANT HIM TO
 END OF TRIP AND WE
 RIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE

4. BOTH C/I AND F/I SHOULD
 HOTEL (JOURNALIST HANG-OUT)
 APRIL, SUMMER F/I PLAN LEA
 TALKING TO NEWS WHEN COME
 IRAN ARE MUCH IN FLUX AND
 FRAME OF COVERAGE. WE WOU
 WITH STATION CONTACT PHONE
 HELD AT HOTEL ROOM. PLEASE
 ASSET AND TRUE NAME AS WE
 PROVIDE CONTACT INSTRUCTI

STAY AT INTERCONTINENTAL
 LANNING DEPART PARIS 28
 AFTER SO HE WILL BE
 ANNOUNCED. EVENTS IN
 USEFUL TO READ TIME-
 TO PROVIDE F/I AND C/I
 D INITIAL MEETING COULD BE
 LANGUAGE CAPABILITY EACH
 TO THE WIRE. STATION WILL

5. FILE: 29-6-245/

1284. RVW 15APR89 DRV D9C.1

2 18 242

SECRET 201915Z APR 79 STAFF

CITE PARIS 98532

TO: DIRECTOR, TEHRAN.

WHINTEL AJAJA UNCAMEL

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 419577
B. TEHRAN 52785

1. C/O BRIEFED UNCAMEL/1 GENERAL RELEVANT SECTIONS
OF REFS. RE PARA 4 REF A, UNCAMEL/1 KNOWS NO ONE WITHIN
IRANIAN COMMUNIST ELEMENTS BUT SAID SOMEONE WHO DOES -
JACQUES V A R I N, WHO WORKS AT FR COMMUNIST PARTY (PCF)
PUBLICATION "FRANCE-NOUVELLE". ACCORDING TO UNCAMEL/1, VARIN
HAD CLOSE CONTACTS WITHIN TUDEH WH INDIVIDUAL IRANIAN COMMUN-
ISTS WERE LIVING HERE IN EXILE AND CLANDESTINITY. VARIN
ALSO HANDLED PRINTING TRACTS FOR UNCAMEL/1 KNOWS VARIN
PERSONALLY AND WILL SOLICIT HIS AID AND AID ON POSSIBLE TRIP
TO IRAN. UNCAMEL/1 BELIEVES THE ALL AGENCY FRANCE
PRESSE (AFP) OFFICE IN TEHRAN CAN CONFIRM LBL AND WILL
MAKE INQUIRIES WHERE RE WHO IS WILL ADVISE.

2. INDEX VARIN. FILE: 248/3. RW 20APR99 DRV

SECRET

Memorandum

11 Mar 79 23 50

SECRET 1232Z MAY 79 STAFF

OFF DIRECTOR, 437023.

THE PRIORITY TEHRAN.

W/NTL UNFUSH, INTEL

REFS: A. NIT-12,501 TEHRAN 53026 TDFIRDS-512-08453-79
E. NIT-12,592 TEHRAN 55013 TDFIRDS-312/08529-79

1. REFS WERE GOOD REPORTS WHICH WERE WELL RECEIVED. IT RAISES THE QUESTION, ONCE AGAIN, HOWEVER, WHETHER GHASMLOU'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KURDISTAN (DPK) AND BARZANI'S KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP) ARE TWO SEPARATE AND DISTINCT PARTIES, OR WHETHER THEY ARE FRACTIONS OF THE SAME PARTY. THERE IS CONFLICTING REPORTING ON THIS SUBJECT IN THE RECENT PAST. TO ADD TO THE CONFUSION, SDGABLEY REPORTED THAT ONE OF THE FOUR LEADERS AT THE 23 FEBRUARY 1979 FOURTH GENERAL CONGRESS OF THE DPK IS A CLOSE ADVISER TO JALAL TALABANI (WHO WE SHOW HEADS THE PATRIOTIC UNION OF KURDISTAN (PUK)) AND SUPPOSEDLY SPOKE FOR TALABANI AT THE CONGRESS.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION APPROPRIATE SOURCES COULD PROVIDE ON THE ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF THE DPK, AS WELL AS CLARIFICATION OF ABOVE, AND, IF A FACTION OF A CROSS-BORDER PARTY, ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS COUNTERPARTS IN IRAQ, SYRIA, AND KURD.

3. NO FILE. RVW 11 MAY 99 DRV DRC.1 ALLSECRET.

SECRET

DPE CADRE: EISENHOWER WOLFF WOLFF (FRIEND OF HUNTER/1)

DPE OFFICE 6 GOLDEN WOLFF (NEAR EISENHOWER AND SHADANAN ST.)

TEL 976-127

HUNTER SOCIETY HEAD W/ WOLFF TO DPE

HUNTER WOLFF

100-105 (HUNTER/1-100-105)

T 051538Z JUN

PARIS 13275

TEHRAN INFO DIRECTOR.

EL AJAJA UNCAMEL

A. TEHRAN 53294
B. DIRECTOR 451889
C. TEHRAN 51410

1. REGRET DELAY BUT I HAD LITTLE TO
REPORT VIS-A-VIS TRIP TO IRAN. BE ABLE TO
TRAVEL BY END NEXT WEEK. EDITORS OF PARIS
LEFTIST "MAGAZINE, "DEMAIN" HE HAS WRITTEN
IN PAST, TOLD THEM HE HAD WITH IMPLIED
FINANCIAL SUPPORT) FROM (D) AND ASKED
IF MAGAZINE WOULD BE INTERESTED FOR HIS ARTICLES/
PHOTOS. EDITORS RESPONDED WITHOUT MARKED
ENTHUSIASM AND UNCAMEL/ AT LEAST GET LETTER
OF ACCREDITATION. HE VARIN, CONTACT AT
FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY "PROGRES-NOUVELLE" WHO
HE HAD BEEN TOLD HAD VARIN; VARIN INTRO-
DUCED HIM TO NOURI EN, PCF MEMBER,
PRESIDENT OF ONE-YEAR ASSOCIATION, AFASPI
(ASSOCIATION FRANCAISE D'IRAN) AVEC LE PEUPLE
D'IRAN. ALBALA PRESENTS VARIATIONS IN IRAN.
VARIN IS ATTEMPTING TO GET FNU N A Z A R I,
DESCRIBED AS MAN IN PARIS. WILL
ADVISE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

3. IS REFUSING TO AGREE THAT
UNCAMEL/ WOULD BE ABLE TO OBTAIN VALUABLE INFORMA-
TION.

4. INDEXED 4284. RVW
25 JUN 91: DRV
S E C R E T

FOR TO STAFF

DIRECTOR.

276

FOLLOWING IS NEW CONTACT PLAN FOR UNCAMEL/1. PHONE
820-891 EXT 1138 RPT 1138 DAYTIME OR 835-538 RPT
EVENINGS, AND ASK FOR "JOAN" WITH C/I IDENTIFYING
AS HENRI. MEETING WILL OCCUR AT LOCATION AND DATE GIVEN
PHONE CONVERSATION, ONE HOUR RPT ONE HOUR EARLIER THAN
AREA. C/I SHOULD CARRY NEW ID MAGAZINE IN HIS HAND,
CASE OFFICER.

2. REPEAT PHYSICAL AND
RECORD FILE HOLDINGS. PLEASE

UNCAMEL/1 NO LONGER IN

3. FILE 819-400-4
2 T

W 8 JUL 99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET.

SECRET 1530Z SEP 70 STAFF

CITE WESTPORT 48610 SECTION 1 OF 2

TO: DIRECTOR INFO GERMANY, BONN, MUNICH, TEHRAN, ANKARA.

WNINTE RYBA AJAJA TRACE

REF: WESTPORT 44848

Should have gone Baghdad

1. FOLLOWING IS A BIOGRAPHIC/BACKGROUND AND PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT REPORT ON AHMED RUF AL-NAKIB, AN IRAQI KURD WHO WALKED IN AT THE USCONGEN IN MUNICH ON 27-7-75 1975 AND WHO WAS SUBSEQUENTLY INTERVIEWED BY ELMER J. ZAMETSON IN MUNICH:

A. AHMED RUF AL-NAKIB (FROM HERE ON A) WAS BORN ON 18 NOVEMBER 1931 IN SULEYMANIYA, KURDISTAN, IRAQ. A KURDISH NATIONAL AND IRAQI CITIZEN. IN 1956, FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF SECONDARY SCHOOL (GYMNASIUM) IN SULEYMANIYA, HE ENROLLED IN AN AGRICULTURAL SCHOOL IN ADD-GRAB, NEAR BAGHDAD. A DID NOT GRADUATE FROM THE ABOVE SCHOOL; HOWEVER, YEARS LATER, HE COMPLETED HIS STUDIES AT THE NICOLAE BALCESCU FACULTY OF AGRICULTURE IN BUCHAREST, ROMANIA. IN ROMANIA, A MET ILSE MEE GEESCH, AN ETHNIC GERMAN WHOM HE MARRIED IN 1964. THEY HAVE A 7-YEAR-OLD SON, NURI. FROM 1956 TO 1958, A SERVED WITH THE RANK OF LIEUTENANT IN THE IRAQI ARMY IN KURDISTAN. SINCE 1961, A INTERMITTENTLY RESIDED IN IRAQ, IRAN AND WEST GERMANY. FROM 1961 TO 1962 HE RESIDES IN FRANKFURT-MAIN. AFTERWARDS IN DRESDEN (1962-64), MUNICH (1964-65), GIESSEN (1965-66) TEHRAN (3 MONTHS IN 1968), SULEYMANIYA (1968-73), WHERE HE SERVED AS DIRECTOR OF THE LOCAL AGRICULTURAL INFORMATION CENTER. FROM 1973 TO 1974, FOR A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS, A WAS AN AGRICULTURAL ADVISER TO MUSTAFA BAKR 2 A M E. THE LATE KURDISH ARMY LEADER. IN 1974, WHEN THE KURDISH REVOLT AGAINST THE IRAQI ARMY WAS CRUSHER, A CROSSED THE TURKEY-IRANIAN BORDER INTO IRAN WITH ONE HUNDRED KURDS. THERE, HE INITIALLY HEADED A KURDISH GROUP FOR SEVERAL MONTHS (FOR CIRCA 3 MONTHS), THEN, FOR ANOTHER THREE MONTHS, HE RESIDED AT SANJULIYAN, ALSO IN IRAN. AFTER 15 DAYS IN TEHRAN, A LEFT FOR DUESSELDORF.

PAGE 2 WESTPORT 48616 S E C R E T

WEST GERMANY, WHERE HE RESIDED WITH HIS BROTHER DAVID UNTIL 1973. FROM 1973 TO JUNE 1978, A RESIDED IN WEST GERMANY, WHERE HE WAS MOSTLY UNEMPLOYED AND LIVED OFF SUBSIDIES TO HIM BY HIS WEALTHY FATHER. IN BETWEEN, IN FALL 1978, A VISITED HIS BROTHER AND IN-LAWS IN WEST GERMANY. A CLAIMS THAT HE COULD NOT FIND SUITABLE WORK BECAUSE OF DISCRIMINATION TOWARDS THE KURDS ON THE PART OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT.

MARI NURI
KURMANIYAH,
AGE GIVEN
1978, A
CLAIMS THAT
TION

3. A CLAIMS TO BE A MEMBER OF THE BARDINGI TRIBE (NUMBERING 14,000) AND THE SON OF SHEIK REUF AL-NAJIBI, 67-YEAR-OLD WELL-KNOWN BUSINESSMAN AND LANDOWNER IN (TELL: 283447). FATHER OWNS A PLANTATION, EXPENSIVE NUMBER OF SHOPS IN SULAYMANIYAH. A HAS TWO BROTHERS, FORMER ARMY COLONELS. IN IRAQ: FAREH AL-WAZIR, AN AT A GOVERNMENT OFFICE IN BAGHDAD; AND SELHADDIN AL- OFFICIAL AT THE ARMY INSPECTION CENTER IN KIRKUK. ANOTHER BROTHER, FAREH WAZIR, A PHYSICIAN WHO OWNS HIS OWN PRACTICE, RESIDES IN SISSINGWORTH, NEAR MORTWENSTADT, FRG.

KURMANIYAH.
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B, AN
BROTHER.

4. POLITICAL AFFILIATION: A CLAIMS TO BE A MEMBER OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KURDISTAN - DPK (IRAQ). FROM 1958 HE WAS A MEMBER OF THE DPK'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE. EARLY HE WAS SECRETARY OF THE KURDISH STUDENT ORGANIZATION IN A CLAIMING TO KNOW WELL ALL LEADING PEOPLE OF THE DPK IN AS WELL AS A LARGE NUMBER OF KURDISH LEADERS IN IRAN. PERSONALLY FOR MORTWEN, MASHOUT AND IDRIS, OF MUSTAFA A CLAIMS THAT MASHOUT BAKRANI WAS ELECTED TO REPLACE MORTWEN BAKRANI AS THE OVERALL LEADER OF THE KURDISH PEOPLE. MORTWEN WAS REPORTED TO BE CURRENTLY IN EASTERN TURKEY. A ALSO CLAIMS THAT HIS FORMER ENEMY FROM EARLY DAYS IN EUROPE APPEARED RECENTLY IN BAGHDAD, CURRENTLY THE HEAD OF THE KURDISH ARMY. A ALSO CLAIMS TO HAVE STUDIED IN THE USSR AND IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. HE IS THE AUTHOR OF A BOOK ON KURDISH A STATEMENT THAT HE CURRENTLY TWO REBEL FACTIONS IN ONE FACTION, HEADED BY MORTWEN BAKRANI, THE OTHER ONE HEADED BY FAREH WAZIR, A RED-COMMUNIST WHO WENT TO MAHARA

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PAGE 3 WISCONSIN 48618 S E C R E T
IRAN. TO HELP THE KURDS THERE GAIN THEIR AUTONOMY
IRANISANS.

D. CONNECTIONS WITH FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. CLAIMS THAT HE SOUGHT HELP FOR THIS PEOPLE BY INFILTRATING VARIOUS GOVERNMENTS. THRU THEIR INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. FLIGHT OF THE KURDISH PEOPLE IN THEIR FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE AND/OR AUTONOMY. IN 1964, 1967, AND AGAIN IN FALL 1978, HE CONTACTED THE ISRAELI EMBASSY IN BAD GODSEBERG, WHERE HE HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAELI OFFICIALS THERE. HE ALSO MADE REPORTS ON THE KURDISH SITUATION IN IRAQ. A CLAIMS OF FUNDS KEEP HIM FROM GOING TO SEE THE ISRAELI EMBASSY IN BAD GODSEBERG. IN 1968, HE ALSO ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH AN IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, SAVAK. IN BAD GODSEBERG, HE ASSOCIATION WITH SAVAK CONTINUED UNTIL 1975, WHEN HE VISITED IRAN. IN 1968, HE WAS THE GUEST OF SAVAK IN TEHRAN, CIRCA THREE MONTHS. DURING THIS PERIOD, HE HELPED IN RELATIONS BETWEEN SAVAK AND IRAQI KURDS, LED BY MUSTAFA BARZANI. A CLAIMS TO HAVE PROVIDED SAVAK WITH LENGTHY DETAILED REPORTS ON THE KURDISH SITUATION IN IRAQ. IN 1973, WHILE WITH THE KURDISH REBELS IN KURDISTAN, HE MAINTAINED CONTACT WITH SAVAK. HE EMPHASIZED THAT HE VOLUNTARILY PROVIDED INFORMATION TO THE ISRAELIS AND IRANISANS AND AT NO TIME DID HE ACCEPT ANY FINANCIAL COMPENSATION EXCEPT FOR EXPENSES.

2. CONNECTIONS WITH US OFFICIALS ABROAD. A ALSO HELD BY CONTACTING US OFFICIALS AT DIFFERENT US INSTALLATIONS ABROAD. IN EITHER 1963 OR 1964, HE CONTACTED THE US CONSUL IN BOMBEY. IN 1968 AND IN 1974, HE CONTACTED THE US CONSUL IN TEHRAN. THERE, IN 1974, HE DISCUSSED THE KURDISH PROBLEM WITH MR. LARRY TREMAK (P). SEPTEMBER 1978, HE VISITED THE US EMBASSY IN ANKARA, WHERE HE VERBALLY REPORTED ON THE SITUATION IN KURDISTAN. IN OCTOBER 1978, HE VISITED THE US CONSUL IN MUNICH, WHERE HE DISCUSSED THE KURDISH PROBLEM WITH A

BT

48618

NAME: WESTPORT 48312 S E C R E T
 (NAME) CONFIDENTIAL AND TO WHOM HE ALSO TURNED OVER A
 REPORT (WRITTEN IN KURDISH) ON THE DEVELOPING SITUATION
 IN IRAQ. DURING HIS 27 AUGUST 1978 VISIT TO
 AMERICAN CONSULATE, HE TURNED OVER ANOTHER REPORT (ALS
 KURDISH), WHICH DETAILS DEALS WITH THE FOLLOWING:
 THE KURDISH SITUATION IN IRAQ; CLAMDESTINE SHIPMENTS
 OF WEAPONS TO KURDISH GROUPS VIA IRAQ -- WITH THE
 APPROVAL OF IRAQI GOVERNMENT; PRESENCE OF IDI AMIN
 (KURDISH INFO); THE AGRICULTURAL SITUATION IN KURDISH
 AND THE KURDS ABROAD.

PERSONALITY DESCRIPTION: A MAKES A GOOD GEN
 IMPRESSION. HE IS A HANDSOME AND WELL-GROOMED MAN WE
 CHARMING, GENTLEMANLY AND INTELLIGENT. HE IS TALL, H
 GREY HAIR, A DARK MUSTACHE, AND DELICATE FACIAL FEATU
 HE IS ELEGANTLY DRESSED. A NATIONALIST AND DEVOTED SH
 MOSLEM. HE CLAIMS TO BE A DESCENDANT OF THE PROPHET MO
 AND HE WOULD LIKE TO HELP BRING ABOUT PEACE BETWEEN
 KURDS AND THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. A IS IN POSSESSION
 SCROLL CERTIFYING THAT HE IS A DESCENDANT OF THE PROPH
 MOHAMED. WITH ABOVE CERTIFICATE, A BELIEVES HE WILL BE
 TO CONVINCE THE AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI THAT HE (A) IS A SUIT
 PARTNER TO NEGOTIATE PEACE BETWEEN THE KURDS AND THE
 IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. A DOES NOT APPEAR AS A RELIGIOUS F
 HOWEVER, HE DOES APPEAR PREOCCUPIED WITH THE FLIGHT OF
 PEOPLE AND IRS FIGHT FOR AN INDEPENDENT KURDISTAN. A IS
 CONVERSATIONALLY AND APPEARS TO HAVE NUMEROUS FRIENDS
 IN IRAQ AND ELSEWHERE. IN ADDITION TO HIS NATIVE KURDISH
 A SPEAKS FLUENT ARAB (IRAKI), IRANIAN, AND GERMAN. GOOD
 AND SOME ROMANIAN AND TURKISH.

2. DURING PARTING WITH ZAKIRSON, A STATED THAT HE WOU
 LIKE TO DISCUSS WITH U.S. MIDDLE EAST EXPERTS(S) THE CURREN
 KURDISH SITUATION, ASKING THAT HE WANTED TO KEEP THE U.S.
 INFORMED ON EVENTS IN KURDISTAN, WITH THE AIM OF KEEPING T

PAGE 5 WESTPORT 48618 S E C R E T
 COMMUNISTS FROM TAKING OVER FULL CONTROL OF KURDISTAN WHEN
 ASKED BY ZAKARYSON WHETHER OR NOT HE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN
 COOPERATING WITH AIS RE ABOVE, ANSWERED THAT HE WOULD BE
 HAPPY TO DO SO, BUT ONLY IN RETURN FOR U.S. BACKING THE
 KURDISH CAUSE AND NOT FOR FINANCIAL COMPENSATION.

3. A PLANS TO RETURN WITH WIFE (WHO HAS WEST GERM PASS-
 PORT) AND SON TO IRAQ ON 3 SEPT 1979. HE IS IN POSSESSION
 OF IRAQI PASSPORT (DID NOT HAVE PASSPORT WITH HIM DURING
 INTERVIEW) WITH WEST GERM. 3-MONTH VISA VALID UNTIL SEPT.
 IF MOS IS INTERESTED IN FURTHER ASSASSINATING AND/OR RECRUITING A
 PLEASE ADVISE. A COULD BE RECONTACTED THRU HIS IN-LAW, FAM.
 GEGESCH, KIRCHSEENWEGSTR 6 II, EGGENHARTING, NEAR MUN.
 (WHERE HE CURRENTLY RESIDES) TEL: 98891-2582. OR THRU HIS
 BROTHER IN GIESSENKIRCHEN. HERE HE PLANS TO VISIT PRIOR TO
 HIS DEPARTURE FROM GERMANY.

4. A'S REPORT AND THREE PHOTOS (A WITH SOME INFLUENCE
 KURDS) WILL BE FOUCHED TO ELIASAP.

5. NAFILE DEBER. RVN IS SEP 09 DRY DO CL.
 S E C R E T
 BT
 8610

12 SEP 19 13 20

TO DIRECTOR 511484

FROM DIRECTOR 511484

RE IMMEDIATE WESTPORT AND IMMEDIATE BOMB, MUNICH, GERMANY.
ROUTINE TIRIAN, ANKARA, ISTANBUL.

MINTEL EVENT ANKARA TIRAC

REFS: A. WESTPORT AND IMMEDIATE BOMB, MUNICH, GERMANY.
B. WESTPORT AND IMMEDIATE BOMB, MUNICH, GERMANY.

1. HAS HAS FOLLOWING INFO ON ARABIAN NAME AL-N A Q I B (PREVIOUSLY
ASSIGNED 281-072861).

A. THE BACKGROUND OF 1 APRIL 1965. THE OFFICIAL BULGE
SERVICE LATER NAMED AS A LIAISON OFFICER OF THE KURDISH STUDENTS
SOCIETY IN BUDAPEST (SEE REF A). HE GRADUATED FROM THE TRACI AGRICULTURAL
SECONDARY SCHOOL AND WAS SERVING IN ROMANIA IN 1965/66, SPECIAL-
IZING IN GENERAL AGRICULTURE.

B. IN BOMB OF 31 MARCH 1965, NAQIB'S WIFE CLAIMED
SHE WAS FORCED TO SIGN A DOCUMENT WITH THE ROMANIAN SECRET SERVICE
IN ORDER TO OBTAIN A PASSPORT TO JOIN HER HUSBAND IN GERMANY IN
1961. IN VIEW OF CHARGE TO THE CONTRARY, NAQIB BELIEVES SHE WAS
STILL COLLABORATING AND THAT SHE WAS IN FREQUENT CONTACT WITH THE
ROMANIAN.

C. AFTER REF A OF 29 NOVEMBER 1965 STATED THAT NAQIB CAME
TO THE EMBASSY IN THE BOMB AND ASKED TO SPEAK WITH A POLITICAL
OFFICER. THE OFFICER SAID HE HAD NO TIME TO SPEAK WITH HIM (THE LAST ONE
IN FILE) IS ALMOST VERIFIED. THE DOCUMENT (WHICH IN THE LAST ONE
WAS TOLD THAT WHILE NAQIB WAS SYMPATHETIC TO THE CAUSE OF
MINORITIES, OFFICIAL POLICY WAS THAT THE BEST SOLUTION WAS FOR AN
ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN THE TWO FORCES. NAQIB STATED THAT HE
UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS WAS THE OFFICIAL U.S. POSITION AND THAT HE WOULD
NOT MISINTERPRET THE POLICY OF POLITICAL OFFICERS TO HEAR HIS STORY
AS ANY INDICATION OF THE EMBASSY SUPPORT FOR BARRANI'S TIRDS.

D. SUMMARY OF INFO ON WESTPORT OPERATIONAL INTEREST AND
PER REF A, PARA 2, THE EMBASSY OFFICER WITH WIDELI EAST

PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 51140 S E C R E T FOLLOW-UP DETERMINING. SEE OFFICE
EXPERIENCE SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN WORK. 16 SEPT ON ANOTHER ASSIGNMENT
R. FRANK ANDERSON WILL BE IN MUNICH FOR A FEW DAYS. MR. ANDERSON WILL MEET
AND. IF SODA CAN RELY REPORT FROM NEW YORK, MR. ANDERSON WILL MEET
IM. REQUEST VISITORS CONTACT SODA TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER OR NOT HE
CAN REMAIN IN MUNICH. HOPEFULLY YOU WILL. PERHAPS 22 SEPT. AND ADVISE BQS
IMMEDIATELY.

3. IDENTIFIED REQUIREMENTS BEING TRANSMITTED SEPARATELY.

4. DOWN: VLM NAME CHECKED IN VISITING AREA. PERSON OFFICER W
RETURN HOME UPON COMPLETION. MR. ANDERSON WILL MEET MR. ANDERSON
REMAIN IN MUNICH BEYOND 15 SEPT. AT 10:00 AM. MR. ANDERSON
GRIMSON TO HANDLE THIS REQUIREMENT. INQUIRY RE STAND FEET DOWN
UNTIL DECISION MADE.

5. FILE: 221-07000. VLM 15 SEP 50 BY DEC. 1. ALL RECORDS
S E C R E T
10
#982

12 SEP

RE T 12 03Z SEP 79 STAFF

REPORT 8028

INFO DIRECTION INFO BONN, GERMANY, MUNICH, TEHRAN,
ISRAEL

RYBAT AJ JA

RE DIRECT 5 1486

AMAD AUL AL-NABAT HAS AGREED TO POSTPONE HIS
TRIP FROM GERMANY UNTIL 22 SEPTEMBER. HE IS LOOKING
FOR A MEETING WITH LEAST SPECIALIST AND EXPECTS PHONE
CONTACT WITH AMERICAN AT 1000 HOURS ON 18 SEPTEMBER. AL-NABAT
WILL RETURN TO IRAQ BY AUTOMOBILE VIA YUGOSLAVIA, GREECE
AND KE.

IF WE REPORT CAN SUPPORT NEAR EAST OFFICER IN ANY WAY

FILE 291-672-61. RVW 12 SEP 99 DIV D9C1.
S E I

13 SEP 79

C R E T 122324Z SEP 79
THE DIRECTOR 512322

PRIORITY WESTPORT AND PRIORITY BERNARD, ANN, UNION,
ROUTINE TEBEAM, AMIR

INTEL EYEAT AJAJA

OP A. WESTPORT 48210
B. DIRECTOR 51148

1. FOLLOWING ARE INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR USE WITH WEST
901-872501) A. WHAT ARE THE PRIORITIES GIVING THE
IRANIAN MURDER GROUP THAT ENTRIES ARE THE MURDER DISTURBANCES
GIVING ON THE IRANIAN MURDER COMMUNITY. SPECIFIC REPORTING ON IRANIAN
MURDER OBJECTIVES Y. THE NEXT TWO YEARS NEXT REPORT AND, BY
POSSIBLE, SOME KIND OF ANALYSIS OF HOW REALITY THESE OBJECTIVES
ARE AS WELL AS DETAIL OF MURDER PLANS TO CARRY OUT AUTOMAT. ETC.

B. ONLY BERNARD, ANN, UNION, AS WELL AS THE
DATA OF ALL KIP LIAISON INFORMATION.

C. SOURCE INFORMATION ON THE IRANIAN MURDER AND
TALABANI FACTORS IN THE IRANIAN MURDER AND RECENT MURDERING
BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS. DOWN OF THE POSSIBLE SUPPORT THEY
MAY BE EXTENDING TO EACH OTHER.

D. DETAILS ON THE IRANIAN MURDER GROUP AND THE KIP AND
THE IRANIAN MURDER GROUP.

E. DETAILS ON THE IRANIAN MURDER GROUP AND THE KIP AND
LOCATED AND SOME OF THE IRANIAN MURDER GROUP AND THE KIP AND
THEY GETTING ON THE IRANIAN MURDER GROUP AND THE KIP AND

F. DETAILS ON THE IRANIAN MURDER GROUP AND THE KIP AND
GETTING FROM THE IRANIAN MURDER GROUP AND THE KIP AND

G. DETAILS ON THE IRANIAN MURDER GROUP AND THE KIP AND
C. DETAILS ON THE IRANIAN MURDER GROUP AND THE KIP AND

E 2 DIRECTOR 51 32 6 E C R E T
DING ARMS INTO MAN WITH TACIT IRAQI GOV APPROVAL.

IT AND WE MAY HAVE ON POSSIBLE IRAQI SUPPORT TO ARAB-
MAKING GROUPS IN MIDDLE EAST.

WE ARE ALSO INTERESTED IN NAMES PLUS PERSONALITY DATA
OF PERSONS WHO HAVE TAKEN REFUGE WITH THE
IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND WHO ARE CURRENTLY SETTING
UP THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST
DURING TO THE IRAQI.

ANOTHER SOURCE MAY HAVE ON IRACI SET A GROUPS SUCH
AS THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT OF HOW WELL ORGANIZED THEY ARE NEEDED
IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND WHO ARE CURRENTLY SETTING UP

JECTIVE: 1. 2.

2. FOLLOW-UP CONVENTIONAL QUESTIONS SHOULD BE COVERED IN
COMING INTERVIEW WITH SUBJ:

1. SUBJ'S PRESENT STATUS AND RELATIONSHIP WITH
IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND WHO ARE CURRENTLY SETTING UP

STAINED: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 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621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 841. 842. 843. 844. 845. 846. 847. 848. 849. 850. 851. 852. 853. 854. 855. 856. 857. 858. 859. 860. 861. 862. 863. 864. 865. 866. 867. 868. 869. 870. 871. 872. 873. 874. 875. 876. 877. 878. 879. 880. 881. 882. 883. 884. 885. 886. 887. 888. 889. 890. 891. 892. 893. 894. 895. 896. 897. 898. 899. 900. 901. 902. 903. 904. 905. 906. 907. 908. 909. 910. 911. 912. 913. 914. 915. 916. 917. 918. 919. 920. 921. 922. 923. 924. 925. 926. 927. 928. 929. 930. 931. 932. 933. 934. 935. 936. 937. 938. 939. 940. 941. 942. 943. 944. 945. 946. 947. 948. 949. 950. 951. 952. 953. 954. 955. 956. 957. 958. 959. 960. 961. 962. 963. 964. 965. 966. 967. 968. 969. 970. 971. 972. 973. 974. 975. 976. 977. 978. 979. 980. 981. 982. 983. 984. 985. 986. 987. 988. 989. 990. 991. 992. 993. 994. 995. 996. 997. 998. 999. 1000. 1001. 1002. 1003. 1004. 1005. 1006. 1007. 1008. 1009. 1010. 1011. 1012. 1013. 1014. 1015. 1016. 1017. 1018. 1019. 1020. 1021. 1022. 1023. 1024. 1025. 1026. 1027. 1028. 1029. 1030. 1031. 1032. 1033. 1034. 1035. 1036. 1037. 1038. 1039. 1040. 1041. 1042. 1043. 1044. 1045. 1046. 1047. 1048. 1049. 1050. 1051. 1052. 1053. 1054. 1055. 1056. 1057. 1058. 1059. 1060. 1061. 1062. 1063. 1064. 1065. 1066. 1067. 1068. 1069. 1070. 1071. 1072. 1073. 1074. 1075. 1076. 1077. 1078. 1079. 1080. 1081. 1082. 1083. 1084. 1085. 1086. 1087. 1088. 1089. 1090. 1091. 1092. 1093. 1094. 1095. 1096. 1097. 1098. 1099. 1100. 1101. 1102. 1103. 1104. 1105. 1106. 1107. 1108. 1109. 1110. 1111. 1112. 1113. 1114. 1115. 1116. 1117. 1118. 1119. 1120. 1121. 1122. 1123. 1124. 1125. 1126. 1127. 1128. 1129. 1130. 1131. 1132. 1133. 1134. 1135. 1136. 1137. 1138. 1139. 1140. 1141. 1142. 1143. 1144. 1145. 1146. 1147. 1148. 1149. 1150. 1151. 1152. 1153. 1154. 1155. 1156. 1157. 1158. 1159. 1160. 1161. 1162. 1163. 1164. 1165. 1166. 1167. 1168. 1169. 1170. 1171. 1172. 1173. 1174. 1175. 1176. 1177. 1178. 1179. 1180. 1181. 1182. 1183. 1184. 1185. 1186. 1187. 1188. 1189. 1190. 1191. 1192. 1193. 1194. 1195. 1196. 1197. 1198. 1199. 1200. 1201. 1202. 1203. 1204. 1205. 1206. 1207. 1208. 1209. 1210. 1211. 1212. 1213. 1214. 1215. 1216. 1217. 1218. 1219. 1220. 1221. 1222. 1223. 1224. 1225. 1226. 1227. 1228. 1229. 1230. 1231. 1232. 1233. 1234. 1235. 1236. 1237. 1238. 1239. 1240. 1241. 1242. 1243. 1244. 1245. 1246. 1247. 1248. 1249. 1250. 1251. 1252. 1253. 1254. 1255. 1256. 1257. 1258. 1259. 1260. 1261. 1262. 1263. 1264. 1265. 1266. 1267. 1268. 1269. 1270. 1271. 1272. 1273. 1274. 1275. 1276. 1277. 1278. 1279. 1280. 1281. 1282. 1283. 1284. 1285. 1286. 1287. 1288. 1289. 1290. 1291. 1292. 1293. 1294. 1295. 1296. 1297. 1298. 1299. 1300. 1301. 1302. 1303. 1304. 1305. 1306. 1307. 1308. 1309. 1310. 1311. 1312. 1313. 1314. 1315. 1316. 1317. 1318. 1319. 1320. 1321. 1322. 1323. 1324. 1325. 1326. 1327. 1328. 1329. 1330. 1331. 1332. 1333. 1334. 1335. 1336. 1337. 1338. 1339. 1340. 1341. 1342. 1343. 1344. 1345. 1346. 1347. 1348. 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13 SEP 79 15 3 2

SECRET 122507Z SEP 79 STAFF

THE DIRECTOR 01223...

1. IMMEDIATE WESTPORT, DOWNS INFO GERMANY, TCG, TEHRAN.

MINTEL DEBAT ANJAN COME

RTS: A. WESTPORT 426
B. DIRECTOR 1480

1. APPRECIATE ANDERSON'S EFFORTS PER MR. FRANK
ANDERSON ARRIVING DUE VIA LUTHERA 60 TON LONDON 18 SEP 79
455 HOURS (ITINERARY ALREADY FORWARDED MULTIPLE). AS SOON AS
ANDERSON HAS CONTACT MONICE DATE AND DNT... HIS SCHEDULE.
ANDERSON WILL CONTACT WESTPORT RE AL-MARIP...

2. FOR BOMB: APPRECIATE MR. JACK GR... ANDERSON STANDING BY
HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF... AND ANDERSON AVAIL... REQUEST THAT
GRISON RETURN HIS...

3. FILE: 10 7 561. RTV 1251999... D4C11 ALL SECRET.
SECRET
BT
#1284

15 SEP 79

E T 140909Z SEP 79

KARA 44631

PORT INFO DIRECTOR, GERMANY, BONN, MUNICH, TEHRAN.

YBA AJAJA TRACE

STPORT 48610

ER R. F. PARA 12 PLS SEE EMBASSY ANKARA AFGHAN A-76 DT
B FOR REPORT OF CONVERSATION WITH AHMED KUDAT-NAKIB

RE: DEFER. RVN 14 SEP 80 DRV DSC.1.

REF ID: A619

1944

2025 RELEASE UNDER E.O. 14176

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF JAMES EARL RAY, JR., DECEASED

THE REFUGEES HAVE WANTED IRANIAN TERRITORY IN ORDER TO AGREE

135

SECRET
TO START

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TOP SECRET

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1. WE CANNOT RECALL BEING INFORMED BY THE GREEK KURDS THAT SUCH REPORTS WERE IDENTIFIED FOR US BY THE GREEK KURDS.

2. WE CANNOT RECALL BEING INFORMED BY THE GREEK KURDS THAT SUCH REPORTS WERE IDENTIFIED FOR US BY THE GREEK KURDS.

3. WE CANNOT RECALL BEING INFORMED BY THE GREEK KURDS THAT SUCH REPORTS WERE IDENTIFIED FOR US BY THE GREEK KURDS.

SECRET

19 SEP 79 00 22Z

SECRET 40 52 SEP 79 STAFF

SECRET 40 52 SEP 79 STAFF

SECRET 40 52 SEP 79 STAFF DIRECTOR, ANKARA, STOCKHOLM INFO TERRA

SECRET 40 52 SEP 79 STAFF

SECRET 40 52 SEP 79 STAFF ANY AVAILABLE KGS AND ARDEE INFO

SECRET 40 52 SEP 79 STAFF STOCKHOLM OF A KURDISH ASSOCIATION

SECRET 40 52 SEP 79 STAFF KURDISH SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS IN TURK

SECRET 40 52 SEP 79 STAFF PREPARING INTEL DISSEM ON T

SECRET 40 52 SEP 79 STAFF AND WOULD APPRECIATE INFO ASAP

SECRET 40 52 SEP 79 STAFF SEP 79 DRV DPCS ALL SECRET

SECRET 10 344Z SEP 75

CITE STOCKHOLM 226184

TO: PRIORITY STANBUL INFO KARA, TEHRAN, DIRECT

UNINTL INTEL

REF: STANBUL 3265

1. SECRET HAVE NO INFO ON ESTABLISHMENT KURD
ASSOCIATION IN STOCKHOLM. WILL QUERY LIAISON AT
BUT REF Y WILL NOT BE RECEIVED IN TIME FOR YOUR

2. FILE RMV 19 SEP 75 IN D90.5.
SECRET

SECRET 230700Z SE-70 STAF

CITE DIRECTOR 517240.

IS: PRIORITY ISTANBUL, ANAARA, STOCKHOLM, RUCO

WHY? INTEL

REF: ISTANBUL 33065

1. ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT DOUBT ITS EXISTENCE, NO
INFORMATION ON ANY TURKISH ASSOCIATIONS IN STOCKHOLM

2. AT RIDE, RTN 19 SEP 99 DRV 0901.

3. RUCO

4.

5.

200475 07 4.2

S E C R E T 290619Z SEP 79 DEFERRED TELEPOUCH

CITE WASHINGTON 522759.

TO: TEHRAN.

FROM: NE/IRAN/R INFO DCNE/SAO, NE/INTEL

SUBJECT: WNINTEL - PLANS AND INTENTIONS OF FEDAYEEN AND CHARIK STUDENTS TO CREATE A FEDAYEEN PARTY

1. FOLLOWING OBTAINED FROM SDPARTNER/1 25 SEPTEMBER.
INVITE STATION COMMENTS.

AT A MEETING OF KURDISH NATIONALISTS, CHARIK AND FEDAYEEN STUDENTS OPPOSED TO THE REGIME OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, THE STUDENTS DETERMINED THAT THEY HAVE LOST POWER AND REPRESENTATION IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN IRAN, EVEN THOUGH THEY HAD A LARGE ROLE IN OVERTHROWING THE SHAH, BECAUSE THEY HAD NO REAL POLITICAL POWER BASE MECHANISM TO ENSURE THAT THEY HAD A SAY IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT ONCE THE PHYSICAL ACT OF REMOVING THE SHAH WAS ACCOMPLISHED. THE FEDAYEEN THEREFORE HAVE DETERMINED THEIR IMMEDIATE PRIORITY IS TO ESTABLISH A POLITICAL PARTY UNDER THE OFFICIAL REGULATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN.

RECOGNIZING THAT THIS PARTY WILL BE CONTROVERSIAL IN CURRENT DAY IRAN, WHILE THEY INTEND TO HAVE VARIOUS FRONT PEOPLE PRESENT IN IRAN, THE ACTUAL LEADERSHIP WILL BE OUTSIDE OF THE COUNTRY AND, AS PRESENTLY INTENDED, BASED IN THE UNITED STATES IN THE WASHINGTON, D.C. AREA.

2. FILE: 201-962539. RVW 27SEP99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.

S E C R E T
BT
#2427

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977-225-323

FEDAYEEN PARTY

... COMPETITION FOR REPRESENTATION IN THE
PARLIAMENT WILL BE ORGANIZED ON PARTY BASIS, AND IT ENTIRELY
POSSIBLE THAT STUDENTS WOULD WANT TO GET INTO THE ACT.

2. REF ALLUSION TO "CHARIK AND FEDAYEEN" STUDENTS
SEEMS TO BE A MISNOMER, AS THE TWO TERMS ARE PART OF THE NAME
OF A SINGLE ORGANIZATION, THE CHARIKA-YE-FEDAYAN-E-KHALQ. WAS
PARTNER/1 REFERRING ONLY TO THE ONE ORGANIZATION, OR DID HE
MEAN TO INCLUDE ALSO THE ISLAMIC-ORIENTED MUJAHEDIN-E-KHALQ?
I HAVE NOT BEFORE HEARD OF SIGNIFICANT CONNECTIONS BETWEEN
IRANIAN NATIONALISTS AND THE FEDAYAN.

... REPRESENTATIVE OF THOSE ACTIVITY.

28587 7 22

TO: DIRECTOR AND TO STAFF
FROM: [illegible]
SUBJECT: [illegible]

[illegible] ARE CURRENTLY LOOKING FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON
[illegible] AND OTHER MINORITIES IN IRAN WHO
[illegible] NO CONTEMPLATING POSSIBLE
[illegible] SUPPORT. HOWEVER, AS THIS IS DEFINITELY
[illegible] IN LINE WITH COMMUNIST/CHINESE
[illegible] IN PRESIDENTIAL ON SOVIET
[illegible] AND NO NE PRESIDENTIAL

ALL INFORMATION IS UNCLASSIFIED

MINORITIES COULD BE USED TO GOOD EFFECT AS WE SEEK
TO BALANCE VARIOUS U.S. INTERESTS HERE, ESPECIALLY IN INTEL
LIGENCE FIELD. THE OTHER EDGE OF THE SWORD AS WE SEE IT HERE
IS THAT MANY--MAYBE MOST--IRANIANS TEND TO SEE THE SUPERPOWERS
COMING FROM SAME CLOTH, AND
THEIR AUDIENCE WILL ASSUME THAT, WHATEVER THE RUSSIANS
ARE DOING, WE MUST BE INVOLVED IN SOMETHING EQUALLY
DANGEROUS. FOR THIS REASON, WE SUSPECT THAT MOST EFFECTIVE USE
OF SOVIET SUPPORT TO ETHNIC SEPARATISTS WOULD INVOLVE
BRIEFINGS OF RELEVANT OFFICIALS.

SECRET

44 (8)

TEHRAN

REF ID: A64427

... EVIDENCE THAT ANY COVERT ACTION EFFORT TO LIAISON WITH TURKISH MINORITIES IN IRAN OR, BY EXTENSION, IN ORDER TO BE CREDIBLE WOULD HAVE TO BE BASED ON CREDIBLE EVIDENCE. OTHERWISE OUR EFFORT MIGHT BE

SEMI-URGENT COMES FROM EXPWIS/5-1 WHO HAS JUST RETURNED TO EASTERN TURKEY WHERE HE TALKED WITH SENIOR TURKISH OFFICERS. ACCORDING TO THESE SOURCES, SOVIET RIFLES TRAVELED VIA THE BLACK SEA INTO THE TRADE AREA. THE SOURCE OF INFORMATION THERE WOULD HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE TURKISH ARMS TRADES.

1 OCT 1964

REPORT CLASS S EIC R E T/MAINTEL--NOFORN--NOCONTRACT--
COUNTRY: IRAQ
SUBJECT: THE IRAQI REGIME'S POLICY TOWARD KURDISH ISSU
(DOI: MIL--AUGUST--EARLY OCTOBER 1979)

SOURCE: AN OFFICIAL ISRAELI SERVICE FROM SEVERAL USUAL
RELIABLE SOURCES.

1. IN MID-AUGUST 1979, THE IRAQI REGIME BEGAN TO CONDUCT
MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE KURDISH REBELS IN KURDISTAN.
IRAQI UNITS RECEIVED AIR SUPPORT. IN EARLY OCTOBER THE OPERATIONS
INCREASED, BUT ROUTINE SECURITY ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA CONTINUED.

2. AT THE SAME TIME, THE IRAQI REGIME HAS MADE SEVERAL
STATEMENTS. KURDS WISHED TO CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN IRAQ AFTER
A 1975 AGREEMENT WITH IRAN WERE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO
AUGUST 1979 UNDER AN AMNESTY DECLARED BY THE IRAQI REGIME.
KURDISH WIVES, MAINLY IN IRAN, WERE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO

3. (ISRAELI SERVICE COMMENT: ALTHOUGH ON THE SURFACE, THE
POINTS MENTIONED ABOVE SEEM CONTRADICTORY, THEY ARE ACTUALLY
ASPECTS OF THE SAME COIN. BOTH ARE DESIGNED TO DEAL WITH THE
PROBLEM AND TO RESTORE QUIET IN THEIR AREA. SEVERAL CONSIDERATIONS
ARE TO INFLUENCE THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT'S POLICY ON THIS ISSUE.
A. OF ALL THE POLICE ON KURDISTAN IS REPORTED BY ISRAELI
SOURCES THAT THE DESIRE TO BASE THE DIVISION THROUGHOUT
THE COUNTRY FOLLOWING THE EXECUTIONS AND ARREST OF HIS OPPONENTS
WAS THERE IS A DESIRE TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT THE RECENT
KURDISH MILITARY ACTIVITY. THE KURDS FLEEING FROM IRAN TO
SYRIA AND TURKEY SINCE THE 1975 AGREEMENT. SINCE THE
1975 AGREEMENT, THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN TRYING TO
SETTLE THE KURDS IN THE MOUNTAINOUS AREA IN ABANDONED
VILLAGES. THE AUTHORITIES HOPE TO CONVINCE THE KURDS
THAT THEY CAN RESETTLE THE REMOTE VILLAGES OF KURDISTAN.)

AGC. ISRAEL, TEL AVIV (29 OCTOBER 1979) FIELD NO: NFV-2
FIELD DISSEM: BY ASSY AT TEL AVIV. SENT TO AMMAN, BEIRUT,
TEHRAN, ISLAMABAD, JIDDA, KARACHI, KUALA LUMPUR, MANAMA, NAF

SECRET 020147Z NOV 79

TO DIRECTOR 545757.

TEL AVIV INFO BERRAM, A MAN, BEING CHIEF DAN SCOUT
RACHI, KUWAIT, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, AMAN
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE FOR ZERWAGO

TEL AVIV 30031 (NFW-23)

1. NOT DISSEMINATING REF AS REPORT LAM...
FORMATION... OF INTEREST... HAS...
THAT PRESIDENT IRAQI... HIS STRONG...
OF METHOD OF RULING... HOWEVER IN THIS...
PLACE THAT AN INCREASE IN MILITARY ACT...
TAKED PLACE IN AUGUST... FOR ST...
DES SENSITIVE SOURCE REPORTING...
ANOR OF SUCH... IRAQI MILITARY...
HAVE BEEN OF MORE INTEREST...
ATION TO SUPPORT CLAIM IN THE...
PARA TWO INFO ON RESETTLEMENT...
OVERED IN DASHED INTEREST...
OCCURRENCE AS ONE DESIGNED TO KEEP IRAQI...
SO FILE. NFW 240720 DR 200.1

SECRET

REPORT CLASS SECRET/NOINTEL/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/NOCOM
COUNTRY: IRAQ/IRAN
SUBJECT: DEVELOPMENTS IN KURDISH AFFAIRS (FOIA OCTOBER 1979)

SOURCE: AN OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE FROM "A NEW SOURCE REPORTING A NUMBER OF KURDISH VISITORS TO BRITAIN."

1. THE KURD WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG KURDISH VISITORS TO SAITAN SAID IN LATE OCTOBER 1979 THAT THERE HAS BEEN A SPLIT BETWEEN MAS'UD BAKHTIARI AND HIS BROTHER IDRIS BAKHTIARI. THE FORMER HAS STATED THAT IRAQI AND IRANIAN KURDS SHOULD COORDINATE THEIR EFFORTS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES BY SUBVERTING BOTH OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AGAINST THE OTHER, AND HE BELIEVED THAT THE IRANIAN AND IRAQI KURDS COULD CREATE AN INDEPENDENT UNIT WHICH WOULD NOT BE DOMINATED BY EITHER GOVERNMENT.

2. ACCORDING TO THE KURD, IDRIS BAKHTIARI FELT THAT KURDISH OPERATIONS WOULD BE BETTER SERVED BY CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE SA'ADULLAH RAHMANI K.M.C. (K.M.I.N.) IN IRAN. THE KURD, IDRIS, ESTABLISHED A CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH MAS'UD, WHO WAS WILLING TO BUY THE KURDS AS A WEAPON AGAINST THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. THE SPLIT BETWEEN MAS'UD AND IDRIS BAKHTIARI, THE KURD COMMENTED, WAS CREATED FOR TACTICAL REASONS TO ALLOW THE IRAQI KURDS A REFUGE IN IRAN IF IT WAS NEEDED. MAS'UD, RATHER THAN IDRIS, WAS THE SUPPORT OF KURDISH FIGHTERS.)

3. THE KURD SAID DR. MUHAMMAD OTHMAN, WHO HAD FORMED A SPLITTER GROUP OF THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP) AFTER THE 1975 ALGERIA AGREEMENT, HAD MADE HIS PEACE WITH THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT. HE HAD ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY OF HIS FOLLOWERS WERE IN BAGHDAD IN OCTOBER. THEY HAD ATTEMPTED TO LEAVE IRAN WITH THEIR WEAPONS BUT HAD BEEN DISARMED BEFORE DEPARTURE BY JALAL TALABANI'S MEN.

4. THE KURD ALSO SAID THAT THE KDP NO LONGER EXPECTED HELP FROM THE SOVIET UNION. IT PINNED ITS HOPES ON THE SOVIET UNION. THE KDP HAD MADE CONTACT WITH KURDISH REPRESENTATIVES IN WEST GERMANY.

5. ENCL. NO. 1 LONDON (19 OCTOBER 1979) FIELD NO.

02-74,557

6. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT LONDON, SET, TO AMMAN, DHAHRAH, DAMASCUS, JIDDA, MUWAIT, TEHRAN, TEL AVIV.

REPORT CLASS SECRET/WARNING NOTICE-INTelligence SOURCE, METHOD, INVOLVED/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS, NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR CONSULTANTS, DISSEMINATION AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR/PI. ALL LOGS, DEBRIEFING BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

SECRET

SECRET 2109Z OCT 79 INTEL

FM LONDON 1500Z ZNY XXXXX

TO: DIRECTOR INFORMATION, BETHUT, CARO, LAM, PES, AND S. L.
RIAD, TEHRAN, TEL AVIV.

UNINTL FGI INTEL ZRWANDQ

UPDATER: ZRWANDQ FOR DESK REVIEW. GRAPH FROM OCT 79
CX 75-0-00 WITH DELICATE SCOTCH TOWING 109
FIELD NO. EL-7, 857, HQ LIAISON. NO LIAISON
RW 300100 RV D981 BY 006156

SECRET 14-00000

~~SECRET~~ ~~IRAQI KUTISH ACTIVITIES~~ ~~DI: AT. 5000~~ ~~100~~

NO OFFICIAL ISRAELI SERVICE FROM A POL. OR MILITARY SOURCE
 CREDIT TO ISRAELI GOVERNMENT CIRCLES; RE: RELIABILITY
 DATED 10/1/68

[illegible]

2. TURKISH FAMILIES FROM IRAQ HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO ENTER IRAQ. ACCOMMODATION FOR THEM IS ARRANGED BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT IN THE AREAS OF DELAWA AND PENJWIN WHERE SPECIAL CAMPS, CONTAINING FOOD, HOSPITALS, HAVE BEEN SET UP. EVERY DAY 1,000 ARE GIVEN FOOD AND MONEY. ALL THE LEADERSHIP MEMBERS OF BAKRANI'S GROUP WHO RETURNED TO IRAQ RECENTLY, WERE ARRESTED BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT. THEY WERE GIVEN MONEY ON THE AL MANJOUR QUARTER IN BAGHDAD, A PRIVATE CAR AND 500,000 DOLLARS. THEY WERE ALSO ALLOWED TO CHOOSE THE CITY OF THEIR RESIDENCE.

THE ACTIVITY OF JAMA'AT AL-DABA' AND MEN IN NORTHERN IRAQ IS NOW STOPPED COMPLETELY AS ALL THE ARMED MEN ARE WITH THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP) ABDOU NAIMAN.

WAS SUCCESSFUL. GIBRALTAR COOPERATED WITH JALAL TALABANI'S MEN.

AGE: 1944. TEL AVIV (1 NOVEMBER 1979) FIELD NO: NEV-2397.

FROM SOURCE: REPORT BY TEL AVIV. SENT TO: THERM,
DEPT. 2200, ISRAELI. JORDA. KARACHI. EGYPT. MANAMA.

REMARKS: CLASS. F. S. C. R. E. F. WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
METHODS INTERVIEWED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OF CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION
OF INFORMATION CONTAINED BY ORIGINATOR--FBI.
CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROL ON OVERSEAS DOCUMENT. ALL PORTIONS

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ABOUTS OF FORMER CHIEF OF THE IRANIAN
AZIZOLLAH PALIZMAN (DOE: MID-AUGUST-76)

ISRAELI SERVICE
OF THE J-2 OF THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES
11.2.34 A.M. ARRIVED IN ITALY FROM IRA
AND IS PRESENTLY LIVING THERE. HIS
IS ALSO RESIDING IN ITALY WITH HIS
I HAVE IRANIAN PASSPORTS. A BROTH
RECENTLY ARRIVED IN THE U.S. UNTIL
GENERAL PALIZMAN HAD SPENT MOST OF HIS
(HEADQUARTERS COMMAND). EDFIRB-515/19268-10
ON A GENERALLY RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTED
CAPTURE BY AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI
LITTLE" AFTER THE REVOLUTION AND WAS
SMEN. EVER SINCE, THERE HAVE BEEN
GENERAL PALIZMAN WAS ORGANIZING A KURD
THE INTENT OF OVERTHROWING THE ISLAMIC

TEL AVIV (04 OCTOBER 1976).
EMBASSY AT TEL AVIV: SENT TO
GIVE NOTICE-INTelligence SOURCES AND
UNAVAILABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT
E CONTRACTOR, JMWELTAYS--DESSMITA
TION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR--FG
RECORDS, REPORT G OF 1083. ALL FOR
CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T
COUNTRY: IRAQ
SUBJECT: RETURN OF REFUGEES FROM
ORIGINAL LOCATIONS IN IRAQ
(OO: LATE OCTOBER 1979)

SOURCE: A WELL ESTABLISHED SOURCE
CONTACTS AMONG IRAQI MILITARY
PERSONALITIES: HIS SOURCE IS
ESTABLISHED.

1. DURING THE LATE SUMMER OF 1979
KURDS WHO HAD BEEN FORCIBLY DEPORTED
YEARS AT LOCATIONS IN SOUTHERN IRAQ
BASRA, AMARA AND KARBALA) IN A
INTENDED TO DIFFUSE THE KURDISH
RETURNED TO THEIR ORIGINAL SETTLEMENT
HERE, THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT IN SOME
IN SOME CASES THEIR OWN HOUSES
AFTER THEIR EARLIER RESETTLEMENT
FINANCIAL RELIEF TO AIDE THEM
ESTABLISHED.

2. BY THIS CONCILIATORY MEASURE
MINORITY, THE IRAQI CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
THE MILITANT KURDS INTO SUPPORTING
PRESIDENT SALDAN HUSAYN IN ANY
FIELD COMMENT: SEE TDFIRDS
REPORTED THE RESETTLEMENT OF
REFUGEES IN IRAQ, ALSO TO BE USED
IN ANY EVENTUAL HOSTILITIES

3. ACQ: 129 OCTOBER 1979.

4. FIELD DISSEM: SENT TO AMMAN, BAGHDAD,
BAMASCUS, JERUSALEM, JIDDA, KUWAIT, TEHRAN.

REPORT CLASS S E C R E T
AND METHODS INVOLVED - NOT RELEASABLE TO
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR

WELL ESTABLISHED SOURCE
CONTACTS AMONG IRAQI MILITARY
PERSONALITIES: HIS SOURCE IS
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REPORT CLASS S E C R E T
AND METHODS INVOLVED - NOT RELEASABLE TO
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR

DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY
ORIGINATOR. ADVISE DISSEMINATION AND RECORD REPORTING
OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CONTAINING DISSEMINATION AND CONTROLS
OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

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SECRET 301302Z OCT 79

AMMAN AB 193 (SCHUELKE AC 110) ZKXXX

TO: DIRECTOR INFO BEIRUT, CAIRO, DAMES, JERUSALEM, JIDDA,
KUWAIT, TEL AVIV, RIYADH, TEMPO, LANA, PARIS.

WAINTEL INTEL

SUBDATA: ZRWAHOC FOR HEADQUARTERS; NO CONTACT; NONE.

SOURCE: CUMINT/1 FROM DEPARTMENT HQS

(UNILATERAL); FIELD NO. 110; 942. DACHSEL

OBTAINED: NO LIAISON; NO CONTACT; CL BY 037630.

DD: S-1-A, FILE DEPT. FOR KILTIGER;

PARIS FOR PRESTERRU AND SC

301302Z

S E C R E T

OCT 79 STAFF

CITE: TEHRAN

TO: DIRECTOR

WHINTEL INTEL SDBLADE

1. IN SW MESSAGE DROPPED 10 OCTOBER, SDBLADE/1 REPORTED IRANIAN ARMY IS PLANNING "SEVER" AND "SERIOUS" ACTION AGAINST THE KURDISH REBELS IN WESTERN IRAN. PRESS IS CARRYING INTIMATIONS TO SAME EFFECT. THE PLANS ARE TO BE IMPLEMENTED NEXT WEEK. REMINDER OF MESSAGE REPORTED 9 OCTOBER ATTACK AGAINST PASSDARAN FORCES BY KURDS, AND VISIT OF DEFENSE MINISTER CHANRAN TO KURDISTAN FOLLOWING THE ATTACK, ALL OF WHICH HAVE BEEN COPIOUSLY REPORTED IN LOCAL MEDIA.

2. FILE: 201-873159. RVW 11OCT99 DRV D9C.1. ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

This text is rewritten from typewriter tapes left in CIA station on 4th November 1979.

*Change
Someday
Only*

OFIRPB-31/1969-72

EXIST: 1 NOVEMBER 1979

THIS IS INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
S E C R E T / -- WHITE -- NOFORN -- NO CONTRACT -- JRCOIN
INCLUDING DISSEMINATION TO ADDRESSEES LISTED IN FINAL PARAGRAPH

COUNTRY: IRAN
SUBJECT: INTERVIEW OF GENERAL MOBASSER IN EXILE OPPOSITION
INCLUDING KURDISH LEADER WITH SMALL ARMY
(D: OCTOBER 1979)
SOURCE: A FORMER IRANIAN OFFICIAL OF PRESENTLY UNDETERMINED
RELIABILITY. HE HAD GOOD ACCESS TO THE INFORMATION
RECORDED BELOW.

1. GENERAL MANOUCHER H. A. S. H. E. M. A. THE FORMER HEAD OF
THE NOW DEFUNCT IRANIAN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY ORGANI-
ZATION'S (NAVAL) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL ISSA
S. S. A. I. M. THE FORMER HEAD OF THE WEST AZERBAIJAN PROVINCE
SAVAK, AND OTHER FORMER SAVAK OFFICERS MET WITH GENERAL MOHSEN
M. B. A. S. S. E. R. THE FORMER CHIEF OF THE IRANIAN NATIONAL POLICE
ON FRIDAY, 19 OCTOBER 1979, IN LONDON. GENERAL MOBASSER SPOKE
OF THE NECESSITY TO ORGANIZING A MOVEMENT TO RESIST THE NEW
ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT IN IRAN BY GATHERING TOGETHER IRANIANS LIVING
OUTSIDE IRAN. HE BELIEVES THAT THE SUPPORTERS OF FORMER IRANIAN
PRIME MINISTER SHAHPOUR B. A. K. A. T. I. A. A. ARE NOT SUFFICIENTLY
ORGANIZED TO FORM A VIABLE MOVEMENT AND THAT THE NEW MOVEMENT
SHOULD GATHER TOGETHER ALL OFFICERS AND KNOWN IRANIANS WHO RESIDE
IN LONDON. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: INFORMATION FROM OTHER RE-
PORTING INDICATES THAT MOBASSER HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN SUPPORT OF
BAKHTIAR.)

2. GENERAL MOBASSER TOLD THE SMALL GROUP THAT A LEADER OF
A LARGE KURDISH TRIBE, THE JAFS, RECENTLY VISITED LONDON AND MET
WITH GENERAL MOBASSER. (SOURCE COMMENT: THIS KURDISH LEADER
ALSO IN CONTACT WITH BAKHTIAR. THE KURDISH LEADER HAS A SMALL
ARMY OF 1500 MEN EQUIPPED WITH MACHINE GUNS AND RIFLES WHICH
BASED ON THE BORDER OF IRAN AND IRAQ. HE DOES NOT NEED IRANIAN
SUPPORT BUT HE DOES NEED MILITARY EXPERTS--AT LEAST TWO OR
THREE WELL-TRAINED OFFICERS WHO CAN TRAIN HIS SMALL ARMY. THE

1. FOR THE TRAINING OF THE OFFICERS AND THEIR RE-
2. PLACEMENT, IS HE IT STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY THE GOVERNMENT.
3. THE MINISTERS ARE THINKING OF SENDING COLOMEL HASSEIN
4. TO A PARACHUTE AND HE FORMER COMMANDER OF AN ANTI-
5. AIR FORCE IN THE GROUND FORCES, TO BE ONE OF THE TRAINERS.
6. SHANTOU IS AN INDIAN OFFICER WHO RECENTLY WENT TO LONDON
7. (SOURCE COMMENT: BECAUSE HE WAS SO EASILY ABLE TO
8. OBTAIN COLOMEL SHANTOU SUSPECTED OF COOPERATING WITH THE
9. ARABIA, BUT HE HAS BEEN CLEAR OF SUSPECTS BY THE
10. ARABIA. THE ARABIA KNOWN AS A "WILL HE
11. LEADER."

1. BECAUSE OF THE URGENT NEED FOR THE UNITY OF ARABS, THE TURKISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (TDP) HAS REQUESTED THE MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT TO CONSIDER THE TURKISH MOVEMENT, HOW IT CAN BE SERVED IN THE FUTURE. HE HAS ALSO REQUESTED THE FORMATION OF A COMMITTEE IN LONDON IN ORDER TO OBTAIN INFORMATION CONCERNING THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT. AFTER HIS TRIP TO ISRAEL HE HAS BEEN PROVIDING WITH SUFFICIENT INFORMATION AS TO THE ATTACK AGAINST THE KHOMAYNI REGIME. HE HAS REQUESTED THAT AN ATTACK SHOULD TAKE PLACE THROUGHOUT IN SEVERAL PROVINCES. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE ISRAELI LEADER IS TRYING TO PLAY THE CARDS OF A R Z A M BY ATTEMPTING TO

SENT TO TREAS. LONDON, PARIS, AND AD

[illegible]

IN THE NAME OF ALLAH,

THE MERCIFUL AND THE COMPASSIONATE.

ILL-REPRODUCED AND MISSING DOCUMENTS FROM
BOOK NO.32 (THE KURDISH PROBLEM) PART II ARE
INCLUDED AT THE END OF THIS COLLECTION.

19 AUG 1979 2 44 Z

S E C R E T 040111Z AUG 79 STAFF
CIT FR SAN FRANCISCO 05118
TO: DIRECTOR INFO TERROR.
WNI PEG ALAJA EDWES SDTHROB
REF DIRECTOR 019111

1. THANKS TO THE WORK HERE BY TDM ALLEN AFFAIRS STAFF FOR
STAMPING AND ISSUING COUNTERPART LEE BEAUCHAMP, SDTHROB/1 (T/1) NO
NOY ARMED WITH U.S. RE-ENTRY PERMIT WHICH WILL PERMIT HIM TO LEA
AND RE-ENTER THE COUNTRY FOR MISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RTACTION. THE
ASS STAFF OF WHICH WAS RENDERED ON BEHALF OF OTHER T/1 FAMILY MEMBER
SHOULD ALSO BE HELD TO RELIEVE SOME OF HIS ANXIETIES OVER THEIR SITU
AND ALLOW HIM TO CONCENTRATE NOW ON OUR PLAN OF OPERATIONS.

2. C/O MACHENY DISCUSSED THE AREAS OF COVER, DOCUMENTATION
AND TRAVEL ITINERARY WITH T/1 ON 2 AUGUST. ALSO SURFACED WAS WHAT
T/1 MAY EXPECT OF RTACTION AS COMPENSATION FOR HIS WORK ON OUR BEH.

3. BASE Y OF DSES AND T/1 IS IN GERNAL AGREEMENT WITH THIS
APPROACH THAT T/1 MAKE AN EXPLORATORY TRIP TO EUROPE OF TWO TO
THREE WEEKS' DURATION AS SOON AS HE CAN BE DOCUMENTED FOR THE
PURPOSE OF RECOGNIZING SUCH FORMER KURDISH ACQUAINTANCES AS THE CA
LOCAT AND GETTING THROUGH THEM, A LINE ON THE WHEREABOUTS OF OTH
HE SHOULD ALSO COLLECT SUCH INTELLIGENCE ON THE ACTIVITIES AND PLAN
THE MAP OF HIS FUTURE FAMILIAR AS HE IS ABLE TO GATHER. T/1 SHOULD
BE PROVIDED WITH A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR CONTACT WITH THE LOCAL
STATION (Y). T/1 SHOULD ALSO STOPS IN LONDON, PARIS AND GERMANY.
OTHER THAN THE VISITS MENTIONED IN TR/SF 24827 AND TR/SF
24226, T/1 WOULD TRY TO LOCATE IN LONDON THE BROTHER OF YDF LEAD
ISRAELI BORN. T/1 IF NOW ATTEMPTING TO PIN DOWN, THROUGH HIS
DAUGHTER, THE LOCATION OF ALI GAZI. IF HE IS IN GERMANY,
IS BELIEVED, HE MIGHT BE A KEY SOURCE OF INFORMATION ON OTHER T/1
PERSONALITIES. UNFORTUNATELY, T/1'S OLD ADDRESS BOOKS AND FILES
REMAIN IN HIS TERRORIST TERROR APARTMENT AND IT COULD BE HARD PU
DECIDE TO THEM. T/1 HAS SUGGESTED THAT IF HIS DAUGHTER COULD BE
SUMMONED TO THE TERRORIST CONSULAE SECTION ON SOME PRETEXT,

2. W/ SAN FRANCISCO 2511 D S E C R E T
COULD PASS THESE PERSONS TO A STATION OFFICER FOR FORWARDING HERE.
TO HQS RE THIS POSSIBILITY. OTHERWISE, T/1 WILL HAVE TO USE
PHONE DIRECTORIES AND OR FREQUENT THE USUAL KURDISH HAUNTS.
USED THIS APPROACH WITH SOME SUCCESS DURING HIS 1973 TRIP TO
ON BEHALF OF THE CIA'S INTELLIGENCE BUREAU. T/1 HAS BEEN
TO START NOW TO USE THE PHONE AND TRY IN ADVANCE OF TRAVEL
ESTABLISH WHEREABOUTS OF HIS TARGETS.

4. T/1 BELIEVES THAT IS COVER STORY FOR TRAVEL TO EUROPE SHOULD
GENERAL LAYERS, W/ BE FILED OFF ACCORDING TO CIRCUMSTANCES.
MOST SUPERFICIAL INFO WOULD BE A STORY OF TRAVEL TO SEE HIS
STER OR WIFE IN EUROPE. THE SECOND LAYER WOULD INVOLVE THE STORY
HE HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BAZARGAN
GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON AND THEY HAVE ENLISTED HIM IN AN EFFORT TO
ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE WITH IRANIAN LEADERS ABROAD. THE MISSION IS
TO SOUND OUT LATTER ON THE CONDITIONS FOR PEACE WITH THE CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT. THE MISSION IS DELICATE BECAUSE BAZARGAN IS READY FOR
NOSSIONS BUT CANNOT TAKE ISSUE WITH KHOMEINI AND HARD LINERS FOR
2. MOMENT. THIRD LEVEL OF STORY IS THAT AFTER GIVING SECOND, T/1
ZES UP HIS CONTACT AND POSSES SOME PRIVATE ENTERPRISE BETWEEN
TO SEIZE PERSONAL PAGE FROM T/1'S ROLE AS EMISSARY, I.E.
THEMSELVES UP AND APS EXTRACT MATERIAL SUPPORT FROM
ZARGAN AND COMPANY. T/1 SUGGESTED TO GO ALTERNATE STORY THAT HE
IN MEXICO RECENTLY GOT SOME PROMISES OF HELP FROM PEOPLE ARO
AN IF KURDISH FORCE BUT TOGETHER TO SUPPORT COMBACK, AT
FOR CROWN PRINCE DOES NOT THINK HIGHLY OF LATTER VERSION
USE.

(1) PAFLAVI COMBAC APPEARS UNLIKELY UNDER ANY CIR-
CUMSTANCES, AND;

(2) KURDS INCLUDING DP CHIEFS CONSIDER THEMSELVES TO HAVE
BETRAYED BY SHAH IN PAST AND ARE UNLIKELY TO WANT TO REHAB
EXPERIENCE.

PFLAVIZES THIS BUT DURING OUT SHAH HAS MONEY AND CONCEIVABLY COUL
PREPARED TO SPEND IT TO HARASS THOSE WHO KICKED HIM OUT
OR OF PRO-SHAH (USIA FORCE BUILDING IN IRAQ UNDER GENERAL
ZARGAN HAS SOME RESERVE CURRENCY).
5. RE DOCUMENTATION FOR TRAVEL TO EUROPE, T/1 BELIEVES BEST

PAGE 2 DIRECTOR 493084 S E C R E T
THAT THEIR MOVEMENT IN NEED OF WESTERN ASSISTANCE AND THAT THEY
WOULD LIKE TO OPEN CHANNEL TO WEST TO ATTEMPT SECURE THAT AS-
SISTANCE. ACCORDING TO STE. MARTIN THIS GROUP, WHICH ALSO IN-
CLUDED MAHMOUD AND SADR G H A Z I CLAIMED THE SUPPORT OF
SHEIK EZZADIN H O S S E I N I AN STATED THAT THEY DID NOT
DESIRE KURDISH INDEPENDENCE, SIMPLY REASONABLE DEGREE OF AUTONOMY
WITHIN IRANIAN STATE. THEY DID NOT WANT TO SOLICIT SOVIET SUP-
PORT FOR THEIR EFFORTS BECAUSE OF THEIR DISTRUST OF SOVIET
ACTIONS LEADING TO FALL OF KURDISH REPUBLIC OF MAHABAD IN 1947.
NOR DOES THIS GROUP WISH ALLY ITSELF WITH BARZANI'S, WHO THEY
DISTRUST ALMOST AS MUCH AS SOVIETS.

4. AS STATION AWARE, NONE OF THIS NEW INASMUCH AS CATOMIC/19
HAS BEEN CONVEYING SAME MESSAGE SINCE APRIL 1979, BUT IT DOES
REPRESENT POSSIBILITY OF SECURING AN IN INTO KURDISH MOVEMENT
IN IRAN USING TEHRAN-BASED FOREIGNER WHO MAY HAVE SOME FAIRLY
GOOD CONTACTS IN THAT MOVEMENT. STE. MARTIN MAY BE ATTRACTIVE
IN SEVERAL OTHER WAYS IN THAT, ACCORDING TO BURNS, HE SPEAKS
EXCELLENT FARSI, NATIVE FRENCH AND ENGLISH, ALTHOUGH ENGLISH
HEAVILY ACCENTED. ACCORDING BURNS, STE. MARTIN WOULD BE WILLING
COOPERATE RI ACTION IF BURNS GIVES WORD, AND INTENDS REMAIN IN
IRAN FORESEEABLE FUTURE. WE, OF COURSE, WOULD NEED GO THROUGH
PROCESS SECURING CORPORATE AND CANADIAN APPROVALS USE OF STE.
MARTIN AND BELIEVE IT WOULD BE AT LEAST THREE TO FOUR WEEKS
BEFORE WE WOULD BE ABLE COMPLETE NECESSARY PAPERWORK/APPROVALS.
IF THIS INTERESTING TO YOU, WE WILL BEGIN PROCESSING NOW. WE
ENVISION INITIAL CONTACT WITH STE. MARTIN AT SOME POINT OUTSIDE
TEHRAN FOR INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND, IF FEASIBLE, RECRUITMENT AND
TRAINING PRIOR TO TURNING OVER STATION, BUT OTHER OPTIONS MAY
BE AVAILABLE, INCLUDING INITIAL CONTACT IN TEHRAN. WOULD
APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTS.

5. FILE: DCD CASE 62638. RVW 10AUG99 DRV D9C.1 ALL SECRET.
S E C R E T

32

6 SEP

3 2

S E C R E T 251532Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE STUTTGART 17957 SECTION 1 OF

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, BONN INFO GERMANY, TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANB

WMINTEL REBAT AJAJA CATOMIC

REF: BONN 84650 (NOTAL)

1. KEITH L. TOHLERNY HAD INTRODUCTORY MEETING WITH CATOMIC/19 (T/19) 20 SEPTEMBER 1979 AT 1830 HOURS IN ROOM 1005 COLOGNE INTERCONTINENTAL. AS ARRANGED. MEETING LASTED FOR ALMOST FOUR HOURS. AND T/19 WAS PAID DM 7500 FOR PERIOD MAY 1979 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1979 AT RATE OF DM 1500 MONTHLY FOR EXPENSES FOR WHICH HE SIGNED HAND RECEIPT IN USUAL ALIAS. IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT MEETINGS WOULD CONTINUE FOR THREE MONTH TRIAL PERIOD. I.E., OCTOBER THROUGH DECEMBER. WITH DM 1500 MONTHLY AS EXPENSES. THE NEXT MEETING WILL BE ON 27 SEPTEMBER. NO SECURITY PROBLEMS WERE APPARENT.

2. ATMOSPHERE: TOHLERNY BEGAN BY EMPHASIZING HIS AGE (SLIGHTLY INCREASED) AND HIS LONG BACKGROUND IN AREA. POINTING OUT THAT HE HAD VISITED KURDISTAN. HAD KNOWLEDGE OF KURDISH HISTORY. ETC. HE THEN ADDED THAT HE WAS GOING TO TALK TO T/19 LIKE A FATHER WHEN NECESSARY AND THAT IT WOULD BE FOR T/19'S OWN GOOD. HE THEN STARTED TO QUESTION T/19 ON HIS SERIOUSNESS ABOUT KURDISH PROBLEMS. GENTLY POINTING OUT THAT T/19 HAD HAD LITTLE TO DO WITH KURDISH NATIONALISM DURING HIS ADULT LIFE AND AT THE SAME TIME PRAISING T/19'S FATHER AND HIS CAREER. TOHLERNY CLOSED THE INTRODUCTION BY NOTING HIS PERSONAL REGARD FOR THE KURDS AND SYMPATHY FOR T/19'S DESIRE TO ASSIST HIS PEOPLE. ALL THIS WAS WELL RECEIVED BY T/19.

3. GOALS: TOHLERNY THEN RAISED QUESTION OF WHAT HE WANTS FROM T/19. DESPITE T/19'S DESIRES, WE HAVE NO INTENTION AT THIS TIME OF ASSISTING KURDISH NATIONALISM WITH ARMS OR MONEY AND T/19 MUST BE AWARE OF THE REASONS FOR THIS. FURTHERMORE, WE DID NOT WANT T/19 TO RETURN "BLACK" TO KURDISTAN, EVEN FOR VISIT AS THAT WOULD ONLY CREATE MORE PROBLEMS FOR EVERYONE. HE COULD BEST SERVE HIS COUNTRY BY SUPPLYING ACCURATE INFORMATION ON WHAT WAS

STUTTGART 17937 S E C R E T
ING THERE AND HOW EVENTS WERE CONTROLLED. THIS WAS FIRST
ASIC STEP. T/19 AGREED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD OUR POLICY,
THOUGH HE DIDN'T LIKE IT, AND HE AGREED THAT THREE-
TRIAL PERIOD SHOULD BE GOOD TEST. HE THEN LAUNCHED INTO
DISCOURSE ON FACT THAT HE WAS GRADUALLY BEING SEPARATED
IS SOURCES AND WOULD SOON HAVE NOTHING TO REPORT. HE THEN
THAT HE IS ABLE TO ENTER KURDISTAN SUCCESSFULLY AND SET UP
VANCES AND ROUTES. HE ALSO RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER
LD ASSIST HIM IN TWO MATTERS: (A) SUPPLYING HIM WITH SAFE
IGATION, I.E. POUCH FACILITIES, BETWEEN GERMANY AND IRAN
D WHETHER WE WOULD HELP HIM SEND EUROPEAN NEWSPAPER TV
INTO KURDISTAN "BLACK" IN ORDER TO PUBLICIZE TRUE STATE OF
E THERE. TOHLERNY REPLIED THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER
QUESTIONS BEFORE REPLYING BUT MADE NO COMMITMENTS. T/19 COM-
T THAT HE HAD CORRESPONDED PRIMARILY THROUGH (A) COURIERS AND
ONE CONVERSATIONS WITH HIS SISTER IN TEHRAN, WHO IS MARRIED T
IN JAF TRIBE AND SHE IN TURN HAD CONTACT WITH KURDISTAN BY PH
ETER. NOW SISTER'S CONTACTS IN KURDISTAN HAD FLED TO HILLS
SHEER HAD MOVED TO BONN. MOREOVER, PUBLIC COMMO IN
AN WAS INCREASINGLY CONTROLLED AS WAS THAT IN TEHRAN.
SISTED THAT HE STILL HAD PLENTY OF POTENTIAL SOURCES
KURDISTAN BUT HE HAD NO WAY TO REACH THEM FROM GERMANY AND
UP NEW ROUTES AND COURIERS.

INTEL: T/19 HAD NO INTEL OTHER THAN GENERAL STATEMENT
18 SEPTEMBER THERE HAD BEEN FIGHTING IN MANY KURDISH
BUT HE HAD NO NAMES OR NUMBERS. TOHLERNY SYMPATHIZES
T/19'S PROBLEM AND SUGGESTED THAT HE TRY TO EXTRACT MORE
TION FROM TRUSTED KURDS IN GERMANY WHO ALSO HAD THEIR
ARDS. HE AGREED TO DO THIS.

TARGETS: TOHLERNY TOLD T/19 THAT FIRST THING WAS TO
LISTS OF NAMES, ADDRESSES AND BIO DATA ON KURDS IN
THAT T/19 TRUSTED AND THOUGHT CAPABLE OF OBTAINING
NT INFORMATION FROM KURDISTAN. HE ALSO ASKED FOR SIMILAR
KURDS IN TEHRAN AND KURDS IN KURDISTAN. DEPENDING ON
ISTS, WE COULD THEN HELP T/19 DETERMINE (A) WHO WAS
E AND (B) IF IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR US TO ASSIST HIM
S BATTLES. WE HAD TO KNOW FIRST WHOM HE MIGHT BE DEALING
O WHAT THEIR BACKGROUNDS WERE. T/19 AGREED READILY TO THI

PAGE 3 STUTTGART 17937 S E C R E T
AFTER THINKING IT OVER CAREFULLY AND AFTER BEING ASSURED WE
WOULD HANDLE INFORMATION IN SECURE MANNER. HE PROMISED TO
HAVE SOME INFORMATION AT NEXT MEETING.

6. SOVIET INFLUENCE: T/19 HAS NO HARD INFORMATION ON SOVIET
CONNECTIONS WITH NATIONALIST FORCES IN KURDISTAN, ESPECIALLY IN
RECENT WEEKS. HE POINTED OUT THAT ALMOST ALL KURDISH LEADERS
HAVE HAD SOME CONTACT WITH SOVIETS, USUALLY FOR A PURPOSE.
CASEMLU, FOR EXAMPLE, HE KNEW AS COMMUNIST AND TUDER MEMBER,
BUT CASEMLU THEN BROKE WITH SOVIETS AND PERHAPS NOW IS BACK WITH
THEM. IN ABSENCE OF HARD AND CURRENT INFORMATION, ALMOST ALL KURD
COULD BE REASONABLY EXPECTED TO HAVE SOME SOVIET CONNECTIONS.
EVEN HIS FATHER, A DEEPLY RELIGIOUS MAN AND STRONG KURDISH
NATIONALIST, HAD ACCEPTED SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO ACHIEVE HIS
PURPOSE. T/19 WAS INSTRUCTED TO BE ESPECIALLY ALERT FOR
INFORMATION CONCERNING SOVIET INFLUENCE.

7. T/19 SOVIET CONTACTS: AT THIS POINT, TOHLERNY ASKED
T/19 ABOUT HIS SOVIET CONTACTS. HE HAD INVITED SOME MONTHS AGO
SOVIET THIRD SECRETARY ALEXANDER S. KULIN TO HIS PARTY AND
KULIN RETURNED SEVERAL WEEKS AGO UNEXPECTEDLY AND ASKED IF
THERE WERE ANYTHING HE COULD DO TO HELP T/19, REFERRING TO T/19'S
LOSS OF DIPLOMATIC POST. ACCORDING TO T/19, THEY TALKED AND
KULIN LEFT SAYING HE WOULD BE BACK, BUT HAS NOT YET RETURNED.
T/19 DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER THIS WAS A PRETEXT OR FUTURE PITCH
OR NOT, BUT EXPECTS KULIN TO RETURN AND TALK ABOUT T/19 AND
KURDISH SITUATION. T/19 PROMISED TO REPORT ANY CONTACT
IMMEDIATELY AND IN DETAIL. HE WAS ALSO WARNED OF POSSIBLE
TELEPHONE AND PERSONAL SURVEILLANCE. T/19 THEN ASKED IF
TOHLERNY THOUGHT KULIN WAS CONNECTED WITH SUBJECT MENTIONED TO
T/19 BY HIS COUSIN, RAHM SAIF GHAZI, PROFESSOR KURDISH
HISTORY AND CULTURE IN BAKU. T/19 MET COUSIN FOR FIRST TIME IN YEARS
SOME MONTHS AGO IN BERLIN AND COUSIN MENTIONED THAT HE MIGHT
BE INVITED (SOMEONE) TO T/19, WHO DIDN'T THINK ABOUT IT AT TIME. LATER
HE WONDERED HOW COUSIN WAS ALLOWED TO COME TO BERLIN, AS HE
WAS NOT BEEN PERMITTED TO TRAVEL PREVIOUSLY OUTSIDE SOVIET UNION.
T/19 IS NOW NOT SURE WHETHER COUSIN MEANT BY "SOMEONE" A KURD WHO
WOULD INFORM HIM ABOUT KURDS IN SOVIET UNION OR SOVIET CONNECTIONS
OF KURDS OR WHETHER COUSIN MEANT SOMEONE REPRESENTING SOVIET
AUTHORITY. TOHLERNY SAID HE DIDN'T KNOW, AND T/19 ASKED IF HE
COULD
SECRET
SECRET

STUTTGART 17937 S E C R E T
ASK COUSIN TO SEND "SOMEONE". TOHLERNY ADVISED WAITING.

T/19 REQUESTS: T/19 MADE SOME REQUESTS. (A) HE WANTED TO
BONN COULD ASSIST SISTER NOW IN BONN IN EDUCATION AT
SCHOOL. SINCE CHILDREN HAD PREVIOUSLY ATTENDED AMER CAN
IN TEHERAN. TOHLERNY SAID HE KNEW NOTHING OF BONN SCHOOL
LD ACQUAINT HIMSELF WITH SITUATION. (B) T/19 WOULD LIKE
BOOK BY (FNU) EGLETON ABOUT KURDS; AND (C) COPY OF
ARTICLE IN MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL ABOUT KURDISH REPUBLIC
-46. HE MADE NO MONEY REQUESTS, AND ALMOST FORGOT TO
MONIES OWED HIM.

IN GENERAL MEETING WENT VERY WELL WITH GENUINE CORDIALITY
AT END OF MEETING AND A SEEMING EAGERNESS TO GET ON
BUSINESS. T/19 SUGGESTED MOVING NEXT MEETING UP TO 27TH FROM
ED & OCTOBER. JUST AS LEAVING, T/19 MENTIONED THAT ON
MBER HE WAS GOING TO REGISTER IN BONN A GROUP TO BE
"THE COUNCIL FOR KURDISH AUTONOMY". HE ALREADY HAD THE
DRAWN UP AND IT WOULD BE A BEGINNING OF HIS ATTEMPT TO
GETHER AN ORGANIZATION HE COULD USE. TOHLERNY WILL
COPY OF PAPERS AND ADDITIONAL DETAILS AT NEXT MEETING.

COMMENTS: IN PRESENT SITUATION AND WITH PRESENT GUIDELINES
HE HAVE LITTLE TO OFFER T/19 AND HAS LITTLE TO OFFER
THEREFORE, WE SHOULD GET OUT SOON BEFORE WE GET BACK IN
SIMPLY THAN WE WANT TO BE. THREE MONTHS TRIAL SHOULD BE AMPL
OTHER HAND, TOHLERNY BELIEVES THAT IF WE ARE WILLING TO TAKE
TIVE ROLE, BASED ON REWARDING ONLY FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT,
T/19 MAY HAVE CONSIDERABLE POTENTIAL. THERE SEEM TO BE NO
KURDS WITH FAMILY BACKGROUND AND INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE
MAKE STRONG HIM FOR KURDISH LEADERSHIP AND PERHAPS T/19
NOT. BUT EVENTS OF RECENT MONTHS IN BOTH IRAN AND
CAN HAVE HAD A DEEP EFFECT ON HIM. PERHAPS ENOUGH TO ALLOW
PUT IT ALL TOGETHER FOR ONCE. TOHLERNY TOLD HIM BLUNTLY THAT
WAS GOING TO AID HIM UNLESS HE EARNED IT. AND HIS TRACK
AS KURDISH NATIONALIST WAS VERY WEAK. HE HAD TO MAKE
INTO SOMEONE OTHERS WOULD COME TO. BOTH KURDS AND
PERS, URATHER THAN BEG FOR AID. T/19 TOOK THIS VERY SERIOUSLY
ELY AGREED THAT HE HAD TO WORK AND WORK HARD TO GET
WANTED. HE NOTED THAT KHOMEINI HAD DONE MUCH WITHOUT

28 SEP 73 7 34Z

S C H E T 281658Z SZJZPB ITAFF
HONN 34952

TO DIRECTOR, STUTTGART INFO GERMANY TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANB
WN TEL AJAJA CATOMIC

FE A. STUTTGART 17957
B. BONN 41941

1. REF B REPORTED INTEL FROM 27 SEP MEETING WITH CATOMIC
/190.

2. SARDAR J A F. ONE OF LEADERS OF JAF TRIBE OF KURDS.
MARRIED TO T/19'S SISTER (HARA EIGHT REP A). AFTER FLEEING
HE ULTIMATELY ARRIVED IN BAGDAD WHERE HE BECAME
INVOLVED IN WORKING WITH IRAQI MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ASSISTING
IRANIAN KURDS WHO WERE SAFE-HAVENED IN IRAQ. JAF TRIBE WAS
TRAINING IRAQI-KURDISH FIGHTING IN IRAQ. SARDAR APPARENTLY
WAS AN ISLATE. HE WAS SCHEDULED TO COME TO GERMANY ABOUT 21
SEP WITH IRAQI MILITARY GROUP AND TO MEET T/19 AND HIS SISTER.
MINUTE TRIP WAS POSTPONED SO SARDAR COULD MAKE TRIP
TO TURKEY AND HE IS NOW SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE BONN 5 OCT.
ARRANGE FOR TOELERNY TO MEET SARDAR.
TO T/19, SARDAR'S CHILDREN (3) HAVE BEEN ENTERED IN
AMERICAN SCHOOL, BUT ITS COST RUNNING OVER \$4,000.
ARRESTED (THIS FIGURE CHECKS) T/19 HAS REQUESTED OUR ASSISTANCE.
FOR CONSULTATION WITH BONN. TOELERNY PROPOSES USING SCHOOL
PROGRAM WITH SARDAR SUGGESTING A "PAY-AS-YOU-GO"
IN RETURN FOR HIS CONTINUING COOPERATION. TARGETS
BOTH KURDS AND IRAQI SERVICE. METHOD OF COMMO WOULD
BE SWIFT WHICH WE COULD UNDERWRITE. OTHERWISE, WILL ARRANGE FOLLOW-
UP TRAINING AND SGSWIRL.
S. REQUEST TRACES SARDAR. ALSO REQUEST HQS APPROVAL THIS
PROPOSAL BY 5 OCT.

1. FILE: 201-0306414. RVW 28SEP73 DRG DFC.1

11 OCT 79 05 09z

REF T 121755Z OCT 79 STAFF

CIT BONN B5222

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO GERMANY, ANKARA, ISTANBUL, TEHRAN
STUTTGART.

WNT L AJAJA CATOMIC

REF BONN B5221.

1. PURSUANT REF OPS INTEL CABLE, KEITH L. TOHLERNY MET
WITH CATOMIC/19 (T/19) AND SARDAR J A F 10 OCTOBER 1979 FOR
TWO HOURS, WHICH WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SORT OUT ALL OPEN MATTER
BUT MAXIMUM TIME JAF AVAILABLE. NEXT MEETING SCHEDULED
WITH T/19 ON 24 OCTOBER.

TOHLERNY ATTEMPTED TO ASSESS JAF WHILE EXTRACTING INFORMATION IN
FROM T/19, PRIMARILY BY ASKING HARD QUESTIONS. JAF CAME ACROSS
VERY OPEN KEY, WITH STRONG IDEAS ABOUT WHAT HE KNEW AND DIDN'T
KNOW. HAD ON DATES (WHICH IS FAIRLY COMMON). VERY CAREFUL WITH
NAMES AND ALTHOUGH HE DROPPED A FEW, HE WAS NOT SELLING THE
IS A THICK, STOCKY MAN WITH ALMOST A DISTINGUISHED APPEARANCE.
LIGHT BROWN SKIN AND GRAY HAIR AND AN AIR OF CONFIDENCE.
TOHLERNY SENSED THAT HE HAD COME TO THE MEETING WITH A
ATTENTION TO T/19, WHO HAD PROMISED HE WOULD BEING A
DISCUSSION CONTINUED, HE BECAME MUCH MORE EASY AND
HE MADE NO PLEA FOR ANY KIND OF ASSISTANCE, EVEN FOR HIS CHILD-
HOODING, WHICH HAD BEEN RAISED. IN FACT, BY T/19
TOHLERNY RAISED THE ISSUE TO OFFSET THEIR RAISING IT, AND
DIATELY TOLD THAT JAF HAD DECIDED TO TAKE HIS FAMILY
BAGHDAD WITH HIM, THAT HE COULD NOT AFFORD TO RETURN
BONN. TOHLERNY POINTED OUT THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER
HERE. THAT IRAQ COULD BE DANGEROUS. JAF AGREED BUT
HAD NO CHOICE AND THAT TOHLERNY DIDN'T HAVE TO Worry
E. THANK YOU JUST THE SAME. HE MAY BE CLEVER
WHAT WE MIGHT WANT TO TRADE AND DIDN'T WANT TO INVOLVE
HIS FAMILY. TOHLERNY CLOSED BY SAYING THAT IF THINGS DID
WELL FOR HIS FAMILY IN BAGHDAD, TO PASS THE WORD

Jul 79

SECRET 114602 JUL 79
CITE FR/LOS ANGELES 20589 (AG P ACTING)
TO: PRIORITY TEHRAN INFO DIRECT
UNINTEL RYBAT AJAJA FORRES SOTRA
REFS: A. FR/LOS ANGELES 20589
B. FR/LOS ANGELES 20589

1. FINAL BRIEF MEET WITH SDI NSIT/I (T/I) ON 9 JULY
RESULTED IN T/I ADVISING THAT HE NOT DEPARTING LOS ANGELES
UNTIL 15 JULY. ALL MEETING ARRANGEMENTS REMAIN THE SAME.
REASON FOR DELAY WAS CALL FROM ONE OF T/I'S CLOSEST FRIENDS
WHO ADVISED HIS FATHER HAD JUST ARRIVED FROM TEHRAN. FATHER,
GENERAL (POLICE) FNU S H A H R. T/I WAS RECENTLY
RETAINED BY THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT WHEN HE BECAME 55. THIS
MAN IS ONE OF THREE COUSINS; ANOTHER WITH SAME FAMILY NAME
AS THE RECENT MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION AND OTHER POSITIONS
IS DESCRIBED IN PARA 3 REF B. T/I HE WAS MOST RECENTLY THE
CHIEF OF THE HIGHWAY PATROL. MORE IMPORTANTLY HE IS CLOSE FRIE
OF THE PRESENT CHIEF OF POLICE IN WHOM ALSO DESCRIBED IN PARA 3
REF B AS FRIEND OF T/I FAMILY. T/I WAS INVITED FOR DINNER
8 JULY. HE WANTED TO POSTPONE DEPARTURE UNTIL NEXT IRAN AIR
FLIGHT SO HE WOULD HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO REQUEST LETTER OF INTRO-
DUCTION AND RECOMMENDATION FROM SHIRAZI TO THE POLICE CHIEF
IN QOM.

2. T/I SAW NO PROBLEM IN MAKING HIS FIRST CAR PICK UP
ON 20 JULY AND WILL BE AT SITE.

3. FILE: 231-2961045. RM 2 199 DRV D90.1. ALL SECRET.

SECRET

S E C R E T 251653Z JUL 79 STAFF

28 JUL 79 18 12

CITE DIRECTOR 482379.

30: IMMEDIATE TEHRAN INFO FR/LOS ANGELES.

UNINTEL AJAJA FORRES SDTRANSIT

REFS: A. TEHRAN 53765
B. FR/LOS ANGELES 20581
C. TEHRAN 53506

1. SUBJECT REF A WHO CALLED IS SDTRANSIT/1. FOLLOWING WAS CONTACT PLAN:

A. TELEPHONE COMM: T/1 WILL CALL STATION OPER NUMBER 850399 EXT 800399 AND WILL SAY HE IS MIKE. THIS IS MIKE. CAN I SPEAK TO CHARLES. WHEN CHARLES COMES ON PHONE HE WILL EXCHANGE IDENTITIES AND THEN MENTION THEY SHOULD GET TOGETHER FOR COFFEE OR TEA. THE PLACE OF CONTACT WILL BE CAR PICKUP SITE LISTED BELOW. ANY OTHER PLACE MENTIONED BY EITHER PARTY IS MEANINGLESS AND SHOULD BE DISREGARDED BECAUSE IT IS ONLY FOR CONVERSATION PURPOSES. THE DATE/TIME CAN BE SUGGESTED BY EITHER PARTY AND WORKED OUT ON THE PHONE. NO MATTER WHAT AGREED, THE DATE TIME WILL BE TWO DAYS AND TWO HOURS PRIOR TO TIME AGREED UPON. I.E., IF IT AGREED MONDAY NIGHT AT 2200, THE CAR PICKUP WOULD BE SATURDAY NIGHT AT 2000 HOURS. IN EVENT STATION SHOULD WANT TO CALL T/1, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE PRE-ARRANGED BY SW OR AT PERSONAL MEETING. THE TIME OF CALL WILL BE BASED ON SAME TWO/TWO SYSTEM. IF T/1 IS ADVISED THAT HE WILL BE CALLED, DATE AND TIME MUST BE GIVEN. HE WILL ARRANGE TO BE AT HIS PARENTS HOME AT TIME CALL EXPECTED. THE NUMBER TO CALL IS IDEN A AND CALLER SHOULD ASK FOR IDEN A. IF CALL MADE IN PARSI.

B. CAR PICKUP: T/1 HAD REQUESTED THAT FIRST DAY OF HIS CAR PICKUP BE 20 JULY REY 20 JULY AT 2100 WITH ALTERNATE OF 2200 HOURS. IF THIS CONTACT NOT MADE HE WILL REVERT TO 15S AND 15TH OF EACH SUBSEQUENT MONTH. USING WESTERN CALENDAR. HIS WILL BE SAME CAR PICKUP SITE ALWAYS USING 2100 AND 2200 HOURS. HE WILL WAIT AT SITE FOR MAXIMUM OF TEN MINUTES. T/1 WILL

2 TEHRAN 53827 S E C R E T

30 JULY: T/I'S FAMILY HAD KNOWN FOR 24 HOURS THAT T/I WAS A MEMBER OF THE FEDAYAN (KHARIKS). NOTHING SPECIFIC ABOUT HIS ACTIVITIES. THEY DID NOT KNOW EXACTLY WHEN HE DIED. ALTHOUGH THEY DO NOT BELIEVE A VERDICT HAS BEEN DECLARED BY THE PASDARAN (REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS). T/I HIMSELF IS A SUPPORTER OF THE MUJAHEDIN, BUT FROM THESE FRIENDS TO ACCOMPANY THEM TO KURDISTAN TO SEE HOW THE FEDAYAN ARE SUPPORTING THE KURDISH REVOLUTION. C/O TOLD T/I THAT WE ARE RELUCTANT TO LOST CONTACT HIM FROM GOAL OF OBTAINING JOBS IN NIOC KURDISTAN. HOWEVER, COOPERATION BETWEEN THE KURDISH AND ARAB RE AN IMPORTANT REPORT, IF HE COULD ARRANGE IT WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH HIS EMPLOYMENT. T/I BELIEVES THAT HE CAN DO SO AND WILL REPORT THE FEDAYAN INVOLVED AND THEIR PLANS AT THE NEXT MEETING WOULD LAST ABOUT ONE WEEK AND COULD NOT TAKE PLACE BEFORE AUGUST. IN DISCUSSING THE TRIP, C/O LEFT T/I TO FURTHER HIMSELF.

5. FROM HIS BROTHER AT THE KOMITEH IN ABADAN ABOUT LABOR PROBLEMS AT NIOC. THE WORKERS CONCERNED ABOUT RATION PRIVILEGES FOR FOOD WHICH IN PAST YEARS, WHICH HAVE BEEN CANCELLED. COOPERATION WITH NIOC GUARD FORCE AND THE PASDARAN GUARDS. T/I WILL BE RETURNING TO ABADAN ON 2 AUGUST TO FINANCE (IDENTITY) BEFORE RETURNING TO TEHRAN. T/I EMPHASIZED THAT WE ARE VERY INTERESTED IN ALL THAT T/I'S BROTHER IN ABADAN AND THAT T/I SHOULD PASS ALL OF HIS BROTHER'S REMARKS ON LABOR PROBLEMS. LATER, T/I ALSO KNOWS AN ARAB SHEIKH, WHO WAS BOSS IN KURDISTAN IN THE SHAH'S ERA. C/O TOLD T/I INTERESTED IN LEARNING ABOUT ARAB ACTIVITIES AND PLANS, CONCENTRATING ON ARAB-PARSI POLITICAL RELATIONS.

6. FOR NEXT MEETING, SCHEDULED FOR 15 JULY, T/I WILL REPORT ON HIS STAFF AND PROSPECTS. T/I WILL MEET HIS BROTHER AT THE ABADAN KOMITEH, AND ON

9 OCT 79 12 58Z

C R E T 091206Z OCT 79 STAFF

BOON 84384

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO TEHRAN, ANKARA, ISTANBUL, C

INTEL AJAJA SDFICKLE

BOON 84384

1. SDFICKLE HAS RETURNED FROM HIS TRIP TO TURKISH
IRANIAN KURDISTAN. FELLHOUSE CONTACTED HIM ON THE EVENING
OCT 7 AND SET UP A DEBRIEFING SESSION FOR 9 OCT IN DUE
2. ONE OF THE REASONS SDFICKLE'S RETURN WAS DENIED
WAS THAT HE HAD BEEN ARRESTED BY IRANIAN (MILITARY)
AUTHORITIES IN SALMAZ
(SHAKHRI) AND DETAINED FOR FOUR DAYS. HE WAS ACCUSED
OF ILLEGALLY CROSSING THE TURKISH-IRANIAN BORDER AND FAILING
TO HAVE LEGAL DOCUMENTS. SDFICKLE SAID THAT HE HAD LEFT
IRAN FOR THE PURPOSE OF VISITING IN TURKEY. FORTUNATELY
THE LOCAL JUDGE AND THE AUTHORITIES
IN IRAN WERE KURDS AND FRIENDS OF SDFICKLE'S FATHER
BEFORE, LET HIM GO. A NEWS ITEM ENTITLED "SON OF CHAH
ARRESTED" APPEARED IN THE TEHRAN DAILY "KEMHAN," NO.
DATED 18 SEPT. WE ARE FORWARDING THE NEWSPAPER CLIP
CONCERNING SDFICKLE'S ARREST TO HQS VIA TM NUMBER 44.

3. RESULTS OF THE DEBRIEFING SESSION WILL BE
SOON AS POSSIBLE.

4. FILE# 056095L, RVN 09 OCT 79 DRV D.S.CI.
S E R E T

13 SEP 79

C C R E T 122304Z SEP 79 STAFF
TE DIRECTOR 912232.

PRIORITY WESTPORT WED PRIORITY GERMANY MUNICH.
UTIME TEHRAN. ANKARA

INTEL HYBAT AJAJA

P A. WESTPORT 48616
B. DIRECTOR 31148

1. FOLLOWING ARE INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR USE WITH SURJ
201-872561):

A. WHAT REPORT IF ANY ARE THERE OF KURDS GIVING THE
IRANIAN KURDISH GROUP THAT EFFECTS ARE THE KURDISH DISTURBANCES
HAVING ON THE IRAQI KURDISH COMMUNITY. SPECIFIC REPORTING ON IRAQI-
KURDISH OBJECTIVES FOR THE NEXT TWO YEARS IS OF INTEREST AND, IF
POSSIBLE, SOME KIND OF APPRAISAL OF HOW REALISTIC THESE OBJECTIVES
ARE AS WELL AS DETAILS OF KURDISH PLANS TO GOVERNMENT AUTONOMY, ETC.

B. OMITTING BARZANI'S, WOULD INCLUDE LIST AS WELL AS BIO
DATA OF ALL KDP LEADERS WE CAN PROVIDE.

C. SOURCE'S COMMENTS ON POSSIBILITY THAT BARZANI AND
TALABANI FACTIONS WILL MERGE, PLUS DETAILS OF ANY RECENT MEETINGS
BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS AND A RUN DOWN OF ANY POSSIBLE SUPPORT THEY
MAY BE EXTENDING TO EACH OTHER.

D. DETAILS OF ANY POSSIBLE LIAISON BETWEEN THE KDP AND
THE IRAQI SHI'A GROUPS.

E. DETAILS ON NUMBER OF KURDISH FORCES, WHERE CAMPS ARE
LOCATED AND COMMENTS ON HOW WELL ARMED THEY ARE, AS WELL AS ANY INFO
THEY GETTING OUTSIDE SUPPORT AND IF SO WHAT TYPE.

F. WHAT IF ANY SUPPORT ARE THE KDP OR TALABANI FACTIONS
GETTING FROM THE KURDI GOVERNMENT.

G. DETAILS PLUS DOCUMENTATION OF CHARGES THAT SOVIETS ARE

SECURITY TO 120800Z SEP 79 STAFF

SECRETARY 1219

DIRECTOR.

INTEL LWSHELL ORGOLSTER

2 DIRECTOR 51 173

1. WE CANNOT RECALL SEEING INTEL REPORT OF SOVIET MATERIAL
SUPPORT FOR THE PANIAN KURE'S ALLUDE TO PARA SIX REF. REQUEST
HOW REPORTING F IDENTIFIED FOR US AND MAY BE HERE IF NOT ALREADY
SENT.

2. CREDIBLE REPORTING OF SUCH SUPPORT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE
IDEAL FOR USE WITH SDPLOD/1. IF NOT REPORTING WITH KURE IS
NOT IMMINENT, MATERIAL MIGHT BE USED IN HANDLING
FOR ATTRIBUTION WITH SDURN/1, SDORCH/1 OR SDTRAMP/1.

3. NO FILE. RWV 15SEP99 DRV 90
SECRET

19 SEP 79 10U 22Z

S E C R E T 09 5Z SEP 79 STAFF

CITE ISTANBUL 33 765

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, ANKARA, STOCKHOLM INFO TEMP
UNINTEL INTEL

1. BASE REQUEST ANY AVAILABLE HQS AND ADDEE INFO
RECENT ESTABLISHMENT IN STOCKHOLM OF A KURDISH ASSOCIATION
AS SPOKESMAN FOR KURDISH SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS IN TURKEY
IRAN. BASE IS CURRENTLY PREPARING INTEL DISSEM ON
TO THIS ASSOCIATION AND WOULD APPRECIATE INFO ASAP.

2. NO FILE FROM 9 SEP 79 DRV D9C3 ALL SECRET
S E C R E T

24 SEP 79 7 22

C R T 262349Z SEP 79 STAFF

DIRECTOR 523487

ANYARA, TEHRAN.

WELL AJAJA RTWINNER INTEL

1. HQS CURRENTLY LOOKING FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON
SIBLE SUPPORT OF KURDISH AND OTHER MINORITIES IN IRAN WHO
AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE. WE CONTEMPLATING POSSIBLE
ION TO EXPLOIT SUCH SUPPORT. HOWEVER, AS THIS IS DEFINITELY
EDGED SWORD SITUATION, WE INVITE STATIONS COMMENTS/OPINION.
POLICY AUTHORITY IS CONTAINED IN PERSPECTIVES ON SOVIET
REFERENCE IN OTHER COUNTRIES' AFFAIRS. AND NO NEW PRESIDENTIAL
ING WOULD BE REQUIRED.

2. NO FILE. RVM 28SEPT99 DRW D90.3 ALL SECRET

C R T

75

LEADER FOR THE TRAINING OF THE OFFICERS AND THEIR DEPENDENT IRAQ, AS HE IS STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ. GENERAL MOBASSER IS THINKING OF SENDING COLONEL HASSEIN SAH AIN U, A PARATROOPER AND THE FORMER COMMANDER OF AN ANTI-TERROR GROUP IN THE GROUND FORCES, TO BE ONE OF THE TRAINERS. COLONEL SHAMLOU IS AN IRANIAN OFFICER WHO RECENTLY WENT TO LONDON FROM IRAN. (SOURCE COMMENT: BECAUSE HE WAS SO EASILY KEPT TO LEAVE IRAN, COLONEL SHAMLOU IS SUSPECTED OF COOPERATING WITH THE NEW REGIME. ONLY AFTER HE HAS BEEN CLEARED OF SUSPICION OF CO-OPERATION WITH THE FORCES OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI WILL HE BE INTRODUCED TO THE KURDISH LEADER.)

3. BECAUSE OF THE URGENT NEED FOR THE UNITY OF KURDS, THE KURDISH LEADER HAD TO JOIN THE KURDISH DEMOCRATIC PARTY (KDP). HE HAS DEMANDED THAT HE BECOME HEAD OF THE KURDISH MOVEMENT, HOWEVER, AND THAT THE SDP JOIN HIM. HE HAS ALSO REQUESTED THE FORMATION OF A NEW INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN LONDON IN ORDER TO OBTAIN SUFFICIENT INFORMATION FOR FIGHTING THE ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT. AFTER HIS ARMY IS TRAINED AND HE HAS BEEN PROVIDED WITH SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO INITIATE AN ATTACK AGAINST THE KHOMEINI REGIME, HE BELIEVES THAT A SIMULTANEOUS ATTACK SHOULD TAKE PLACE THROUGHOUT IRAN, OR AT LEAST IN SEVERAL PROVINCES. (SOURCE COMMENT: GENERAL MOBASSER THINKS THE KURDISH LEADER IS TRYING TO PLAY THE ROLE OF THE LATE MULLAH MUSTAFA SADEGH QAZVINI BY ATTEMPTING TO OBTAIN THE SUPPORT OF A WESTERN GOVERNMENT.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: SENT TO TEHRAN, LONDON, PARIS, ANKARA, ISTANBUL.

5. WASHINGTON DISSEM: TO STATE, EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, INR
TO DIA, EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, DIA
REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NO RELEASE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACT CONSULTANTS. DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR. DISSEMINATIONS DRN DEC 1 CLASSIFIED BY REPORTED REPORTING OFFICER. PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

#68

2 Nov 79 362

0 P S M C E T UMBRA 020246Z NOV 79 SPECIAL CHANNELS

IR SCWASHINGTON 36594.

SCTEHRAN.

TEL BYTEL

LOWING PUBLISHED AS 3/AA/05173

IRAQI MILITARY ATTACHE, LONDON

M.O.D., BAGHDAD

TRD: ARCA/IRIS; ROME

FROM 'AYED I) TO 'ALI (E)

SHAPUR BAKHTIAR HAS SENT HIS COUSIN RUSTAM BAKHTIAR TO
ON TO MEET SIRDAR (I) TO DISCUSS THE MATTER OF THE CONTACT
HE TOOK PLACE WITH BAKHTIAR ON THE PART OF BARZAN (I)
THIS MEETING OF BAKHTIAR BY BARZAN TOOK PLACE ONE DAY AFTER
MEETING WITH BAKHTIAR.
THE MEETING WITH BARZAN LASTED THREE HOURS. AND BARZAN
WENT TO FACILITATE BAKHTIAR'S MISSION IN EVERY WAY
BAKHTIAR AGREED TO TAKE THIRTY OFFICERS WITH HIM TO IRAQ.
HE WILL LEAVE FOR IRAQ DURING THE NEXT TEN DAYS.

NOTE (1) NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED.
(1) POSSIBLY WAS 'UD BARZAN, HEAD OF KURDISAN DEMOCRATIC
PARTY OF IRAN. RWL @NOV 9 DRV GISR ALL TOP SECRET

0 P S M C E T UMBRA